Page v. Estate of Page

3 Citing cases

  1. Tyler v. J.C. Penney Co.

    145 Ill. App. 3d 967 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)   Cited 18 times
    Discussing procedural difference between an answer and a motion to dismiss

    Thus, defendants continue, the judgment became final as of the June 18, 1985, order, and the time for filing a notice of appeal began to run as of that date. (See English v. English (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 736, 393 N.E.2d 18; Page v. Estate of Page (1978), 66 Ill. App.3d 214, 383 N.E.2d 615; Richey Manufacturing Co. v. Mercantile National Bank (1976), 40 Ill. App.3d 923, 353 N.E.2d 123.) As the argument goes, plaintiffs' failure to file their notice of appeal within 30 days of the June 18, 1985, order requires that we dismiss this appeal.

  2. In re Marriage of Stuart

    141 Ill. App. 3d 314 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)   Cited 19 times

    ) The purpose of such post-trial motions is to alert the trial court to errors it has committed and thereby afford it an opportunity for their correction. (See Page v. Estate of Page (1978), 66 Ill. App.3d 214, 217, 383 N.E.2d 615, 618.) The power to grant the motion rests in the sole discretion of the trial court.

  3. Altek, Inc. v. Vulcan Tube Metals

    398 N.E.2d 240 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 7 times
    Holding the party opposing a motion to dismiss is not required to file a response

    • 1 The decision of a trial court to grant a new trial is an exercise of discretion which should not be disturbed unless a clear abuse of that discretion is shown. ( Ervin v. Sears, Roebuck Co. (1976), 65 Ill.2d 140, 357 N.E.2d 500; Dombrowski v. Laschinski (1978), 67 Ill. App.3d 506, 385 N.E.2d 35.) The purpose of a motion to vacate judgment is to alert the trial court of errors it has committed and thereby afford it an opportunity for their correction. ( Page v. Estate of Page (1978), 66 Ill. App.3d 214, 383 N.E.2d 615; Abbey Plumbing Heating, Inc. v. Brown (1977), 47 Ill. App.3d 719, 365 N.E.2d 115.) Under the circumstances of this case, it is difficult to conceive that the second judge acted to correct errors committed at the first trial or found that the verdict was against the preponderance of the evidence and a new trial was required. (See Spankroy v. Alesky (1977), 45 Ill. App.3d 432, 359 N.E.2d 1078.)