Opinion
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DISMISSING PETITION
FERNANDO M. OLGUIN, District Judge.
Petitioner was convicted of one count of assault with a semiautomatic firearm, one count of first degree residential burglary, and one count of second degree robbery. In addition, the jury found true the allegations that petitioner personally used a firearm in the commission of each of the offenses. [ECF 1 at 2].
Citations are to the Electronic Case File ("ECF") version of the petition. Pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the document.
The California Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner's conviction, but modified the judgment by staying a sentence enhancement imposed upon the robbery count, awarding petitioner a total of 488 days of custody credit, and deleting the imposition of a five-year parole term. People v. Padilla, 2014 WL 2735466, at *5 (Cal.Ct.App. June 17, 2014). On August 27, 2014, the California Supreme Court denied petitioner's petition for review. [ECF 1 at 11].
Petitioner filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court on October 22, 2015. The petition raises the following five claims for relief: (1) the trial court erred by denying petitioner's motion for judgment of acquittal on the robbery count; (2) "a reversal on count 3, robbery, requires a remand for resentencing"; (3) the trial court erred by imposing a concurrent term for the firearm use sentence enhancement; (4) the trial court erred by imposing a five-year parole period; and (5) petitioner's presentence credits were improperly calculated. [Petition at 5-6].
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides that "[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition...." For the following reasons, the petition is subject to summary dismissal.
Federal habeas corpus relief is available only if a petitioner has been convicted or sentenced in violation of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. It is not available for alleged errors in the interpretation or application of state law. Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Petitioner does not allege that he has been deprived of any federally protected right. Instead, his claims are based solely upon alleged errors of state law. As a result, the petition fails to state a cognizable federal claim for relief.
Even if petitioner's claims could be construed as raising federal claims, none have been exhausted. A state prisoner is required to exhaust all available state court remedies before a federal court may grant habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). Exhaustion requires that a petitioner "fairly present" his federal claims to the highest state court available. Davis v. Silva, 511 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008). "To fairly present a federal claim, a state prisoner must present to the state courts both the operative facts and the federal legal theories that animate the claim." Arrendondo v. Neven, 763 F.3d 1122, 1138 (9th Cir. 2014).
Petitioner's petition for review filed in the California Supreme Court raised a single claim for relief: the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence of a "special relationship" to support petitioner's robbery conviction. [ECF 1 at 58]. Thus, four of the five claims raised in petitioner's federal petition have never been presented to the California Supreme Court in any fashion. The one issue included in the petition for review did not purport to raise a federal claim. Although petitioner argued that the evidence was not sufficient to support the robbery conviction, he did not describe the federal legal theory on which his claim was based, he did not cite the United States Constitution or a federal case, and he did not label his claim "federal." See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2004) (holding that federal nature of claim was not fairly presented to the state court where the petitioner alleged only "ineffective assistance of appellate counsel" but did not mention "provisions of the Federal Constitution, " and provided "no citation of any case that might have alerted the court to the alleged federal nature of the claim"). Instead, petitioner relied exclusively on state law - specifically, five state cases interpreting California's requirement that in order to have constructive possession of property for purposes of robbery, the alleged victim must have a "special relationship" with the owner of the property such that the victim had authority or responsibility to protect the property on behalf of the owner. [See ECF 1 at 56-68]. As a result, petitioner has not exhausted a federal claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. See Arrendondo, 763 F.3d at 1138 (concluding that the petitioner had failed to exhaust a federal claim for relief because his brief filed in the highest state court "focused exclusively on state law, [so] he failed to present his compulsory-process claim as a federal claim").
Although "for purposes of exhaustion, a citation to a state case analyzing a federal constitutional issue serves the same purpose as a citation to a federal case analyzing such an issue, " Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), none of the state cases cited in petitioner's petition for review analyzed a federal constitutional issue. [See ECF 1 at 56, 64-65].
Finally, the Court notes that it has discretion to stay mixed habeas petitions to allow the petitioner to exhaust his state remedies. See Rhines v. Webber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-278 (2005). It does not, however, have discretion to stay a petition containing only unexhausted claims. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Once a district court determines that a habeas petition contains only unexhausted claims, it need not inquire further as to the petitioner's intentions. Instead, it may simply dismiss the habeas petition for failure to exhaust."). Because the petition does not include any exhausted cognizable claim, there is nothing the Court can "stay."
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed without prejudice.
Petitioner is cautioned that a one-year limitation period applies to any future federal habeas corpus petition he may file. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Nothing in this order should be construed as expressing an opinion as the timeliness of any such future petition.
It is so ordered.
JUDGMENT
It is hereby adjudged that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed without prejudice.