Opinion
No. CV 05-4004373 S
November 1, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This is a decision on the plaintiff's motion to strike the defendants' special defenses, dated August 30, 2005.
On March 23, 2005, the plaintiff, Virginia Pagoni, filed a three-count complaint against the defendants, Nicholas Kreider and Ryan Company Inc. of Massachusetts (Ryan), as a result of injuries alleged to have been sustained in an automobile accident on September 10, 2003. The first count seeks damages as a result of the alleged negligent operation of an automobile by the driver, Nicholas Kreider. The second count seeks vicarious liability from Ryan, the alleged owner of the vehicle. The third count seeks vicarious liability from Ryan, the alleged lessor of the vehicle, pursuant to C.G.S. § 14-154a.
Counsel for the defendants has opined in the pleadings that the plaintiff has mis-characterized the identity of this defendant.
The defendants filed an answer with revised special defenses on June 30, 2005. The second special defense states: "(P)laintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." In the third special defense, the defendants raise as a defense the "sudden emergency doctrine." In the fourth special defense, the defendants raise as a defense that the accident was "inevitable and unavoidable and, therefore is not actionable against the defendants."
On August 30, 2005, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike the defendants' special defenses along with a memorandum of law. The defendants filed a memorandum of law in opposition on September 15, 2005. The motion to strike was heard on the short calendar on September 24, 2005.
I.
"Whenever any party wishes to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of any answer to any complaint . . . or any part of that answer including any special defense contained therein, that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof." Practice Book § 10-39(a)(5). "It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a [pleading] challenged by a [party's] motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Labor v. C.J.M. Services, Inc., 268 Conn. 283, 292, 842 A.2d 1124 (2004). "The court must construe the facts in the [challenged pleading] most favorable to the [pleading party]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). "A motion to strike . . . does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 588. "A motion to strike is properly granted if the [challenged pleading] alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).
II.
The plaintiff, in her memorandum of law in support of their motion, argues that the defendants' special defenses which allege that the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted should be stricken as it is not cognizable as a defense in Connecticut. In opposition, the defendants assert that a special defense alleging that the plaintiff's complaint fails to state a cause of action is proper, citing Scan Associates, Inc. v. Civitello Building Co., Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 93 0350643 (January 24, 1994, Hodgson, J.) ( 10 Conn. L. Rptr. 646).
This court has previously addressed this issue in Vejseli v. Pasha, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 02-0172369 (July 21, 2004, Matasavage, J.). In that case, this court struck the special defense because the defendants failed to support the challenged special defense with a factual basis. The defendants' special defense alleging failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted does not even allege a cognizable legal conclusion. See Pozoukidis v. Bridgeport, supra, 21 Conn. L. Rptr. 382. "A motion to strike is properly granted if the [challenged pleading] alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, supra, 262 Conn. 498.
In this case, the defendants have not alleged any facts to support the legal conclusion that the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. As such, the plaintiff's motion to strike the second special defense is granted.
III.
The plaintiff has also moved to strike the third and fourth special defenses which allege the sudden emergency doctrine and unavoidable accident, respectively. The plaintiff claims that both "defenses" are more appropriately pled and proved under a general denial, and not as a special defense.
Both of these issues have recently been decided in Abramova v. Huang, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. CV 04-4001197 (September 12, 2005, Tanzer, J.) ( 39 Conn. L. Rptr. 918). In that case, Judge Tanzer granted a motion to strike and adopted the majority view and held that the special defense of sudden emergency should be pled as a simple denial. Further, the court granted the motion as to unavoidable accident and held that in the majority of cases, the Superior Court judges have determined that unavoidable accident is not a proper special defense and also should be pled as a general denial.
This court agrees with the in-depth and well-reasoned decision by Judge Tanzer and adopts the majority view that both of the special defenses of sudden emergency and unavoidable accident are not properly pled as special defenses, and are more properly pled under a general denial.
As such, the motion to strike the defendants' second, third and fourth special defenses is granted.