The mere fact of the shooting does not tend to show defendant was at fault; the uncontradicted evidence shows that the shooting could not reasonably have been anticipated as the natural and probable result of the failure of defendant to inform the government forces, earlier or otherwise than was done, that there were no insurrectos on the train. P. 75. 3 F.2d 747, reversed. CERTIORARI ( 269 U.S. 542) to a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals which reversed a judgment of the District Court, entered on an alternative verdict for defendant, and directed the District Court to enter judgment on the verdict of damages for the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries suffered by the plaintiff while a passenger on defendant's railway in Costa Rica, when the train was fired upon by Costa Rican troops.
Prosser, Torts (1941) § 109; 2 Williston, Contracts (1936) § 338A. Louisville Gas Electric Co. v. Beaucond, 1920, 188 Ky. 725, 224 S.W. 179, 186; Blackmer v. McCabe, 1912, 86 Vt. 303, 85 A. 113; cf. Page v. United Fruit Co., 1 Cir., 1925, 3 F.2d 747, 752; Young v. Anderson, 1921, 33 Idaho 522, 196 P. 193, 50 A.L.R. 1056; Murphy v. Penniman, 1907, 105 Md. 452, 66 A. 282, 289, 121 Am.St.Rep. 583. The foundations of the rule are in confusion.
Under the law of Indiana, the cause of action died with the plaintiff, just as, in the case at bar, it died in New York with Ormsby; but the court held that whether or not the cause of action survived depended upon the law of Illinois where the action was brought, not upon that of Indiana, where it abated and so the action was maintained. In Page v. United Fruit Co. (C.C.A.) 3 F.2d 747, 754, one Michael B. Ryan, a citizen of Connecticut, was injured by the defendant, United Fruit Company, in Costa Rica. Suit to recover damages was brought by Ryan in the district of Massachusetts. After verdict and while the case was pending in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, plaintiff died, and Page was substituted for him as plaintiff.
(Emphasis ours.) Other cases to the same effect are Page v. United Fruit Co., 1 Cir., 3 F.2d 747; Luster v. Martin, 7 Cir., 58 F.2d 537; Gordon v. Chicago, R. I. P. R. Co., 154 Iowa 449, 134 N.W. 1057; Austin's Adm'r v. Pittsburg, C. C. St. R. Co., 122 Ky. 304, 91 S.W. 742, 5 L.R.A., N.S., 756; Grant v. McAuliffe, Cal.App., 255 P.2d 819, 823, par. 5. The case of Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174 139 A. 691, 692, contains this language: (It is dictum, but, nevertheless, sound reasoning.)
( Austin v. Pittsburg, C., C., St. L. Ry. Co., 122 Ky. 304, 309-310 [91 S.W. 742]; Baltimore Ohio R. Co. v. Joy, 173 U.S. 226, 231 [19 S.Ct. 387, 43 L.Ed. 677]; Clough v. Gardiner, 111 Misc. 244, 248-249 [182 N.Y.S. 803]; Herzog v. Stern, 264 N.Y. 379, 383-384 [ 191 N.E. 23], followed in Demuth v. Griffin, 253 App. Div. 399, 401 [2 N.Y.S.2d 2], Domres v. Storms, 236 App. Div. 630 [260 N.Y.S. 335], Silverman v. Rappaport, 165 Misc. 543, 545-546 [300 N.Y.S. 76], Taynton v. Vollmer, 242 App. Div. 854 [275 N.Y.S. 284]; Gordon v. Chicago, R.I. P.Ry. Co., 154 Iowa 449, 451 [134 N.W. 1057]; In re Vilas'Estate, 166 Or. 115, 123-124 [ 110 P.2d 940]; Martin v. Baltimore Ohio R. Co., 151 U.S. 673, 692-693 [14 S.Ct. 533, 38 L.Ed. 311]; Martin v. Wabash R. Co., 142 F. 650, 651 [73 C.C.A. 646, 6 Ann.Cas. 582]; Page v. United Fruit Co., 3 F.2d 747, 754; Matter of Killough, 148 Misc. 73, 85-89 [265 N.Y.S. 301]; Texas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Richards, 68 Tex. 375, 378 [4 S.W. 627]. See, also, Barker v. Ladd, Fed.Cas. 990 [3 Sawy. 44]; Gaskins v. Bonfils, 4 F. Supp. 547, 551; Luster v. Martin, 58 F.2d 537, 539-540; Portland Gold Mining Co. v. Stratton's Independence, Ltd., 196 F. 714, 716-717; Whitten v. Bennett, 77 F. 271, 273; Winslow v. Domestic Engineering Co., 20 F. Supp. 578, 579.