In the context of contracts entered into with a public entity, our courts have repeatedly recognized that such contracts benefit the public, but these benefits are typically incidental to the contract and do not create third-party beneficiary status. See Miree, supra, 242 Ga. at 135-136 (3) (contract to maintain airport); Backus v. Chilivis, 236 Ga. 500, 501-503 (II) ( 224 SE2d 370) (1976) (contract to perform tax appraisals); Mitchell v. Ga. Dept. of Community Health, 281 Ga. App. 174, 181 (3) (a) ( 635 SE2d 798) (2006) (contract to administer state health benefit plan); Page v. City of Conyers, 231 Ga. App. 264, 267-268 (1) (b) ( 499 SE2d 126) (1998) (customers not third-party beneficiary of franchise agreement for water and sewer services). (a) With regard to K y the plaintiffs support their third-party beneficiary claim by pointing to various contract provisions regarding K V's contract responsibilities during installation of the equipment.

A third party does not obtain standing to assert claims for breach of a contract where the contract does not evidence an intent to benefit a third party directly, but rather, only benefits citizens and members of the general public indirectly and incidentally. See Page v. City of Conyers, 231 Ga. App. 264, 265-268 (1) ( 499 SE2d 126) (1998). More importantly, third-party beneficiary status is not conferred when "[t]here is no intention manifested in the contract . . . [to] compensate any member of the public for injurious consequences," and to permit the general public to sue for breach of the contract.

It is true that under OCGA § 9-2-20(b), a third party beneficiary to a contract may bring suit to enforce the contract. Miree v. United States, 242 Ga. 126, 135(3) ( 249 S.E.2d 573) (1978); Backus v. Chilivis, 236 Ga. 500, 502(II) ( 224 S.E.2d 370) (1976); Page v. City of Conyers, 231 Ga. App. 264, 265(1) ( 499 S.E.2d 126) (1998). But accepting arguendo that the alleged oral divorce agreement conferred third party beneficiary status on the attorney and/or the firm, neither Steele nor MIJS brought suit.

the security contract because the contract did not specify a specific intention to benefit the patrons) (emphasis omitted); Donnalley v. Sterling , 274 Ga. App. 683, 686 (1), 618 S.E.2d 639 (2005) ("While the members of the football team may have incidentally benefitted from [an agreement between a football team and camp for the team to provide first aid services when using camp grounds], we find nothing in the language indicating an intent to confer a direct benefit upon the individual players to protect them from physical harm."); Gay v. Ga. Dept. of Corr. , 270 Ga. App. 17, 23-24 (2), 606 S.E.2d 53 (2004) ("Furthermore, the Contract, when viewed as a whole, tends to show that the Association's safety-related promises are not intended to benefit the inmates [on a work detail].... The Association's promise to provide a safe workplace does arguably benefit prisoners assigned to the work details. However, the benefit is incidental to the Contract.") (citations and punctuation omitted); Page v. City of Conyers , 231 Ga. App. 264, 266 (1) (a), 499 S.E.2d 126 (1998) (finding language in a government contract that it "will benefit the county and its residents" does not "evidence an intent to confer third-party rights upon [residents] ... [because p]ractically, every contract entered into by a county is for some public benefit because the only business of the county is public business") (citation omitted); compare Green v. Pateco Svcs., LLC , 348 Ga. App. 132, 135 (1), 820 S.E.2d 285 (2018) (finding that plaintiff, an employee of DDR, was a third-party beneficiary because "the language of the contract between Pateco and DDR required Pateco to report to DDR any problems or defects observed while maintaining the parking lot and to do so ‘in a manner which will minimize health, safety, legal, and other risks to Owner, and its respective employees, agents, guests, and invitees’ ") (punctuation omitted). In summary, we affirm the trial court's denial of summary judgment as to the tort claims asserted by appellees and we r

Judgment affirmed in Case No. A07A1878. Phipps and Mikell, JJ., concur. Compare Page v. City of Conyers, 231 Ga. App. 264, 265-268 (1) ( 499 SE2d 126) (1998). See Murawski v. Roland Well Drilling, 188 Ga. App. 760, 764 (2) ( 374 SE2d 207) (1988) (property owners were third-party beneficiaries of agreement which contained promises regarding rates which they could be charged for water).

As we have previously stated, See Brown, supra; Page v. City of Conyers, 231 Ga. App. 264, 266 (1) ( 499 SE2d 126) (1998). (Emphasis in original.)

Id. at 135-136. See also Page v. City of Conyers, 231 Ga. App. 264, 265-267 (1) ( 499 S.E.2d 126) (1998). Here, in addition to the provision relied on by the majority, the security contract includes a merger clause which states, "this writing constitutes the sole agreement between the parties, and any representation, warranty or promise not included herein shall be of no effect."

A third party does not obtain standing to assert claims for breach of a contract where the contract does not evidence an intent to benefit a third party directly, but rather, only benefits citizens and members of the general public indirectly and incidentally. Page v. City of Conyers, 231 Ga.App. 264, 499 S.E.2d 126, 128 (1998).          Of the three agreements, the only one that even arguably contemplates the plaintiffs is the March 23, 2004 agreement.