"`The answer to all complaints from the appellant, on the score of delay (in making a tender of the purchase price of land), is that he had it in his power at any time to hasten the action of the respondent by tendering a full performance on his own part, and if the respondent refused to comply with the decree, the court, on motion, would have ordered him to perform within a specified time, on pain of having the decree set aside.'" (See also Koshaba v. Koshaba, 56 Cal.App.2d 302, 312 [ 132 P.2d 854]; Kent v. Superior Court, 106 Cal.App.2d 593, 595 [ 235 P.2d 420]; Priebatsch v. Third Baptist Church, 66 Miss. 345 [6 So. 237]; Midland Coal Lumber Co. v. Ferguson, 61 Mont. 402 [202 P. 389, 391]; First National Trust Savings Bank v. Cerveny, 93 Cal.App.2d 255, 259 [ 208 P.2d 1018]; Pailhe v. Pailhe, 113 Cal.App.2d 53, 64 [ 247 P.2d 838]; Connell v. Crawford, 92 Cal.App. 715, 719 [ 268 P. 948]; Potomac Oil Co. v. Dye, 14 Cal.App. 674, 679 [ 113 P. 126].) [4] In Klinker v. Klinker, 132 Cal.App.2d 687, 694 [ 283 P.2d 83], the court appropriately said:
[9] It is a well established principle that once the jurisdiction of a court of equity is invoked, it has the power to pass on all questions raised which affect the parties before it. ( Hannah v. Wahlberg, 128 Cal. 407, 410 [ 60 P. 1035]; Rossi v. Rossi, 134 Cal.App.2d 639, 642 [ 286 P.2d 563]; Beeler v. Plastic Stamping, Inc., 144 Cal.App.2d 306, 309 [ 300 P.2d 852]; Pailhe v. Pailhe, 113 Cal.App.2d 53, 64 [ 247 P.2d 838].) [8b] The corporation was named as a party defendant in the complaint.
This, of course, was offered for the purpose of rebutting motive by bolstering defendant's testimony that at the time the fire occurred he did not know that he had insurance. Defendant cites Estate of Carson, 184 Cal. 437, 445 [ 194 P. 5, 17 A.L.R. 239]; Kelly v. Bank of America, 112 Cal.App.2d 388, 394 [ 246 P.2d 92, 34 A.L.R.2d 578]; People v. Hewlett, 108 Cal.App.2d 358, 377-378 [ 239 P.2d 150]; Pailhe v. Pailhe, 113 Cal.App.2d 53, 63 [ 247 P.2d 838]; Estate of Doran, 138 Cal.App.2d 541, 553 [ 292 P.2d 655]; People v. Teitelbaum, 163 Cal.App.2d 184, 215 [ 329 P.2d 157]; and Mueller v. Marshall, 166 Cal.App.2d 367, 370 [ 333 P.2d 260], in support of his contention that such statement to his wife was admissible in evidence. Citations contained in those cases lead also to Whitlow v. Durst, 20 Cal.2d 523 [ 127 P.2d 530]; People v. Alcalde, 24 Cal.2d 177 [ 148 P.2d 627]; People v. Weatherford, 27 Cal.2d 401, 421 [ 164 P.2d 753]; People v. Chenault, 74 Cal.App.2d 487 [ 169 P.2d 29]; Sandoval v. Southern Cal. Enterprises, Inc., 98 Cal.App.2d 240 [ 219 P.2d 928]; People v. One 1948 Chevrolet Conv. Coupe, 45 Cal.2d 613, 620 [11a] [ 290 P.2d 538, 55 A.L.R.2d 1272]; People v. Silver, 16 Cal.2d 714, 723 [9] [ 108 P.2d 4], and People v. Fong Sing, 38 Cal.App. 253, 258 [ 175 P. 911].
[7] Such self-serving declarations are admissible to show the state of mind of the grantor, or donor, or testator at the time of execution of an instrument, his susceptibility to influence and relation to those around him and the beneficiaries. ( American Trust Co. v. Fitzmaurice, 131 Cal.App.2d 382 [ 280 P.2d 545]; Cox v. Schnerr, 172 Cal. 371 [ 156 P. 509]; Kelly v. Bank of America, 112 Cal.App.2d 388 [ 246 P.2d 92, 34 A.L.R.2d 578]; Pailhe v. Pailhe, 113 Cal.App.2d 53 [ 247 P.2d 838]; Piercy v. Piercy, 18 Cal.App. 751 [ 124 P. 561].) "`". . . when the intention or state of mind of the alleged donor is involved, evidence of declarations made by him before or after the transaction is admissible though the declarations were not made in the presence of the adverse party.
[7b] The trial court was entitled to draw from this evidence an inference that there never was an oral agreement to divide the property fifty-fifty, as claimed by the defendant and that Mrs. Lord never intended to make a gift of it to him. ( Pailhe v. Pailhe, 113 Cal.App.2d 53, 63 [ 247 P.2d 838], and cases cited; American Trust Co. v. Fitzmaurice, 131 Cal.App.2d 382, 386 [ 280 P.2d 545]; Donlon v. Donlon, 140 Cal.App.2d 428 [ 295 P.2d 51]; Schindler v. Schindler, 126 Cal.App.2d 597, 602 [ 272 P.2d 566].) No prejudical error appears in the reception of evidence and no miscarriage of justice has resulted.
" (Emphasis added.) [3] Referring to the record before this court on the former appeal as we are authorized to do ( Estate of Bruce, 27 Cal.App.2d 44, 51 [ 80 P.2d 82]; Gackstetter v. Market St. Railway Co., 10 Cal.App.2d 713, 716 [ 52 P.2d 998]; Hammell v. Britton, 19 Cal.2d 72, 75 [ 119 P.2d 333]; Pailhe v. Pailhe, 113 Cal.App.2d 53, 66 [ 247 P.2d 838], we find one of the objections urged therein was that, "Certain items of property were received by the guardian but were neither shown upon the inventory nor accounted for nor returned to the ward. These items include: (a) One trunk and its contents, now in the possession of Jewel Giroux.
Without the allegation required by section 581 and proof thereof, appellant could not possibly have made a recovery of the property. (See Pailhe v. Pailhe, 113 Cal.App.2d 53 [ 247 P.2d 838].) Furthermore, the original complaint did not contain an allegation alleging that the administratrix was seeking recovery of the rents, profits, and issues of the property of decedent, as she would be entitled to do under section 581, supra, until the time of settlement of the estate.
[13] Where equity has acquired jurisdiction for one purpose, it will retain that jurisdiction to the final adjustment of all differences between the parties arising from the causes of action alleged. ( Pailhe v. Pailhe, 113 Cal.App.2d 53, 64-65 [ 247 P.2d 838]; First Nat. T. S. Bank v. Cerveny, 93 Cal.App.2d 255, 258-9 [ 208 P.2d 1018]; Murphy v. Sheftel, 121 Cal.App. 533, 541 [ 9 P.2d 568]; Vallera v. Vallera, 64 Cal.App.2d 266, 270-271 [ 148 P.2d 694]; McAuliff v. McFadden, 42 Cal.App. 505, 512 [ 183 P. 870].) [14] Where a court has taken jurisdiction of a suit in equity it may determine all legal as well as equitable issues in order to completely dispose of the matters in controversy.
[9] It happens, however, that we may take judicial notice of the record in the other action, upon the same basis that we took judicial notice of another action in Estate of McSweeney, supra, 107 Cal.App.2d 140, 142-144. In the instant case the record in the other action appears in the record upon Rene Pailhe's appeal to this court from the judgment rendered in that action, identified as Civil No. 15,056 upon the files of this court, decided September 12, 1952, and reported in Pailhe v. Pailhe, 113 Cal.App.2d 53 [ 247 P.2d 838]. Our examination of that record convinces us there was a sufficient basis in the evidence for the order in question.
In Leathers v. Leathers, 77 Cal.App.2d 134, 174 P.2d 875, the court set aside a bill of sale of farm machinery given by a mother to her son, holding that the son's fraudulent representation that the bill of sale was mere security to protect him against loss on a lease in case she died, constituted undue influence, and overcame the mother's will. There are numerous authorities holding that the procuring of a conveyance, under the circumstances detailed here, is a constructive fraud. Nobles v. Hutton, 7 Cal.App. 14, 93 P. 289; Johnson v. Clark, 7 Cal.2d 529, 61 P.2d 767; Pailhe v. Pailhe, 113 Cal.App.2d 53, 247 P.2d 838; Wells Fargo Bank Union Trust Co. v. Brady, 116 Cal.App.2d 381, 254 P.2d 71; Annotation 112 A.L.R. 687; 26 C.J.S., Deeds, § 21 b, pages 196-197; § 57 c (2), page 281; § 58; 16 Am.Jur., Deeds, § 32. True, Mrs. Bistline obtained the approval of both grantors before delivering the deed.