Summary
In Pacific Fisheries Corp v. Power Transmission Products, Inc., 2000 WL 1670917 (D. Hawai'i 2000), Pacific Fisheries filed suit in Hawaii as a result of an explosion involving a steel ammonia tank stored on the deck of a fishing vessel which was located in Hawaii.
Summary of this case from Burdick v. Dylan Aviation, LLCOpinion
Civil No. 00-00298 SOM/BMK
October 17, 2000
Alexander Marrack (argued the motion) Honolulu, HI; George W. Ashford, Jr. (present, but did not argue), Ashford Associates, Kailua, HI, Attorney for Plaintiff.
Daniel Obuhanych, Burke Sakai McPheeters Bordner Iwanaga Estes, Honolulu, HI, Attorney for Defendant.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT POWER TRANSMISSION PRODUCTS, INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
I. INTRODUCTION.
Plaintiff Pacific Fisheries Corp. ("Pacific") claims that a steel ammonia tank stored on the deck of the fishing vessel F/V Icy Point (the "Icy Point") exploded while the vessel was in Hawaii, causing ammonia in the tank to be discharged into the atmosphere. The explosion allegedly injured several workers and caused damage to a nearby ice plant.
Pacific, the owner of the Icy Point, alleges that Defendant Airgas-Norpac, Inc. ("Airgas") owned the tank and had leased it to Defendant Power Transmission Products, Inc. ("Power Transmission") a few years before the accident. Power Transmission then allegedly subleased the tank to Pacific for use on the Icy Point, where it ultimately exploded. Pacific claims that Airgas and/or Power Transmission asked Defendant Oxarc, Inc. ("Oxarc") to fill the tank with ammonia, that the tank was overfilled, and that the tank was thereby rendered dangerously defective. Pacific alleges that this defective condition caused the explosion. Pacific therefore seeks exoneration from or limitation of liability pursuant to the Federal Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 181-189, as well as damages against Power Transmission.
Pacific also initially sued Airgas and Oxarc, which moved to dismiss the claims against them for lack of personal jurisdiction. Receiving no opposition to these motions, the court entered an Order 1) Granting Defendant Oxarc, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Filed on June 15, 2000, and 2) Granting Defendant Airgas-Norpac, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Filed on July 12, 2000. Accordingly, the court now considers only Power Transmission's Motion to Dismiss.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2), Power Transmission has moved to dismiss this case for lack of personal jurisdiction. Because (1) Power Transmission allegedly subleased the ammonia tank to Pacific, knowing that Pacific would take the tank to Hawaii; (2) Pacific's claims arise out of activities by Power Transmission related to Hawaii; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable, the court exercises specific personal jurisdiction over Power Transmission. Accordingly, Power Transmission's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
II. BACKGROUND.
The Complaint alleges that, on October 22, 1999, the Icy Point was moored at Pier 13, Honolulu Harbor. Complaint ¶ 6. On that date, a steel ammonia tank stored on the Icy Point's weather deck allegedly exploded, causing ammonia in the tank to be discharged into the atmosphere. Id. Pacific, the owner of the Icy Point, claims that this ammonia injured several crewmen and workers. Id. The explosion also allegedly damaged an adjoining ice plant. Id.
The tank was allegedly overfilled with ammonia by Oxarc when Airgas and/or Power Transmission requested the tank be filled. Id. ¶ 18. Pacific claims that, as a result of the alleged overfilling, the tank would explode if subjected to ambient air temperatures in the range of 80x to 90x F. Id. ¶ 18.
Pacific further alleges that Airgas, the owner of the tank, had leased the tank to Power Transmission at some time during or before August 1997. Id. ¶ 21. In August 1997, Power Transmission then allegedly subleased the tank to Pacific for possible use for refrigeration purposes aboard the Icy Point. Declaration of Leroy John Johnson ¶ 5 (August 12, 2000) ("Johnson Dec."). The tank was stowed in full view on the Icy Point's main weather deck. Id. ¶ 6.
Power Transmission argues that it did not sublease the tank to Pacific. See Power Transmission's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction at 2. It claims that Pacific took the tank without permission. Id. As Power Transmission notes, this factual dispute is irrelevant on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). Id. at 3. In a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, all factual disputes are resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. In re Pintlar Corp., 133 F.3d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 933 (1998).
During March 1998, the captain of the Icy Point paid sixty dollars to continue the sublease on the tank for six months.Id. ¶ 7. The captain says he informed Power Transmission's countermen on several occasions that the Icy Point was headed to Honolulu and would be fishing out of Honolulu for the indefinite future. Id. ¶ 8. The tank remained on the Icy Point's main weather deck continuously until October 22, 1999, at which time it exploded while the vessel was moored at Pier 13, in Honolulu, Hawaii. Id. ¶ 9.
Pacific alleges that Power Transmission failed to check the status of the tank and note that it was overfilled, failed to warn that the tank was prone to explosion at air temperatures between 80x and 90x F, and allowed the tank to be shipped with a label warning only that the tank should not be exposed to temperatures exceeding 125x F. Complaint ¶ 21-22. Pacific therefore claims that Power Transmission is strictly liable in tort to Pacific for all injuries and damages resulting to it from the tank explosion. Id. ¶ 27. The Complaint also alleges that Power Transmission's negligence caused the explosion. Id. ¶¶ 28, 30.
Power Transmission is an Oregon corporation with its principal place of business in Portland, Oregon. Affidavit of Timothy C. Andersen ¶ 2 (October 10, 2000) ("Andersen Aff."). Power Transmission does not advertise in, market to, or solicit business from Hawaii. Id. ¶ 3. Power Transmission has never owned any property or maintained any offices in Hawaii. Affidavit of Jeff Boyd ¶ 4 (June 13, 2000) ("Boyd Aff."). Power Transmission does not have any employees, sales agents, or distributors in Hawaii. Andersen Aff. ¶ 3.
Power Transmission says it made one sale to Unitek Solvent Service, Inc., a Hawaii corporation, on September 29, 1998, for approximately $1,279. Andersen Aff. ¶ 4. Power Transmission says it also made eight sales to Hapuna Beach Prince Hotel, on the island of Hawaii, between May 9, 2000 and July 18, 2000. Id. ¶ 5. The total amount of these eight purchases was approximately $1500. Id. These purchases were not the result of solicitation or advertising directed at Hawaii, and the total amount of these purchases was less than 1 percent of Power Transmission's annual sales. Id. ¶ 6.
Power Transmission has moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). Power Transmission specifically argues that it does not have sufficient contacts in Hawaii for this court to assert general or specific personal jurisdiction over it. Pacific opposes Power Transmission's Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that: (1) Power Transmission's business contacts with Hawaii subject Power Transmission to the general personal jurisdiction of this court; and (2) this court has specific personal jurisdiction over Power Transmission because Power Transmission subleased the tank to Pacific with the knowledge that Pacific would take the tank to Hawaii. This court exercises specific but not general personal jurisdiction over Power Transmission.
III. RULE 12(b)(2) STANDARD.
A motion to dismiss will be granted when there is no personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). It is the plaintiff's burden to establish personal jurisdiction.Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1995);Fernandez v. McDaniel Controls, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 1365, 1367 (D. Haw. 1998). When, as here, a district court acts on a defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) without holding an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need make only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to dismiss. See Pacific Atl. Trading Co. v. M/V Main Exp., 758 F.2d 1325, 1327 (9th Cir. 1985); Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Tech. Assoc., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977). The plaintiff need only demonstrate facts that, if true, would support jurisdiction over the defendant. Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1285. All factual disputes are resolved in favor of the nonmoving party.In re Pintlar Corp., 133 F.3d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 933 (1998).
IV. ANALYSIS.
A proper exercise of "[p]ersonal jurisdiction requires a two-part showing: (1) that the forum state has an applicable statute conferring jurisdiction on nonresidents, and (2) that the assertion of jurisdiction under the statute comports with constitutional requirements of due process." People's Ins. Co. of China v. M/V Damodar Tanabe, 903 F.2d 675, 678-79 (9th Cir. 1990). The "jurisdictional inquiries under state law and federal due process merge into one analysis" when, as here, the state's long-arm statute is "coextensive with federal due process requirements." Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 620 (9th Cir. 1991).
Hawaii's long-arm statute, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 634-35, was adopted to expand the jurisdiction of Hawaii's courts to the extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cowan v. First Ins. Co. of Hawaii, 61 Haw. 644, 649, 608 P.2d 394, 399 (1980). See also Complaint of Damodar Bulk Carriers, Ltd., 903 F.2d 675, 679 (9th Cir. 1990).
Jurisdiction can be exercised over a nonresident defendant without violating notions of due process only when the defendant has "certain minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation omitted). Therefore, the central inquiry for this court concerns the relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977). There are two types of relationships with Hawaii that can give rise to personal jurisdiction over a defendant. These two relationships result in general jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction. See Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1995).
General Jurisdiction.
A court may exercise general jurisdiction when the defendant is a resident or domiciliary of the forum state, or when the defendant's contacts with the forum state are "substantial" or "continuous and systematic." Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16 (1984). Power Transmission is not a resident or domiciliary of Hawaii. If general jurisdiction over Power Transmission is to be exercised, that jurisdiction must therefore arise either because Power Transmission's contacts with Hawaii were "substantial" or because they were "continuous and systematic."
Pacific has failed to establish that Power Transmission's contacts with Hawaii were "substantial" or "continuous and systematic." The record indicates that Power Transmission made one sale to Unitek Solvent Service, Inc., on Oahu for $1,279 and eight sales over a two-month period to Hapuna Beach Prince Hotel on the island of Hawaii for approximately $1,500. These sales were not the result of solicitation or advertising directed at Hawaii, and the total amount of these sales was less than 1 percent of Power Transmission's annual sales.
Pacific also claims that a number of fishing vessels operating out of Hawaii purchase goods from Power Transmission in Oregon. See Johnson Dec. ¶ 11. The court does not consider this evidence because Pacific has not established, or even alleged, that Power Transmission was aware that it sold products to Hawaii-based vessels.
These types of sales are not the type of substantial, continuous, or systematic contacts necessary to establish general personal jurisdiction. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 417-19 (stating that "mere purchases, even if occurring at regular intervals, are not enough to warrant a State's assertion of in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation"). The Ninth Circuit has regularly "declined to find general jurisdiction even where the contacts are quite extensive." Amoco Egypt Oil Co. v. Leonis Navigation Co., 1 F.3d 848, 851 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1990), and Cubbage v. Merchent, 744 F.2d 665, 667-68 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005 (1985)). The sales to Unitek Solvent Service, Inc., and Hapuna Beach Prince Hotel do not establish that Power Transmission had extensive, substantial, continuous, or systematic contacts with Hawaii. Because the record contains no further evidence of Power Transmission's contacts with Hawaii, Pacific has failed to meet its burden of establishing that this court has general jurisdiction over Power Transmission.
Specific Jurisdiction.
When general jurisdiction does not exist, the court may nevertheless exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant. See Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 473. A court may exercise this limited personal jurisdiction over a defendant if "the specific cause of action arises out of a defendant's more limited contacts with the [forum] state." See Roth, 942 F.2d at 620. The Ninth Circuit has articulated a three-pronged analysis to determine when it is proper for a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Id. at 620-21. The exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with due process when:
(1) a nonresident defendant performs some act by which it avails itself of the benefits and protections of the forum's laws;
(2) the claim arises out of or results from the defendant's forum-related activities; and
(3) the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable.
Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co., Ltd., Osaka, 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1983); accord Roth, 942 F.2d at 620-21; Fernandez, 999 F. Supp. at 1367. The court will therefore examine each of these criteria.
Purposeful Availment.
"By requiring that individuals have fair warning that a particular activity may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign, the Due Process Clause gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The fair warning requirement is satisfied if the defendant has "purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum, and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities." Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
"[F]oreseeability of causing injury in another State . . . is not a sufficient benchmark for exercising personal jurisdiction." Id. at 474. "Instead, the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis . . . is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." Id. "[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state." Id. at 474-75. "This purposeful availment requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts, or of the unilateral activity of another party or a third person." Id. at 475 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
In Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co., Ltd., Osaka, 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1983), the Ninth Circuit considered whether a defendant becomes subject to personal jurisdiction merely by placing a product into the stream of commerce with the knowledge that the product is likely to arrive in the forum state. Hedrick involved a products liability action brought in Oregon against a Japanese manufacturer of wire-rope splices designed to be used on ships serving world ports. Id. at 1356. The Ninth Circuit held that a manufacturer that delivers products into the stream of commerce expecting them to reach the forum state may be sued in the forum state. Id. at 1358.
The plaintiff in Hedrick was severely and permanently injured when a defective splice in a wire rope pulled loose, allowing a ship's boom to sweep out of control and hit him. Id. at 1356. The splice was manufactured by Daiko Shoji Co., Ltd. of Osaka, Japan ("Daiko"). Id. Daiko admitted that it was "in the business of splicing wires used on ocean-going ships" and that "it spliced the wire pendant that failed." Id.
The district court granted Daiko's motion to quash service of summons and dismissed the claim against Daiko on the ground that the court did not have personal jurisdiction over Daiko. Id. The district court stated "that the `arrival of the cables in Oregon was completely fortuitous. This was Daiko's only known contact with Oregon. And, absent any other contact with Oregon, the due process requirements for personal jurisdiction for an out-of-state defendant are not satisfied.'" Id.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit examined whether Daiko had purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of Oregon's laws "when it produced a splice that it knew was destined for ocean going vessels serving United States ports, including those of Oregon." Id. at 1358. The Ninth Circuit noted that "in cases where a defendant delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will reach the forum state, `the forum's court may assert personal jurisdiction.'" Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980)).
The Ninth Circuit found that, although Daiko produced splices only in Japan, it provided splices for ships that serve world ports. Id. The court stated that the "splice caused an injury to Hedrick in a port that was within the expected service area of Daiko's customers." Id. The court concluded that a "manufacturer or supplier of a defective product who knew or should have known that a product would enter the stream of foreign commerce can be subjected, consistently with due process, to a forum state's long arm jurisdiction and be sued in the forum where the injury occurred." Id. at 1358.
Based on Hedrick, this court concludes that Power Transmission purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Hawaii. Power Transmission "knew or should have known" that the ammonia tank would be transported to Hawaii. Power Transmission allegedly subleased the ammonia tank to Pacific for use on the Icy Point knowing that the ammonia tank was destined for use in Hawaii. Power Transmission made no effort to retrieve the tank that it had subleased to Pacific before the Icy Point left for Hawaii.
It was therefore not a unilateral act by Pacific that brought the ammonia tank to Hawaii. The tank was brought to Hawaii because Power Transmission subleased it to Pacific and allowed it to be brought here. Power Transmission received a direct economic benefit by subleasing the ammonia tank to Pacific and allegedly authorizing its transport to Hawaii. Power Transmission therefore had an ownership interest in property located in Hawaii when the Icy Point took the ammonia tank there. By allegedly subleasing the ammonia tank with the knowledge that it would be transported to Hawaii, Power Transmission affirmatively availed itself of the privilege and benefit of having its equipment stored and operated in Hawaii. This contact, although not extensive, is sufficient under Hedrick to establish that Power Transmission should have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in Hawaii.
Power Transmission argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), controls the present situation. In Asahi, a Japanese company ("Asahi") manufactured a valve stem that was incorporated into a tire manufactured by a Taiwanese company and installed on a Honda motorcycle. Id. at 106-07. The Honda motorcycle was shipped to California and sold to Gary Zurcher, a California resident. Id. Zurcher was injured in a motorcycle accident in California and brought a products liability action in a California state court, alleging that the tire was defective. Id. The personal injury suit against the Taiwanese tire manufacturer settled, but the manufacturer cross-claimed against Asahi for indemnification. Id. Asahi moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id.
The majority of the Supreme Court agreed that the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction by a California state court over a claim between two foreign companies was unreasonable and unfair. Id. at 116. The majority specifically determined that the exercise of jurisdiction by a California court was unreasonable given the international context, the heavy burden on an alien defendant of defending itself in a unfamiliar court system, and Zurcher's settlement, which left him and California with very little interest in the outcome of the dispute between the Taiwanese manufacturer and Asahi. Id. However, the justices could not agree on whether Asahi had purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of California law. Id. at 116-21.
A four-judge plurality (Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Powell, and Justice Scalia), in section IIA of the Asahi decision, disapproved of the Ninth Circuit's approach in Hedrick and adopted what has been referred to as the "stream-of-commerce plus" test. Id. at 112-13. Justice O'Connor stated that the mere placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act by a defendant purposefully directed toward a forum state. Id. at 112. Justice O'Connor concluded that additional conduct by a defendant is therefore necessary to support personal jurisdiction and that "awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State." Id.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun, disagreed with Justice O'Connor's interpretation of the stream-of-commerce theory. Id. at 116. Justice Brennan stated that additional conduct by the defendant was not necessary to support personal jurisdiction as "long as a participant in this process is aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State." Id. at 117. Justice Brennan therefore concluded that personal "jurisdiction premised on the placement of a product into the stream of commerce is consistent with the Due Process Clause," and a showing of additional conduct is not required. Id.
Justice Stevens wrote a separate opinion disagreeing with section IIA of Justice O'Connor's opinion. Id. at 121. Justice Stevens criticized Justice O'Connor's articulation of the "stream-of-commerce plus" test. Id. Specifically, because the majority of the Supreme Court had agreed that the exercise of jurisdiction over Asahi was unreasonable and unfair, Justice Stevens saw "no reason in this case for the plurality to articulate `purposeful direction' or any other test as the nexus between an act of a defendant and the forum State that is necessary to establish minimum contacts." Id.
Power Transmission relies on section IIA of Justice O'Connor's opinion. Id. at 105. Five justices expressly rejected Justice O'Connor's "stream-of-commerce plus" theory. Id. at 116-21. Accordingly, section IIA of Justice O'Connor's opinion is not the opinion of the majority of the Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Hedrick therefore has not been overruled by a majority of the Supreme Court and remains binding on this court.See Abuan v. General Electric Co., 735 F. Supp. 1479, 1487 (D.Guam 1990) (stating that the split by the Supreme Court in theAsahi decision justifies reference to Hedrick); Western Helicopters, Inc. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp., 715 F. Supp. 1486, 1490 (D.Or. 1989) (holding that section IIA of Asahi is not the opinion of the majority of the Supreme Court and that Hedrick remains the controlling case law in the Ninth Circuit).
In Omeluk v. Langsten Slip Batbyggeri A/S, the Ninth Circuit recognized that Hedrick had been disapproved in section IIA of Asahi. Omeluk v. Langsten Slip Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 271 (9th Cir. 1995). The Omeluk court noted that "if that portion of Asahi is the law, then Hedrick is no longer the law of this circuit." Omeluk, 52 F.3d at 271. However, the Omeluk court decided the case on the basis of the part of Asahi that was agreed to by a majority of the Supreme Court. Omeluk, 52 F.3d at 271. The part of Omeluk that recognized the disapproval of Hedrick is therefore dicta and not binding on this court.
Power Transmission also analogizes the present case to the situations in Fernandez v. McDaniel Controls, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 1365 (D. Haw. 1998), and Alvarez v. Aircraft Modular Products, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 1470 (D. Haw. 1996). In Fernandez, the court refused to find specific jurisdiction over a Louisiana distributor of a pressure gauge on an oxygen tank that exploded in Hawaii, ruling that the distributor's contacts with Hawaii were insufficient to support specific jurisdiction. Fernandez, 999 F. Supp. at 1368. Power Transmission argues that there are no material differences between Fernandez and the present case. However, the defendant in Fernandez had no "direct contact with Hawaii customers or residents." Id. at 1368. The defendant instead shipped gauges to middlemen and distributors who did not reside in Hawaii. Id. There was no evidence in Fernandez that the defendant knew that the gauge that exploded was destined for Hawaii. Id. at 1367-68.
Power Transmission, on the other hand, allegedly subleased the tank to Pacific knowing that it would end up in Hawaii. Power Transmission therefore had an ownership interest in property that was in Hawaii when it exploded. Accordingly, Power Transmission had more extensive contact with Hawaii than the defendant in Fernandez had. The Fernandez holding is therefore inapplicable to the present situation.
The plaintiff in Alvarez was injured by a "buffet unit" during a flight over the Atlantic Ocean. Alvarez, 949 F. Supp. at 1475. At the time of the injury, the plaintiff was based in Newark and a resident in Texas. Id. The plane was not en route to or from Hawaii. Id. Nevertheless, the plaintiff brought suit in Hawaii, arguing that the "buffet units" were installed on planes that would fly to or from Hawaii. Id. The court inAlvarez focused on the fact that the injury did not occur in Hawaii. Id. Because of this fact, the court determined that the defendant could not anticipate that it would be subject to suit in Hawaii for an injury suffered over the Atlantic Ocean. Id. Accordingly, the court did not exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. at 1477-78.
Power Transmission, by contrast, allegedly knew that the specific ammonia tank was destined for Hawaii. The injury to Pacific, unlike the injury to the plaintiff in Alvarez, did occur in Hawaii. Power Transmission therefore could anticipate that Pacific would bring suit in Hawaii.
This court relies on Hedrick in holding that Power Transmission purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of Hawaii's laws.
Relation to Forum-Related Activities.
This court will not assert specific jurisdiction over Power Transmission unless Pacific's claims arise out of or result Power Transmission's forum-related activities. Omeluk, 52 F.3d at 271. The issue before this court is whether, "but-for" Power Transmission's contacts with Hawaii, Pacific's claims would have arisen. Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995). Power Transmission allegedly subleased the ammonia tank to Pacific and allowed it to be taken to Hawaii. "But-for" Power Transmission's actions, the ammonia tank would not have been subleased to Pacific and would not have exploded in Hawaii. Pacific's claims therefore arose out of Power Transmission's forum-related activities.
Reasonableness.
Power Transmission must overcome "the presumption that the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable because it has been shown that [it] purposefully availed himself of the forum's benefits." Sinatra v. National Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal citation and quotation omitted). The burden thus shifts to Power Transmission "to present a compelling case that jurisdiction would be unreasonable." Id. The district court must balance the following seven factors to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable: "(1) the extent of the defendant's purposeful interjection into the forum state's affairs; (2) the burden on the defendant; (3) conflicts of law between the forum and defendant's home jurisdiction; (4) the forum's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the dispute; (6) the plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of an alternative forum." Roth, 942 F.2d at 623. None of the factors is dispositive and the district court must balance all seven. Id.
Purposeful Interjection.
"Even if there is sufficient interjection into the state to satisfy the purposeful availment prong, the degree of interjection is a factor to be weighed in assessing the overall reasonableness of jurisdiction under the reasonableness prong."Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Industries AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1488 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Power Transmission's contacts with Hawaii were not extensive. As set forth above, other than nine sales to Hawaii corporations, Power Transmission's only contact with Hawaii was the alleged sublease of the ammonia tank to Pacific. Because Power Transmission's contacts were few, this factor weighs against the exercise of personal jurisdiction, but this weight is not heavy. See id. at 1488 (stating that attenuated contacts weighed only slightly in the defendant's favor because the contacts, although slight, were sufficient to meet the purposeful availment prong).
Defendant's Burden.
A defendant's burden in litigating in the forum state is a factor in the assessment of reasonableness. Roth, 942 F.2d at 623. The Ninth Circuit has stated, however, that "unless the `inconvenience is so great as to constitute a deprivation of due process, it will not overcome clear justifications for the exercise of jurisdiction.'" Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1323 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Caruth v. International Psychoanalytical Ass'n, 59 F.3d 126, 128-29 (9th Cir. 1995).
Power Transmission argues that it will face significant expenses if it has to travel and transport witnesses to Hawaii to defend the case. While certainly Power Transmission will have to pay to bring its own employees to Hawaii for trial, it is not at all clear that this inconvenience outweighs the burden and cost Power Transmission would have of transporting witnesses from Hawaii to Oregon if the case is tried in Oregon. Certainly Power Transmission does not show that the inconvenience of litigating in Hawaii would deprive Power Transmission of due process. In this "era of fax machines and discount air travel, requiring [the defendant] to litigate in [a foreign jurisdiction] is not constitutionally unreasonable." Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1323 (internal quotations omitted). Due to the ease of travel and communication in the modern era, this factor is, on the present record, neutral.
Conflict of Laws.
The next factor concerns the extent to which the exercise of jurisdiction in Hawaii would conflict with the sovereignty of Oregon. Roth, 942 F.2d at 623. Pacific's claims seek relief under the Federal Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 181-189 and related admiralty principles of indemnification. Pacific's claims do not require the application of state law. Accordingly, no conflict exists between the sovereignty of Oregon and that of Hawaii, and this factor presents no barrier to litigation in Hawaii and therefore weighs in Pacific's favor. See United Kingdom Mutual S.S. Assurance Ass'n, Ltd. v. Continental Maritime of San Francisco, Inc., No. C-91-2798, 1992 W.L. 486937, at *5 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 31, 1992) (stating that because there was no conflict between Canadian law and U.S. law in that case, this factor weighed in favor of the exercise of specific jurisdiction).
Forum's State Interest.
Pacific is a California corporation and not a citizen of Hawaii. Hawaii therefore does not have an interest in this case such as would exist if Hawaii was providing an effective means of redress for one of its citizens. See Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 1200. However, the accident did occur in Hawaii and the injuries and damages occurred to several residents of Hawaii. The Icy Point was also operating out of Hawaii at the time of the accident. Hawaii's interest in adjudicating this suit therefore weighs in favor of Pacific.
Efficient Judicial Resolution.
Consideration of the efficiency of the forum focuses on the location of the witnesses and evidence. Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 475-76. This factor is no longer weighed heavily given the modern advances in communication and transportation. See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1323 (citing Caruth, 59 F.3d at 129). Power Transmission contends that a number of potential witnesses are located in Oregon and would have to travel to Hawaii for the lawsuit. Pacific, in contrast, claims that because the explosion happened in Hawaii, most of the witnesses to the accident are in Hawaii and would have to travel to another jurisdiction if the action is not heard in Hawaii. This factor does not weigh in favor of either party. Neither Power Transmission nor Pacific has expressly identified the potential witnesses for this case. The court therefore cannot determine on the present record whether Hawaii would be the most efficient forum to hear this case.
Convenient and Effective Relief.
In analyzing this factor, little weight is given to a plaintiff's inconvenience. See Roth, 942 F.2d at 624. A court should place greater significance on the possibility of effective relief. See Core-Vent, 11 F.3d at 1489. Here, Pacific argues that it is more convenient to hear the case in Hawaii because many witnesses to the explosion are located here. Power Transmission argues, however, that not all possible defendants are amenable to suit in Hawaii, so that litigating this case in Hawaii will require that companion litigation occur elsewhere. This court notes that the companion litigation that concerns Power Transmission is litigation for contribution, an issue that could conceivably be rendered moot if Power Transmission prevails against Pacific. As Power Transmission has no contribution claims pending at present, this court will not engage in speculation as to whether an alternate forum would allow contribution claims to be tried with Pacific's claim. On the present record, this factor is neutral.
Alternative Forum.
Pacific bears the burden of proving the unavailability of an alternative forum. See Core-Vent, 11 F.3d at 1490. Here, Pacific has not met that burden. As an alternative forum may exist for Pacific's suit, this factor may weigh against the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
After balancing the relative weight of each factor, the court concludes that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Power Transmission is reasonable. Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 1201. Although some factors weigh slightly against the exercise of personal jurisdiction, the court recognizes that there is a presumption of reasonableness given Power Transmission's contacts with Hawaii. See id. Power Transmission has the burden of rebutting that presumption. See id. Because Power Transmission does not do that, this court finds it reasonable to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Power Transmission.
CONCLUSION.
Because Power Transmission allegedly subleased the ammonia tank to Pacific and allowed it to be taken to Hawaii, Power Transmission could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Hawaii. Pacific's claims arose out of Power Transmission's forum-related activities, and the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Power Transmission is reasonable. Accordingly, Power Transmission's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.