When a contractual term of a settlement agreement “ ‘is clear, unambiguous, and capable of only one interpretation as written, the provision's plain meaning must be strictly enforced.’ ” Page v. Baylard, 281 Ga. 586, 587(1), 642 S.E.2d 14 (2007) (citation omitted). In this case, the trial court's attempt to extend indefinitely the time that Scherer was required to keep the business account open was an improper modification of the parties' agreements.
But, when a contractual term of a settlement agreement incorporated into a divorce decree is clear, unambiguous, and capable of only one interpretation as written, the plain meaning of the provision must be strictly enforced. Page v. Baylard, 281 Ga. 586, 587 (1) ( 642 SE2d 14) (2007). In this case, the superior court found the language at issue to be "complete, clear, and unambiguous," and indeed it is; however, it completely, clearly, and unambiguously expresses the intent of the parties that the beneficiary spouse is releasing any and all interest in the benefits at the time of divorce.
See City of Conyers v. Southern Outdoor Advertising, No. S06I1492 (June 20, 2006) (denying interlocutory application). We followed approximately the same course in a context similar to this case (the appeal of a child support award) in Page v. Baylard, 281 Ga. 586 ( 642 SE2d 14) (2007). In the published opinion, we stated merely that "[w]e granted discretionary review" without explaining the prior history of the discretionary application.
Mermann v. Tillitski , 297 Ga. 881, 883, 778 S.E.2d 191 (2015) (punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied); accordDoritis v. Doritis , 294 Ga. 421, 423 (3), 754 S.E.2d 53 (2014).Floyd , 291 Ga. at 609 (2), 732 S.E.2d 258 (punctuation omitted); accordPage v. Baylard , 281 Ga. 586, 587 (1), 642 S.E.2d 14 (2007).See supra note 17 & accompanying text.
(Citation omitted.) Page v. Baylard, 281 Ga. 586, 587 (1) ( 642 SE2d 14) (2007).Applebaum v. Hames, 159 Ga. App. 552, 553 ( 284 SE2d 58) (1981).
Consequently, the grant of summary judgment to Eichholz was improper. See Self, supra at 152-153; Nobel Lodging v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, 249 Ga. App. 497, 498-499 (1) ( 548 SE2d 481) (2001); Collum Properties, supra at 774-776; compare Page v. Baylard, 281 Ga. 586, 587 (1) ( 642 SE2d 14) (2007); Athens Heart Center v. Brasstown Valley Resort, 275 Ga. App. 607, 608 ( 621 SE2d 565) (2005); Hall v. Ross, 273 Ga. App. 811, 813 ( 616 SE2d 145) (2005). See Nobel Lodging, supra (where language of guaranty was unambiguous, parol evidence was ineffectual to add a condition precedent).
Logic thus dictates that selling off smaller parts of a tract of land similarly cannot be employed to circumvent a right of first refusal. Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that Meinhardt was unlikely to prevail on the issue of whether the property was legally conveyed to him. Page v. Baylard, 281 Ga. 586, 587 (1) ( 642 SE2d 14) (2007).Hinson v. Roberts, 256 Ga. 396, 398 (1) ( 349 SE2d 454) (1986).
The “cardinal rule” of contract interpretation is to “ascertain the intention of the parties.” Page v. Baylard, 281 Ga. 586, 642 S.E.2d 14, 16 (2007). Accordingly, if a provision within a contract is “clear, unambiguous, and capable of only one interpretation as written, the provision's plain meaning must be strictly enforced.”
"A condition precedent must be performed before the contract becomes absolute and obligatory upon the other party." O.C.G.A. § 13-3-4; Page v. Baylard, 281 Ga. 586, 587, 642 S.E.2d 14, 16 (2007). The Court looks to the language of the contract to determine whether it contains a condition precedent.