Paiwich v. Krieswalis

22 Citing cases

  1. Testa v. Carrolls Hamburger System, Inc.

    154 Conn. 294 (Conn. 1966)   Cited 21 times

    Indeed, where 52-212 is an appropriate remedy, as in the instant case, and is utilized, it is extremely doubtful whether the same basic issue can be relitigated in a proceeding under 52-270. Id., 195; see also Paiwich v. Krieswalis, 97 Conn. 123, 126, 115 A. 720. We now turn to the material facts of this case.

  2. Kuser v. Orkis

    169 Conn. 66 (Conn. 1975)   Cited 30 times
    Concluding that no new issues of fact were raised when the only new fact alleged in plaintiff's amendment to the complaint was that the child at issue in the paternity suit had been born on a specified date, and the only answer filed by the defendant in response was "not guilty"

    If any doubt remained as to the court's jurisdiction over the defendant, it was removed by the two general appearances which he entered first on December 10, 1963, and again on December 8, 1965. By his general appearances he submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Practice Book, Form No. 527; Fine v. Wencke, 117 Conn. 683, 684, 169 A. 58; see Beardsley v. Beardsley, 144 Conn. 725, 729, 137 A.2d 752; Pavlick v. Meriden Trust Safe Deposit Co., 139 Conn. 733, 737, 97 A.2d 265; Paiwich v. Krieswalis, 97 Conn. 123, 127, 115 A. 720; Stephenson, Conn. Civ. Proc. (2d Ed.) 4, 53. The defendant, by way of several assignments of error, claims that 52-443 as it read in 1963 and as it remains substantially unchanged is unconstitutional in that it violates the thirteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States prohibiting involuntary servitude, and also violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment and the corresponding sections of article first, 8, 9, 10, 12, of the constitution of Connecticut in that it makes an arbitrary distinction in denying to defendants in paternity proceedings privileges which are allowed to other prisoners on civil process.

  3. Jaquith v. Revson

    159 Conn. 427 (Conn. 1970)   Cited 63 times
    Upholding court's refusal to grant motion to open because defendant did not set forth facts showing that her “history of illness and cause for seclusion” was reasonable cause for not complying with court order

    But the orderly administration of justice requires that relief be denied unless the moving party alleges and shows reasonable cause for relief under the statute. Lundborg v. Salvatore, 148 Conn. 435, 438, 171 A.2d 400; Gryskiewicz v. Morgan, supra; Paiwich v. Krieswalis, 97 Conn. 123, 125, 115 A. 720. Such relief ordinarily should not be granted if the failure to comply with an order of the court resulted from the moving party's own negligence. While the defendant's motion to open the judgment of nonsuit recites her history of illness and cause for seclusion as the reason for her failing to comply with the court order, it failed to set forth facts showing reasonable cause for not complying with the court order or that she was prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause from complying.

  4. Culetsu v. Dix

    181 A.2d 116 (Conn. 1962)   Cited 14 times

    A default may properly be entered against a defendant for nonappearance. Practice Book 47; Automotive Twins, Inc. v. Klein, 138 Conn. 28, 33, 82 A.2d 146. Patrignelli's default amounted to an admission of his liability. Paiwich v. Krieswalis, 97 Conn. 123, 125, 115 A. 720, and cases cited. The entry of the default did not constitute a judgment but rather was an order which precluded Patrignelli from making any further defense in the case so far as his liability was concerned.

  5. Jenkins v. Bishop Apartments, Inc.

    144 Conn. 389 (Conn. 1957)   Cited 52 times

    He neglected to take advantage of the remedy afforded by General Statutes 7963 by filing a motion to open the judgment within the time prescribed. Jacobson v. Robington, 139 Conn. 532, 536, 95 A.2d 66; Paiwich v. Krieswalis, 97 Conn. 123, 125, 115 A. 720. Furthermore, he did not list the defendant's claim for rent in the schedules filed with his petition in bankruptcy. This is prerequisite to securing a discharge of the claim by bankruptcy proceedings unless it can be shown that the creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy.

  6. Jacobson v. Robington

    139 Conn. 532 (Conn. 1953)   Cited 30 times
    In Jacobson, the defendant appealed from a judgment of foreclosure by sale rendered against him following the entry of a default for failure to appear.

    General Statutes 7805. The effect of the entry of the default was to preclude her from making any defense in the action. Paiwich v. Krieswalis, 97 Conn. 123, 125, 115 A. 720. The judgment of foreclosure upon that default necessarily followed. Except where a judgment has been obtained by fraud or where an application is made on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, the power of a court to open a judgment after default is controlled by 7963 of the General Statutes, which reads: "Any judgment rendered or decree passed upon a default or nonsuit in the superior court, the court of common pleas or any municipal court may be set aside, within four months succeeding the date on which it was rendered or passed . . . upon the complaint or written motion of any party or person prejudiced thereby, showing reasonable cause, or that a good defense in whole or in part existed at the time of the rendition of such judgment or the passage of such decree, and that the defendant was prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause from appearing to make the same."

  7. Cutting v. Yudkin

    79 A.2d 823 (Conn. 1951)   Cited 2 times

    The period of forty-eight hours measures the length of the statutory stay of execution and not a limitation on the jurisdiction of the court to allow the writ of error. Casner v. Resnik, 95 Conn. 281, 283, 111 A. 68; Webb v. Ambler, 125 Conn. 543, 547, 7 A.2d 228; Paiwich v. Krieswalis, 97 Conn. 123, 128, 115 A. 720; Brodner v. Swirsky, 86 Conn. 32, 35, 84 A. 104; see Conn. App. Proc. 135. Aside from the fact that it appears upon the face of the statute that the forty-eight-hour provision relates only to a stay of execution, there are two other considerations which make it plain that it is not intended to be a statute of limitations. The first of these is that it applies only to the cases in which the judgment in the trial court ran against the defendant.

  8. Barton v. Barton

    196 A. 141 (Conn. 1937)   Cited 12 times

    Even where a judgment of default is based upon a failure to make entry of appearance, the judgment may not be opened unless the defendant was prevented from appearing by accident, mistake or other reasonable cause. General Statutes, 5649; Paiwich v. Krieswalis, 97 Conn. 123, 125, 115 A. 720. As the trial court stated in its conclusion, an application to open a judgment by default, unless at least it is based on a pure error of law, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and we cannot hold that the trial court in this instance did not exercise a proper discretion in denying the motion. Jartman v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co., 69 Conn. 355, 362, 37 A. 970; White's Appeal, 75 Conn. 314, 319, 53 A. 582; Carrington v. Muhlfeld, 122 Conn. 334, 337, 189 A. 184.

  9. Went v. Schmidt

    117 Conn. 257 (Conn. 1933)   Cited 23 times

    "A default in an action for legal relief admits the material facts declared on as constituting a cause of action, and that, if these do constitute a cause of action, the plaintiff has a right to recover at least nominal damages." Starr Cash Package Car. Co. v. Starr, 69 Conn. 440, 446, 37 A. 1057; Paiwich v. Krieswalis, 97 Conn. 123, 125, 115 A. 720; Gallup v. Jeffery Co., 86 Conn. 308, 311, 85 A. 374; Fox v. Hoyt, 12 Conn. 491, 498. "The defendants, by their omission to deny them, are held to have admitted the truth of all well pleaded material allegations in the declaration, and the consequent right of the plaintiff to judgment for a limited sum, that is, for nominal damages and costs, without the introduction of evidence. This is the extent of the advantage gained by the plaintiff from that admission; if he is not satisfied with nominal, and seeks greater damages, he must proceed to prove the amount, and the declaration, so far forth as the increased amount is concerned, remains subject to the rules of pleading and evidence, and the proof must follow the allegations as closely as if the case stood upon the general issue. If therefore, in proving the greater damages, the plaintiff proves that they resulted entirely from a wrong which he has not declared upon, this evidence forces him back to the nominal judgment.

  10. Reilly v. Antonio Pepe Co.

    143 A. 568 (Conn. 1928)   Cited 50 times

    No further citations are necessary to show that the mere appearance of the final certificates of dissolution upon the record in this case, even if we regard them as properly filed and proven, does not conclusively establish that the court was without jurisdiction or that this action could not be maintained. Miller v. Newberg Orrel Coal Co., 31 W. Va. 836, 8 S.E. 600. A motion to erase the case from the docket will only be granted when it clearly appears from the record that the court is without jurisdiction; Paiwich v. Krieswalis, 97 Conn. 123, 115 A. 720; Norton v. Shore Line Electric Ry. Co., 84 Conn. 24, 32, 78 A. 587; Halliday v. Collins Co., 73 Conn. 314, 318, 47 A. 321; Cocking v. Greenslit, 71 Conn. 650, 651, 42 A. 1000; Wheeler v. New York, N. H. H.R. Co., 70 Conn. 326, 328, 39 A. 443; and, like a plea in abatement, such a motion will not be aided by intendment or inference. New York, N. H. H.R. Co. v. Illy, 79 Conn. 526, 529, 65 A. 965. We have discussed the motion upon the defendant's assumption that the certificates of dissolution were a proper part of the record.