¶ 53 Thus far, Illinois courts have characterized the following, in addition to typical modes of transportation, as common carriers: owners of buildings with elevators (Springer v. Ford, 189 Ill. 430, 434 (1901)); a scenic railway at an amusement resort (O'Callaghan v. Dellwood Park Co., 242 Ill. 336, 345 (1909)); a merry-go-round (Arndt v. Riverview Park Co., 259 Ill.App. 210, 21617 (1930)); a taxicab (Metz v. Yellow Cab Co., 248 Ill.App. 609, 612 (1928)); and a Ferris wheel (Pajak v. Mamsch, 338 Ill.App. 337, 341 (1949)).
" Zerjal, 405 Ill. App. 3d at 912.¶ 19 In determining whether a defendant is a common carrier that owes the highest degree of care in transporting its passengers, the courts have characterized the following as common carriers: owners of buildings with elevators (Rotheli, 7 Ill. 2d at 177); a scenic railway at an amusement resort, where "steep inclines, sharp curves, and great speed necessarily are sources of peril" (O'Callaghan, 242 Ill. at 344); a merry-go-round (Arndt v. Riverview Park Co., 259 Ill. App. 210, 216-17 (1930)); a taxicab (Metz v. Yellow Cab Co., 248 Ill. App. 609, 612 (1928)); and a Ferris wheel (Pajak v. Mamsch, 338 Ill. App. 337, 341 (1949)).¶ 20 In finding that an escalator was not a common carrier, the Illinois Supreme Court in Tolman found it significant that a person on an escalator may actively participate in the transportation in a manner similar to the use of a stairway and may contribute to his own safety.
Those jurisdictions which have held amusement park operators to a higher standard of care include: Neubauer v. Disneyland, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 672 (C.D. Calif. 1995) (holding that amusement park rides fall within definition of common carrier); Lyons v. Wagers, 404 S.W.2d 270 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1966) (operator of amusement ride owes his patrons same degree of care owed by common carrier to its passengers, which is the highest degree of care); Lewis v. Buckskin Joe's, Inc., 396 P.2d 933 (Colo. 1964) (operator of amusement park's stage-coach ride held to highest duty of care); Pajak v Mamsch, 87 N.E.2d 147 (Ill. App.Ct. 1949) (court acknowledges that operator of ferris wheel held to highest degree of care, equivalent to that of common carrier); Coaster Amusement Co. v. Smith, 194 So. 336 (Fla. 1940) (operator of roller coaster held to highest degree of care equivalent to that of common carrier); Bibeau v. Fred W. Pearce Corp., 217 N.W. 374 (Minn. 1928) (operator of roller coaster held to highest degree of care equivalent to that of common carrier); Cooper v. Winnwood Amusement Co., 55 S.W.2d 737 (Mo.Ct.App. 1932) (operator of roller coaster held to the highest degree of care equivalent to that of common carrier); Sands Springs Park v. Schrader, 198 P. 983 (Okla.
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 110, par. 68.1(2). Clifford v. Schaefer (1969), 105 Ill. App.2d 233, 247; Foster v.Union Starch Refining Co. (1956), 11 Ill. App.2d 346; Lipscomb v. Coppage (1963), 44 Ill. App.2d 430; Pajak v. Mamsch (1949), 338 Ill. App. 337. The judgment is affirmed.
While it is true, as plaintiff's counsel points out, that a post trial motion need not specify errors in detail, the motion must nonetheless indicate the grounds upon which the litigant relies with sufficient particularly to afford the trial judge identity of the error relied upon. Osborne v. Leonard (1968), 99 Ill. App.2d 391, 240 N.E.2d 769 cited by plaintiff is not authority for a complete omission of the alleged errors in the post trial motion. See also Krug v. Armour and Co. (1940), 335 Ill. App. 222, 80 N.E.2d 386 and Pajak v. Mamsch (1949), 338 Ill. 337, 87 N.E. 147. The defendant called one Richard Beinlich as an expert witness.
The defendant answers plaintiff's contentions by arguing: (1) that the post-trial motion did not specifically and with particularity present defense objections above set forth and, thus, they are waived; (2) that the plaintiff did not preserve the errors by making timely trial objections; and that (3) the errors were not prejudicial because the issue of liability was not presented to the jury. [1, 2] We have read plaintiff's post-trial motion and we find that it indicates the grounds upon which plaintiff relies with sufficient particularity to afford the trial court identity of the error relied upon. It has been held that a post-trial motion need not specify errors in detail to qualify under section 68.1 of the Practice Act. Tabor v. Tazewell Service Co., 18 Ill. App.2d 593, 153 N.E.2d 98; Pajak v. Mamsch, 338 Ill. App. 337, 87 N.E.2d 147. [3] Regarding defendant's second point, we have referred to the record and we find that plaintiff made numerous timely objections to defendant's activities.
Taylor v. Hughes, 17 Ill. App.2d 138, 144, 149 N.E.2d 393. The reasons for such a rule were well stated by Mr. Justice Friend in his opinion in Pajak v. Mamsch, 338 Ill. App. 337, at page 344, 87 N.E.2d 147: Reviewing courts are constantly being asked to reverse judgments of trial judges for alleged error in the giving or refusing of instructions where, in many instances, the particular instructions criticized on appeal were not called to the attention of the trial judge so as to enable him to correct any error that he may have committed. . . . It places an unfair burden upon the trial judge to require him to examine the numerous instructions frequently given, with a view of determining whether any of them were erroneous.
A trial judge should have an opportunity to appraise the errors which are asserted to have taken place. It is unfair to charge him with errors in a reviewing court without having brought them to his attention so that a new trial could have been granted if he found it advisable. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Johnson, 191 Ill. 594; Pajak v. Mamsch, 338 Ill. App. 337."
Prior to the decisions in Saunders v. Schultz, 20 Ill.2d 301, 170 N.E.2d 163, and Onderisin v. Elgin, J. E. Ry. Co., 20 Ill. App.2d 73, 155 N.E.2d 338, it was held that the instructions must be identified and specified in the post-trial motion. Krug v. Armour Co., 335 Ill. App. 222, 80 N.E.2d 386; Pajak v. Mamsch, 338 Ill. App. 337, 87 N.E.2d 147; Rudolph v. City of Chicago, 2 Ill. App.2d 370, 119 N.E.2d 528; Dodds v. C.T.A., 9 Ill. App.2d 388, 132 N.E.2d 816; Foster v. Union Starch Refining Co., 11 Ill. App.2d 346, 137 N.E.2d 499. In Tabor v. Tazewell Service Co., 18 Ill. App.2d 593, 153 N.E.2d 98, the plaintiff in his post-trial motion had objected to certain instructions given by the court. It was contended that the question of the propriety of those instructions was not properly before the reviewing court because the instructions were not sufficiently identified, nor were there any grounds in support of the objections stated, and therefore the post-trial motion failed to meet the requirements of section 68.1 of the Civil Practice Act.
A trial judge should have an opportunity to appraise the errors which are asserted to have taken place. It is unfair to charge him with errors in a reviewing court without having brought them to his attention so that a new trial could have been granted if he found it advisable. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Johnson, 191 Ill. 594; Pajak v. Mamsch, 338 Ill. App. 337. We will, therefore, consider only the errors which were particularly specified in the post-trial motion.