However, the manner in which the matter is brought to the attention of the court is immaterial; when the court becomes aware of the facts it must, if they come within the purview of the statute, dismiss the action. ( Miller Lux Inc. v. Superior Court (1923), supra, 192 Cal. 333, 338-339; Pacific States Corp. v. Grant (1927), 87 Cal.App. 108 [ 261 P. 1100]; Turnbull v. SuperiorCourt (1932), 126 Cal.App. 141, 142-143 [ 14 P.2d 540].) [3] And it is established law that the five-year period is not interrupted by defendant's death.

However, the authorities tend to indicate that petitioners are correct in their conclusion that a stipulation to effectively extend the time for trial beyond the five-year period, whether made before or after the expiration of such period, must be in writing. (Sec. 583, Code Civ. Proc.; Miller Lux v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. 333-341 [ 219 P. 1006]; Pacific States Corp. v. Grant, 87 Cal.App. 108 [ 261 P. 1100].) [1] The only written stipulation here involved quoted above, extended the time for trial to November 10, 1931, unless the "convenience of the court" required a further continuance.

) Prior to this amendment, section 1008 was not jurisdictional. ( Josephson v. Superior Court (1963) 219 Cal.App.2d 354 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 196]; Moore v. Moore (1955) 133 Cal.App.2d 56 [ 283 P.2d 338]; Pacific States Corp. v. Grant (1927) 87 Cal.App. 108 [ 261 P. 1100].) In 1998, section 1008 was amended again to add subdivision (g), making the section applicable to all applications for interim orders.

However, the requirements of this section do not go to the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the second motion. ( Andersen v. Superior Court, 187 Cal. 95, 102 [ 200 P. 963]; Pacific States Corp. v. Grant, 87 Cal.App. 108, 111 [ 261 P. 1100]; Tiffany Productions, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, p. 735; Moore v. Moore, 133 Cal.App.2d 56, 60 [ 283 P.2d 338]; Radlinski v. Superior Court, 186 Cal.App.2d 821, 823 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 73]; 34 Cal.Jur. 2d § 14, p. 518; 1 Witkin, California Procedure, § 252, pp. 771-772; 2 Witkin, California Procedure, § 12, p. 1649.) Section 1008, Code of Civil Procedure, provides: "When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to the court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted conditionally, or on terms, and subsequent application for the same order, upon an alleged different state of facts, shall be made, it shall be shown by affidavit what application was before made, when and to what judge, what order or decision was made thereon and what new facts are claimed to be shown.

The matters thus relied on are not sufficient to bring this case within any of the established exceptions, and the record sustains the trial court's finding to that effect. ( Pacific States Corp. v. Grant, 87 Cal.App. 108 [ 261 P. 1100]; Rosenfelt v. Scholtz, 17 Cal.App.2d 443 [ 62 P.2d 381]; Christin v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.2d 526 [ 71 P.2d 205, 112 A.L.R. 1153]; Miller Lux v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. 333 [ 219 P. 1006]; Smith v. Bear Valley Mill Lbr. Co., 26 Cal.2d 590 [ 160 P.2d 1].) [5] It is next contended that the defendant city was estopped from moving for a dismissal by its own conduct.

The point decided in Mercantile Investment Co. v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. 770 [ 25 P.2d 12], was that a written stipulation consenting to the filing of a third amended complaint had the effect of starting the running of the statute anew from the date of such filing. And in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 117 Cal.App. 528 [ 4 P.2d 294], Sedarovich v. Paul, 16 Cal.App. (2d) 452 [ 60 P.2d 871], Central Pac. R.R. Co. v. Riley, 31 Cal.App. 394 [ 160 P. 844], Barry v. Learner, 113 Cal.App. 651 [ 299 P. 82], and Pacific States Corp. v. Grant, 87 Cal.App. 108 [ 261 P. 1100], the written instruments relied on as stipulations did not go beyond the point of consenting to the dropping of the cases from the calendar to be reset on notice, and contained no agreement, as here, that such dislodgment should not "in any respect" operate to the prejudice or disadvantage of the plaintiff. The writ is denied and the proceeding is dismissed.

( Kenney v. Kelleher, 63 Cal. 444.) A reference to some of the authorities by which it has been held that as to certain motions and ensuing orders the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable may be helpful: To vacate a default judgment ( Kenney v. Kelleher, supra); to vacate sheriff's return on execution and to order a new sale ( Johnson v. Nelson, supra); to change place of trial of action ( Johnston v. Brown, supra; but see Karst v. Seller, supra); to dismiss action ( Ventura County v. Clay, supra; Andersen v. Superior Court, 187 Cal. 95 [ 200 P. 963]; Pacific States Corp. v. Grant, 87 Cal.App. 108 [ 261 P. 1100]); in effect to be placed in possession of property ( Bowers v. Cherokee Bob, supra); to issue an alias writ, or to require sheriff to execute writ ( Ford v. Doyle, supra); to vacate order of execution of judgment on ground that the summons never was served ( Cooper v. Miller, 165 Cal. 31 [ 130 P. 1048]; see, also, Boggs v. Clark, 37 Cal. 236); for alimony ( Gay v. Gay, supra). In the case of Andersen v. Superior Court, supra, it is said: "Section 182 (Code Civ. Proc.) does not apply to the renewal of a motion refused for informality of the moving papers or proceedings, or in cases where leave to renew is given; and, in any event, does not go to the jurisdiction of the court to entertain a second motion. . . ."

Before Woley , courts were generally resistant to the use of estoppel as a mechanism to enforce oral agreements to extend statutory trial deadlines. (Miller & Lux , supra , 192 Cal. at p. 339, 219 P. 1006 ; Larkin v. Superior Court , supra , 171 Cal. at pp. 725–726, 154 P. 841 ; Pacific States Corp. v. Grant (1927) 87 Cal.App. 108, 115–117, 261 P. 1100.) g. Woley v. Turkus