Our cases have adopted the position of the Restatement and have held a landowner liable when he creates or maintains structures or other artificial conditions which he should realize involve an unreasonable risk to those who foreseeably deviate from the highway. Chickering v. Thompson, 76 N.H. 311, 82 A. 839 (1912); White v. Suncook Mills, 91 N.H. 92, 13 A.2d 729 (1940); Paine v. Hampton Beach Improvement Co., 98 N.H. 359, 100 A.2d 906 (1953). The plaintiff's position is not that the defendants were under a duty to remove the tree that originally stood near the highway, apparently recognizing that the rule imposing liability on a landowner to travelers on the highway extends only to artificial conditions.

The plaintiff points to only one case in which a change of level from a public sidewalk down to the defendant's property subjected a landowner to potential liability. In Paine v. Hampton Beach Improvement Co., 98 N.H. 359, 100 A.2d 906 (1953), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the possessor of the property adjacent to the sidewalk where the drop off was six or seven inches, where the adjacent land had been cemented, and where the cement construction created by the defendant was "alike in color, texture, and material" to the elevated public sidewalk running next to it. In that case, it was undisputed that the defendant had created an "artificial condition."

"[I]t is well settled in this jurisdiction that an involuntary or accidental entry upon the land of another is not a trespass." Paine v. Hampton Beach Imp. Co., 98 N.H. 359, 363-64 (1953) (internal quotations and citations omitted). That said, "[t]he intent with which tort liability is concerned is not necessarily a hostile intent, or a desire to do any harm.

See Ryder v. Robinson, 107 N.E.2d 803, 804-05 (Mass. 1952) (where fence fell on plaintiff child after being struck with rock, jury could believe contact with fence was inadvertent and not a trespass); Paine v. Hampton Beach Improvement Co., 100 A.2d 906, 910 (N.H. 1953) (where plaintiff fell down on defendant's land on drop-off next to public sidewalk, plaintiff would not be considered trespasser because entry onto defendant's land was involuntary or accidental). These decisions do not help plaintiffs in this case because, following the Restatement rule, we have held that a person is a trespasser even if the entry on land was inadvertent.

We first consider the plaintiffs' exception to the nonsuit granted to the defendant Dover Shopping Plaza. The issue here is whether there was evidence to sustain a finding that this defendant breached any duty which it owed to the plaintiff. Cote v. Litawa, 96 N.H. 174, 176; Gossler v. Miller, 107 N.H. 303, 305. This in turn depends on whether the Shopping Plaza had the right to control, or maintained or exercised any control, over the automatic door. Black v. Fiandaca, 98 N.H. 33, 35; Paine v. Hampton Beach c. Co., 98 N.H. 359, 364. The basis of the plaintiffs' claim was that the malfunctioning of the door, which was electrically activated and hydraulically operated, was caused by lack of due maintenance.

The Court could properly find that this would probably aid the jury. Paine v. Hampton Beachc. Co., 98 N.H. 359, 366. The plaintiff was not prejudiced by the exhibit.

See Dowd v. Portsmouth Hospital, 105 N.H. 53. This duty however related only to the premises which the decedent possessed or over which she had control. Gosslet v. Miller, 107 N.H. 303; Paine v. Hampton Beach c. Co., 98 N.H. 359, 364; Morin v. Manchester Housing Authority, 105 N.H. 138, 139; see Restatement (Second), Torts, s. 349; Restatement (Second), Agency, s. 497, comment c. As to the abutting street, the decedent's duties were confined to exercising reasonable care to see that activities conducted on her premises, or conditions allowed to exist thereon, posed no threat to users of the public way. Gossler v. Miller, supra; Abell v. Company, 95 N.H. 439; Montrone v. Archambault, 99 N.H. 179; MacLean v. Parkwood, Inc., 354 F.2d 770 (1st Cir. 1966).

We do not believe it must be held the Court abused its discretion in finding that the trooper's opinion might aid the jury. Dowling v. Shattuck, 91 N.H. 234; Paine v. Hampton Beach c. Co., 98 N.H. 359, 365-366. The defendant's exception to the admission of this testimony is therefore overruled.

The New Hampshire court has reaffirmed the principle that an involuntary or accidental entry upon the land of another is not a trespass. White v. Suncook Mills (1940), 91 N.H. 92, 13 A.2d 729; Paine v. Hampton Beach Improvement Co. (1953), 98 N.H. 359, 100 A.2d 906. In Edgarton v. H.P. Welch Co. (1947), 321 Mass. 603, 74 N.E.2d 674, the plaintiff's intestate was riding on a truck driven by another.

It is established law in this jurisdiction that the owner or possessor of premises bordering a public highway or sidewalk is under a duty to prevent artificial conditions on his land from being unreasonably dangerous to travelers upon an adjoining highway. Chickering v. Thompson, 76 N.H. 311; Paine v. Hampton Beach c. Co., 98 N.H. 359; Restatement, Torts, s. 358. There was no evidence in this case that the area which had been fenced in was in the exclusive possession of the defendant's tenant. On the contrary, it could be found from the evidence that the defendant exercised control over the grounds of the project and retained possession of them for the common use of its tenants.