Opinion
B323377
11-28-2023
ELLIE PAGE, as Special Administrator, etc., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HYUN PARK et al., Defendants and Appellants
Law Offices of Steven L. Sugars and Steven L. Sugars for Defendants and Appellants. James Ellis Arden for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. No. BC679504 Wendy Chang, Judge. Dismissed in part and affirmed in part.
Law Offices of Steven L. Sugars and Steven L. Sugars for Defendants and Appellants.
James Ellis Arden for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ASHMANN-GERST, ACTING P. J.
Defendants and appellants Hyun Park (Hyun), also known as Eugene Park, and Iolline Wallace (Wallace) challenge a trial court judgment setting aside a default judgment entered against plaintiff and respondent Carlos Alexander Dueñas (Dueñas) in a prior action. In light of the overwhelming evidence of Hyun's fraud on the court to obtain the default judgment, the trial court did not err in exercising its inherent authority to vacate the default judgment in favor of Hyun and against Dueñas. Because Wallace is not a party aggrieved by that judgment, her appeal is dismissed.
Hyun and his daughter, Phoebe Park (Phoebe), were both parties to the underlying litigation. Because Phoebe and Hyun (the Parks) share the same last name, we refer to them by their first names. No disrespect is intended.
Dueñas passed away on August 31, 2018. On January 13, 2020, we granted the motion to substitute the special administrator of the Estate of Carlos Alexander Dueñas, Ellie Page, as the respondent in this case. For ease, we refer to the respondent as Dueñas.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Dueñas's sale of the property to Phoebe; Hyun's default judgment against Dueñas
As set forth in our prior opinion, in 2014, Dueñas sold a building to Phoebe. (Page v. Park (Oct. 6, 2020, B293993) [nonpub. opn.].) Shortly after the sale, Hyun filed a complaint against Dueñas, alleging that Dueñas had fraudulently sold the building to him and that he suffered resultant damages (the Default Action). (Ibid.) After filing a proof of service with the court, Hyun obtained Dueñas's default and a default judgment was entered in favor of Hyun and against Dueñas on April 16, 2015. (Ibid.)
Wallace is the assignee of Hyun's default judgment against Dueñas. (Page v. Park, supra, B293993.)
Dueñas learns of the default judgment and files the instant action
Dueñas contended that he was never served with a copy of Hyun's complaint in the Default Action. Rather, he did not learn of the default judgment until the end of August 2017, prompting him to file the instant action against the Parks and Wallace to set aside the default judgment. (Page v. Park, supra, B293993.)
Each defendant filed an anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court granted Wallace's motion and dismissed her from the action. The trial court denied the Parks' anti-SLAPP motion. Phoebe appealed the trial court order, and on October 6, 2020, we reversed the trial court's order with directions that the trial court grant Phoebe's anti-SLAPP motion and dismiss Dueñas's action against her. (Page v. Park, supra, B293993.)
SLAPP is an acronym for strategic lawsuit against public participation. (Wilcox v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 809, 813, overruled in part on other grounds in Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 68, fn. 5.)
The action remained pending against Hyun, and a nonjury trial was set for March 23, 2022.
Trial briefs
On March 11, 2022, the parties filed their respective trial briefs. As is relevant to the issues in this appeal, Dueñas argued that his statement in his declaration filed in opposition to Hyun's anti-SLAPP motion that he had not been served with Hyun's complaint in the Default Action warranted judgment in his favor.
On March 16, 2022, the trial court requested additional briefing on the admissibility of Dueñas's declaration.
Trial and statement of decision
The matter proceeded to a bench trial on March 25, 2022.
On May 20, 2022, the trial court issued its tentative statement of decision. First, the trial court considered whether the default judgment was void for ineffective service of process on Dueñas. It found Dueñas's declaration filed in opposition to Hyun's anti-SLAPP motion inadmissible hearsay. Finding no other evidence to rebut the presumption of valid service by Hyun's registered process server, "notwithstanding [its] deep skepticism that [Dueñas] was on notice of the" Default Action, the trial court determined that it could not "void the Default Judgment on the grounds of improper service."
The trial court then turned to the question of whether the default judgment was void for other reasons. It expressly found that Hyun had engaged in fraud in obtaining the default judgment against Dueñas, "[i]ndependent of service of process issues":
"In reviewing the evidence, the court finds [that Hyun's] lawsuit is replete with misrepresentations and false statements, from beginning to end-made to the court, in an effort to obtain a default judgment that [Hyun] was not legally entitled to receive. The entire proceeding, and the resulting default judgment, constituted a fraud on the court:
"1) The [Default Action] . . . filed by 'Hyun Park aka Phoebe Park' . . . alleges . . . 'Park,' [as] an individual was a buyer of [Dueñas's] building.' . . . This is false. [Hyun] is a wholly different individual than Phoebe Park-Plaintiff in the [default] action was actually two people.... For [Hyun] to file his lawsuit using the Korean version of his name, and then stating 'a.k.a.' using his daughter's name, when he uses 'Eugene,' demonstrates an intent to hide his identity and to deceive the court. The court finds [Hyun] knew that everyday English speakers would not know if 'Hyun' is a feminine or masculine name in Korean, and would assume that 'Phoebe' was the American name adopted by Hyun Park-and that they were a single person.
"2) [Hyun] expressly lied to the Court. He told the Court that Phoebe Park was not his aka, but rather his wife. [Citation.] She is his daughter.
"3) [Hyun] falsely alleged that he bought the Property from [Dueñas] . . . and then falsely submitted a declaration under the penalty of perjury to that same effect.... The court finds these misrepresentations were intentional .... [Hyun] knew . . . that it was Phoebe . . . who signed the operative sales documents of the property. He admitted that fact at his deposition [in another lawsuit]. Further, the court finds [Hyun] prepared the sales documents for the sale of the Property from [Dueñas] to Phoebe Park, as they bear the same handwriting that appears on many of the core documents in the [Default Action], which the Court finds to be [Hyun's] own handwriting. Those sales documents, prepared by [Hyun], expressly acknowledged that Eugene Park &Associates was not a party to the agreement, but rather, her real estate broker.... [Hyun] knew that only Phoebe had standing to bring the lawsuit, not him. Therefore, he decided to hide the fact they were separate people, and filed the lawsuit as 'Hyun Park aka Phoebe Park.'
"4) In an attempt, again, to falsely present himself as the buyer of the Property, in support of his default judgment, [Hyun] did not attach the sales agreement (which revealed the facts set forth above), but rather, only attached escrow instructions vesting title to Phoebe Park, falsely labeling it 'purchase agreement' at the top in his own handwriting."
In sum, the trial court found that Hyun knew he lacked standing and made misrepresentations to the trial court to obtain a default judgment "he had no legal right to."
The statement of decision became final, and judgment was entered in favor of Dueñas and against Hyun on July 14, 2022, vacating the default judgment in the Default Action.
Appeal
Hyun and Wallace's timely appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION
I. Wallace's appeal is dismissed
Wallace is named as an appellant in the notice of appeal, but the challenged judgment was only entered against Hyun. We must therefore first address whether her appeal is proper.
The right to appeal is purely statutory. Code of Civil Procedure section 902 provides that only an "aggrieved" party may appeal a judgment. "'"One is considered 'aggrieved' whose rights or interests are injuriously affected by the judgment." [Citation.] Conversely, "A party who is not aggrieved by an order or judgment has no standing to attack it on appeal." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Conservatorship of Gregory D. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 62, 67.) "Injurious effect on another party is insufficient to give rise to appellate standing." (Ibid.)
Because the judgment here was not entered against Wallace-in fact, she was earlier dismissed from the action when the trial court granted her anti-SLAPP motion-she is not a proper appellant. Her appeal is dismissed.
Even if her appeal were valid, it would fail for the same reasons Hyun's appeal lacks merit. Our discussion below applies equally to both appellants.
II. Standard of review
As the parties agree, we review the trial court judgment for abuse of discretion. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981.) Under this standard, we do "not disturb the exercise of a trial court's discretion unless it appears that there has been a miscarriage of justice." (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566.)
We review the trial court's factual findings for substantial evidence. (Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 581-582.)
III. Relevant law
"[A] court has the inherent power to set aside a judgment obtained by fraud upon it." (In re Marriage of Smith (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 543, 555; see also Russell v. Dopp (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 765, 778; Olivera v. Grace (1942) 19 Cal.2d 570, 577578.) "The court's power to vacate a judgment procured by intrinsic fraud is beyond question, but it would seem that the power is inherent rather than statutory." (Don v. Cruz (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 695, 702, fn. 2.)
IV. The trial court properly entered judgment in favor of Dueñas and against Hyun
The trial court did not err in exercising its inherent authority to set aside the default judgment that was the result of Hyun's fraud upon the court. In unwavering language, the trial court found that Hyun "wholly lack[ed] credibility" in his statements to support his request for a default judgment. He intentionally misled the trial court by lying about his identity, his status as the buyer of the property, and his relationship to Phoebe. In addition, he falsely labeled key documents. Hyun's fraud upon the court led to a default judgment to which he was not entitled, and the trial court acted well within its inherent authority to vacate such an improvident default judgment.
Urging us to reverse, appellants point out that a default judgment may not be vacated outside the six-month period set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 473 unless there is evidence of extrinsic fraud or mistake. According to appellants, there was no such evidence here because the trial court excluded from evidence Dueñas's declaration that he was not served with the complaint in the Default Action. Regardless of whether appellants are right on the law, they are wrong on the facts. The trial court did not vacate the default judgment on the grounds that Dueñas was never served. In fact, in its statement of decision, the trial court expressly noted: "[N]otwithstanding this court's deep skepticism that [Dueñas] was on notice of the existence of the [Default Action], on the evidence before the court, the court cannot void the Default Judgment on the grounds of improper service." It solely relied upon its inherent equitable authority, and appellants offer no legal authority that there is a time limit on such authority.
"'Extrinsic fraud occurs when a party is deprived of his opportunity to present his claim or defense to the court, where he was kept in ignorance or in some other manner fraudulently prevented from fully participating in the proceeding. [Citation.] Examples of extrinsic fraud are: concealment of the existence of a community property asset, failure to give notice of the action to the other party, convincing the other party not to obtain counsel because the matter will not proceed (and it does proceed). [Citation.]' [Citation.] On the other hand, 'Fraud is intrinsic and not a valid ground for setting aside a judgment when the party has been given notice of the action and has had an opportunity to present his case and to protect himself from any mistake or fraud of his adversary, but has unreasonably neglected to do so. [Citation.]'" (Gibble v. Car-Lene Research, Inc. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 295, 315.)
DISPOSITION
Wallace's appeal is dismissed. The judgment against Hyun is affirmed. Dueñas is entitled to costs on appeal.
We concur:, J. CHAVEZ, J., HOFFSTADT, J.