Opinion
2:22-cv-02109-RFB-BNW
09-29-2023
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
BRENDA WEKSLER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 26. Defendant responded (ECF No. 31), and Plaintiff replied. ECF No. 32.
Because Plaintiff's third cause of action for premises liability is duplicative of his claim for negligence, the Court recommends dismissal of this claim as futile. But, as Defendant's arguments concerning Plaintiff's purportedly flawed agency theory claims deal with issues of fact, the Court does not find them to be futile. Lastly, Plaintiff is allowed to amend his complaint to to name the new Defendants. Thus, Plaintiff's motion is granted in part and it is recommended it be denied in part.,.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff sued the Nevada Gaming Control Board (“NGCB”) and the MGM Grand Hotel (“MGM”) based on allegations that they wrongfully arrested Plaintiff and subjected him to detention conditions that caused him physical and emotional damage See generally ECF No. 1. In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts five claims for relief: (1) excessive force in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) negligence; (3) battery; (4) negligent hiring, retention, and supervision; and (5) false imprisonment. Id. Initially, each cause of action was alleged against all Defendants, including the Nevada Gaming Commission Board (NGCB), MGM, and Doe Defendants 1 and 2.
Plaintiff and the NGCB later filed a joint motion to dismiss the NGCB from the suit because Nevada agencies are immune from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions. See ECF No. 19. The dismissal did not include the NGCB's agents in their individual capacities, however, and Plaintiff was free to name said agents as defendants upon discovery of their identities. Id. at 2. Plaintiff now seeks leave to file a second amended complaint (“SAC”) because he recently learned the true names and identities of the NGCB agents he previously identified as Doe Defendants 1 and 2.. ECF No. 26 at 3. Because Plaintiff recently dismissed the NGCB as an entity, he asserts that it is necessary to amend his First Amended Complaint to include the recently discovered NGCB agents as named defendants in the NGCB's place. Id. MGM opposes the motion because it claims that amendment would be futile. ECF No. 31.
II. ANALYSIS
“[A] party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(A)(2). “Five factors are taken into account to assess the propriety of a motion for leave to amend: bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of amendment, and whether the plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004). Not all these factors carry equal weight and prejudice is the “touchstone.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003). Absent a showing of prejudice or a strong showing of any of the remaining factors, there is a presumption that leave to amend should be granted. Id. “In exercising this discretion, a court must be guided by the underlying purpose of Rule 15-to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 628 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981)). Generally, the analysis “should be performed with all inferences in favor of granting the motion.” Griggs v. Pace Am. Grp., Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1999).
“Denial of leave to amend on this ground [futility] is rare. Ordinarily, courts will defer consideration of challenges to the merits of a proposed amended pleading until after leave to amend is granted and the amended pleading is filed.” Netbula, LLC v. Distinct Corp., 212 F.R.D. 534, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2003). “Deferring ruling on the sufficiency of the allegations is preferred in light of the more liberal standards applicable to motions to amend and the fact that the parties' arguments are better developed through a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment.” Steward v. CMRE Fin'l Servs., Inc., 2015 WL 6123202, at *2 (D. Nev. Oct. 16, 2015).
The party opposing the amendment bears the burden of showing why leave should be denied, Desert Protective Council v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 927 F.Supp.2d 949, 962 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (citing Genentech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 127 F.R.D. 529, 530-31 (N.D. Cal. 1989)), including the burden of establishing prejudice, DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1987).
MGM does not oppose amendment based on Plaintiff's efforts to add Agent Stevenson and Agent Adams as named defendants. ECF No. 31 at 1. Rather, MGM opposes amendment because (1) the proposed SAC fails to remove Plaintiff's premises liability claim, which MGM claims is duplicative and legally improper; and (2) the proposed SAC includes allegations that the NGCB agents acted as agents of MGM or under its direction, which MGM asserts are “legally flawed allegations.” Id. MGM has met its burden of demonstrating that Plaintiffs premises liability claim is futile, because the claim is duplicative of Plaintiff's negligence claim. The Court therefore recommends dismissal of Plaintiff's third cause of action. But because Plaintiff's agency-based claims concern issues of fact, MGM failed to meet its burden of showing that there are no set of facts that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim. Allen v. City of Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367 (9th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff may amend his remaining causes of action.
A. The Court recommends dismissal of Plaintiff's premises liability claim because it is duplicative of Plaintiff's negligence claim
MGM opposes amendment of Plaintiff's premises liability claim because it asserts that the proposed SAC fails to cure the legal deficiencies that MGM raised in its Motion to Dismiss and its Reply. ECF No. 31 at 5; see also ECF Nos. 18 and 22. Regardless of the legal sufficiency of Plaintiff's premises liability theory, amendment of this claim would be futile because it is duplicative of Plaintiff's second cause of action for negligence. It is well established that district courts have the power to dismiss duplicative claims. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 846 (9th Cir. 1995)(holding duplicative claims are futile); M.M. v. Lafayette School Dist., 681 F.3d 1082, 1091 (9th Cir.2012); see also Arevalo v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, No. 2:14-CV-01837-JAD, 2015 WL 4042001, at *1 (D. Nev. June 30, 2015). Though Plaintiff's third claim has a different subheading (“premises liability”) than his second claim (“negligence”), both are framed as negligence-based claims at their core. Plaintiff only needs one negligence-based claim in this case. The Court therefore recommends dismissal of Plaintiff's third cause of action.
B. Plaintiff's agency-related claims are not futile because they involve issues of fact
MGM opposes amendment of Plaintiff's agency-based causes of action because it contends that Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that NGCB agents acted as agents of MGM or under MGM's direction, while MGM denies such relationship. ECF No. 31 at 6-11. Both Plaintiff's FAC and SAC contain numerous allegations of this sort, with the only difference being that the SAC identifies Agents Stevenson and Adams by name. See ECF No. 26, Ex. C. The parties' disparate contentions demonstrate that the question of whether the NGCB agents acted at MGM's direction is an issue of fact. MGM therefore has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief. Allen, 911 F.2d at 367. Because MGM has failed to show that Plaintiff's agency-related claims are futile, Plaintiff may file an SAC as to these claims. MGM may then refile a motion to dismiss the new SAC if it so chooses.
III. CONCLUSION
IT IS THERFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 26) is GRANTED in part.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's third cause of action for premises liability is DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that ECF No. 18 be denied as MOOT.
NOTICE
This report and recommendation is submitted to the United States district judge assigned to this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A party who objects to this report and recommendation may file a written objection supported by points and authorities within fourteen days of being served with this report and recommendation. Local Rule IB 3-2(a). Failure to file a timely objection may waive the right to appeal the district court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).