Courts have been careful to keep broad acts from being hampered in their effects by later acts of limited scope. Pacific Wool Growers v. Draper Co., 158 Or. 1, 73 P.2d 1391 (1937), and compare Section 1-104. They have recognized the policies embodied in an act as applicable in reason to subject-matter which was not expressly included in the language of the Act, Commercial Nat. Bank of New Orleans v. Canal-Louisiana Bank Trust Co., 239 U.S. 520, 36 S.Ct. 194, 60 L.Ed. 417 (1916) (bona fide purchase policy of Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act extended to case not covered but of equivalent nature).
This Act, carefully integrated and intended as a uniform codification of permanent character covering an entire "field" of law, is to be regarded as particularly resistant to implied repeal. See Pacific Wool Growers v. Draper Co., 158 Or. 1, 73 P.2d 1391 (1937) (emphasis added). Although the Alabama Legislature has made significant additions and revisions to many parts of Title 7 during the 1990s, this important prohibition against implied rescission has remained untouched.
"Where a person having sold goods continues in possession of the goods, or of negotiable documents of title to the goods, the delivery or transfer by that person, or by an agent acting for him, of the goods or documents of title under any sale, pledge or other disposition thereof, to any person receiving and paying value for the same in good faith and without notice of the previous sale, shall have the same effect as if the person making the delivery or transfer were expressly authorized by the owner of the goods to make the same." Cases that have decided that the statute means what it says and that the purchaser who first acquires possession of the property is entitled to keep it, include: Pacific Wool Growers v. Draper Co. (Ore.), 73 P.2d 1391; Tripp v. National Shawmut Bank (Mass.), 161 N.E. 904; Hier v. Wightman, 188 N.Y.S. 274; Gorman v. La Bella, 262 N.Y.S. 345. On the question generally, see also Patchin v. Rowell (Conn.), 85 A. 511; and McKee v. Ward, (Pa.), 137 A. 599. Mrs. Cottman does not deny the existence and applicability of the general rule but argues that delivery may be constructive as well as actual, and that the shipping instructions given by her to Welter amounted to a constructive delivery.
We hold that when an owner voluntarily clothes the fraudulent or criminal purchaser with indicia of title and delivers to him the possession of the chattel, he will be estopped to assert his title as against one who for value and in good faith and without notice, purchases the chattel in reliance upon the apparent ownership of the one so entrusted with possession and indicia of title. Commercial Finance Corp. v. Burke et al., supra; Ruddy v. Oregon Automobile Credit Corp. 179 Or. 688, 174 P.2d 603; Kelley v. Ness, 182 Or. 661, 189 P.2d 570 (under the provisions of the Sales Act); Mogul Transportation Co. v. Larison, supra (dictum); Pacific Wool Growers v. Draper Co., 158 Or. 1, 73 P.2d 1391; First National Bank of Portland v. Stretcher et al, 169 Or. 532, 129 P.2d 830; Gray v. Fankhauser, 58 Or. 423, 115 P. 146; Beckwith v. Galice Mines Company, 50 Or. 542, 93 P. 453; Vanderpool v. Burkitt, 113 Or. 656, 234 P. 289; Russell v. American Bell Telephone Company, supra; National Safe Deposit Company v. Hibbs, supra. In the following cases cited by the plaintiff the original owner prevailed against the purchaser or lienee, claiming under the wrongdoer, but the possibility of estoppel against the assertion of title was recognized: Frye Co. v. Boltman, supra; Gustafson v. Equitable Loan Ass'n., 186 Minn. 236, 243 N.W. 106; Schumann v. Bank of California, supra; State Bank of Black Diamond v. Johnson et al., 104 Wn. 550, 177 P. 340.
Three of our decisions are cited by the plaintiff to the proposition that "It is error to make a finding of fact with no satisfactory evidence to support it." Northwest Oil Co. v. Haslett Warehouse Co., 168 Or. 570, 123 P.2d 985; Pacific Wool Growers v. Draper Co., 158 Or. 1, 73 P.2d 1391; Silver Falls Timber Co. v. Eastern Western Lumber Co., 149 Or. 126, 184, 40 P.2d 703. With the substitution of the word "substantial" for "satisfactory", there can be no doubt of the correctness of the rule stated.