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Packal v. Johnson

226 So. 3d 337 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)
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Packal v. Johnson

9 Citing cases

  1. Cash v. Gagnon

    306 So. 3d 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 9 times
    Engaging in uncivil conduct toward fellow condominium resident—which included three separate confrontational encounters involving verbal hostility, yelling, cursing, and the revving of a car engine— constituted only an "uncomfortable neighborly dispute[] that d[id] not rise to the level of stalking"

    Two or more acts that are part of one continuous course of conduct are legally insufficient to qualify as separate instances of harassment. SeePackal v. Johnson , 226 So. 3d 337, 338 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). Further, "a ‘course of conduct’ for purposes of the statute does not include protected speech.

  2. Baruti v. Vingle

    343 So. 3d 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2022)   Cited 3 times
    Concluding that a "mean stare" by an estranged wife who came to the workplace of her husband's paramour to interrupt her while she worked and make her feel "uncomfortable" was insufficient to "constitute substantial emotional distress"

    We review entry of an injunction against stalking for competent, substantial evidence. See Packal v. Johnson, 226 So. 3d 337, 338 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). Under section 784.048, "[a] person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the offense of stalking[.]" § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2021).

  3. Garcia v. Soto

    337 So. 3d 355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2022)   Cited 2 times

    Touhey v. Seda , 133 So. 3d 1203, 1204 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). "Two or more acts that are part of one continuous course of conduct are legally insufficient to qualify as separate instances of harassment." Cash , 306 So. 3d at 109 (citing Packal v. Johnson , 226 So. 3d 337, 338 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). "A course of conduct requires multiple acts that are separated by time or distance." Id. (citing Levy v. Jacobs , 69 So. 3d 403, 405 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) ).

  4. Bell v. Battaglia

    No. 2D19-280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2022)   Cited 4 times
    Noting that "we, as a district court of appeal, are constitutionally charged with deciding plenary appeals within our jurisdiction" (citing McFadden v. State, 177 So.3d 562, 566 (Fla. 2015))

    Additionally, the trial court's reliance on a single text message comes short of the repeated acts required to establish stalking. Cf. Packal v. Johnson, 226 So.3d 337, 338 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (reversing entry of stalking injunction after "trial court expressly disregarded" an alleged "history of confrontations" and relied instead on a single altercation, which was insufficient to "support a finding of stalking, which requires evidence of repeat harassment"). "By its statutory definition, stalking requires proof of repeated acts."

  5. Sutton v. Fowler

    No. 4D20-1978 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2021)   Cited 2 times
    Yelling of obscenities by upstairs condominium resident, directed toward downstairs resident, as well as "screaming and yelling and howling like a wolf" on both his balcony and inside his residence, were insufficient to constitute stalking

    "Two or more acts that are part of one continuous course of conduct are legally insufficient to qualify as separate instances of harassment." Cash, 306 So.3d at 109 (citing Packal v. Johnson, 226 So.3d 337, 338 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017)). "A course of conduct requires multiple acts that are separated by time or distance."

  6. Krapacs v. Bacchus

    301 So. 3d 976 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 14 times
    Holding that court orders that forbid speech activities on social media are "classic examples of prior restraints"

    Krapacs' actions do not qualify as cyberstalking because they did not constitute a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over time evidencing a continuity of purpose. See § 784.048(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2018) ; Packal v. Johnson , 226 So. 3d 337, 338 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (finding that multiple acts can "amount to one continuous course of conduct, establishing only one instance of harassment"). Krapacs' act of retagging Bacchus in her social media posts for four hours constitutes one instance of qualifying conduct under the statute.

  7. Campanhac v. Lauramore

    264 So. 3d 412 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019)

    After considering the limited testimony and evidence presented below and without the benefit of briefs or any appearance by Appellees, we agree with Appellant that there was no competent, substantial evidence to support a finding of stalking. See Packal v. Johnson, 226 So.3d 337, 338 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (holding that each incident of stalking must be proven by competent, substantial evidence to support injunction against stalking). Accordingly, we reverse the injunction.

  8. McCaffrey v. Ashley

    265 So. 3d 688 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019)   Cited 2 times
    Holding that petitioner was entitled to either an order specifying the deficiencies in her allegations or an evidentiary hearing

    " David v. Schack, 192 So.3d 625, 627–28 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (citing Roach v. Brower, 180 So.3d 1142, 1144 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ). "Each incident of stalking must be proven by competent, substantial evidence to support an injunction against stalking." Packal v. Johnson, 226 So.3d 337, 338 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (quoting David, 192 So.3d at 628 ). We note that the Fourth District Court has held that it is improper to summarily deny a petition for an injunction without providing an explanation "as to how the allegations are insufficient," or without a hearing.

  9. Pickett v. Copeland

    236 So. 3d 1142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 49 times
    Holding that more than one act is required to constitute a course of conduct under the definition of stalking in section 784.048(b), Florida Statutes, but the victim does not have to be stalked repeatedly to meet the statutory definition

    " Lukacs v. Luton , 982 So.2d 1217, 1219 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) ; see alsoPower v. Boyle , 60 So.3d 496, 498 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) ("Stalking has been interpreted to mean 'repeated acts of following or harassment.' ") (quoting Lukacs , 982 So.2d at 1219 )). Stated differently, repeated acts are required for "one act of stalking. " Lukacs , 982 So.2d at 1219 (emphasis in the original); see alsoPackal v. Johnson , 226 So.3d 337 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (reversing permanent injunction for protection against stalking violence because the evidence did not support a finding of repeat harassment); Carter v. Malken , 207 So.3d 891, 894 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) ("A minimum of two incidents of harassment are required to establish stalking.").In contrast, several courts have held that a stalking injunction requires proof of two or more separate incidences of "stalking.