Opinion
Civil Action 24-10074
05-10-2024
DEMARCIANO H. PAGE, Plaintiff, v. DONALD L. UPSHAW, REGINA C. CASTRO, THIRD PRECINCT, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE UNIT, Defendants.
Mark A. Goldsmith United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF'S STATE LAW DEFAMATION CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT REGINA C. CASTRO, AND TO DENY CASTRO'S MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF NO. 18) AS MOOT
DAVID R. GRAND UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pro se plaintiff Demarciano H. Page (“Page”) commenced this action on January 10, 2024, against defendants Donald L. Upshaw (“Upshaw”), Regina C. Castro (“Castro”), and the City of Detroit's “Third Precinct Police Department” and “Domestic Violence Unit,” for alleged violations of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In short, Page alleges that Castro was his former roommate, and that on September 19, 2022, she “orchestrated a violent scene” and “had [him] arrested based on false allegations.” Page asserts that he was “held against [his] will, assaulted, and detained in jail,” and that Upshaw, who apparently is a City of Detroit police “investigator,” “approved his arrest” “without any real probable cause.” Page claims he was charged with certain crimes related to the incident, but was acquitted of all charges on June 26, 2023.
After counsel for the City of Detroit noted that Castro was not an employee of the city, the Court issued an Order directing Page to show cause why the Court should not recommend dismissing Castro from this case because she was not a state actor, explaining:
On April 2, 2024, attorney Peter V. Granata, an attorney with the City of Detroit Law Department, filed his appearance on behalf of “the City of Detroit” (ECF No. 9), and on April 4, 2024, filed a motion to withdraw his representation of Castro, explaining that she “was misidentified as an employee of the City of Detroit,” and therefore he cannot and does not represent her in this matter (ECF No. 11). The Court recently granted Granata's motion to withdraw his representation of Castro. (ECF No. 17).
While Page's complaint references only the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, “42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides the vehicle through which [a] Plaintiff must bring [his] constitutional challenge.” Inv. Realty Servs., LLC v. City of Allen Park, No. 18-11476, 2020 WL 230272, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 15, 2020). In turn, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, “a plaintiff must allege a violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Wershe v. Combs, 763 F.3d 500, 504-05 (6th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). In other words, state action is an essential element of any § 1983 claim against any defendant. See American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 58 (1999); Campbell v. PMI Food Equip. Grp., Inc., 509 F.3d 776, 783 (6th Cir. 2007) (“As a general rule, ‘[s]ection 1983 does not ... prohibit the conduct of private parties acting in their individual capacities.'”) (internal citation omitted).
Based on attorney Granata's declaration that Castro is not an employee of the City of Detroit, and Page's allegation that Castro was merely his “ex-roommate,” it appears that the complaint fails to allege that Castro is a state actor subject to liability under section 1983. Accordingly, Page is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE, in writing, on or before May 3, 2024, why this Court should not recommend that Castro be dismissed from this case because the complaint fails to allege that she is a state actor subject to liability under section 1983.(ECF No. 19, PageID.85) (emphasis in original).
On May 7, 2024, Page filed his response to the Order to Show Cause, which does not dispute that Castro is not a state actor. Rather, Page explains that “[m]y lawsuit against Regina Castro is for defamation of character” because he was “falsely arrested for assault by fal[s]e allegations from Regina Castro” but was later “acquitted from all charges.” (ECF No. 20, PageID.87). In other words, Page's response makes clear that his only claim in this federal action against Castro, a non-state actor, is a state law claim for defamation, and that there is no § 1983 claim raised against Castro for a violation of his federal constitutional rights.
Because Page raises no federal claim against Castro, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law defamation claim against her, and dismiss such claim without prejudice. Gamel v. City of Cincinnati, 625 F.3d 949, 951 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 “grants a district court broad discretion to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over state-law claims” where the jurisdictional basis is grounded in federal law claims); see also Jesse Young v. Prison Health Servs., No. 16-CV-13016, 2017 WL 2793956, at *2 (E.D. Mich. June 28, 2017) (“the dismissal of the claims over which the federal court had original jurisdiction creates a presumption in favor of dismissing without prejudice any state-law claims that accompanied it to federal court.”). The Court also finds that this federal court case will be most efficiently litigated by declining to exercise jurisdiction over Page's state law defamation claim against Castro. For these reasons alone, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Page's state law defamation claim against Castro, and that claim should be dismissed without prejudice.
Moreover, the Court notes that on April 18, 2024, Castro filed a “Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue and Forum Non Conveniens” in which she asserts that Page is currently litigating this same defamation claim against her in state court. (ECF No. 18, PageID.70-71). Page did not file a response to Castro's motion or otherwise challenge her assertion about him litigating the issue in state court. That provides an additional basis for declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Page's state law defamation claim against Castro.
For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Page's state law defamation claim against Castro, and that such claim be DIMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Castro's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 18) be DENIED AS MOOT.
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS
The parties' attention is drawn to Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a), which provides a period of fourteen (14) days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order within which to file objections for consideration by the district judge under 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1).