Opinion
Civ. File No. 04-3302 (PAM/RLE).
May 11, 2005
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Cross-Motions for Judgment on the Administrative Record. For the reasons that follow, the Court denies Plaintiffs' Motion and grants Defendant School Board of Independent School District No. 11's Motion.
The Court previously found that Defendant Alice Seagren, in her capacity as the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Education, was an improper party and therefore dismissed her from this action. (See Dec. 1, 2004, Order.)
BACKGROUND
This case arises from an appeal of a special education administrative due process decision under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. ("IDEA"). Plaintiff Sarah Pachl is a twelve-year-old child with developmental disabilities, including epilepsy, Dandy Walker syndrome, scoliosis, bilateral hearing loss, and autism spectrum disorder. She does not yet read and is working on attaining basic communication skills. Because she is disabled, Sarah is entitled to receive special education and related services under the IDEA. Defendant Independent School District No. 11 ("School District") is the local educational agency responsible for Sarah's education under the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(15). As such, it is obligated to develop an individualized education plan ("IEP") for Sarah. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412.
Sarah attended elementary school at Hoover Elementary School, and was fully integrated for more than seventy percent of her school day, with time away from the mainstream education for occupational therapy, physical therapy, speech/language services, and adaptive physical education. While in the mainstream classroom, Sarah received the support of an instructional assistant and made progress on her IEP goals.
When Sarah was to enter sixth grade at Coon Rapids Middle School in Fall 2003, the School District determined that Sarah should attend a segregated program, known as the Structured Teaching and Related Strategies ("STARS") program. STARS is a center-based program for special education students that focuses on structured teaching strategies. It incorporates communication and social skills interaction, sensory modulation techniques, applied behavior analysis, discrete trial training strategies, and assistive technology.
In August 2003, the School District developed an interim placement in which Sarah spent part of her day in mainstream classroom and part of her day in the STARS program. (Def.'s Ex. 15.) The interim placement was designed to provide Plaintiffs Kevin and Susanne Pachl (collectively "Parents") the opportunity to secure an expert to evaluate the appropriateness of placing Sarah in both center-based and mainstream classrooms. Parents hired Dr. Alice Udvari-Solner, an expert in special education and inclusive educational practice, to observe Sarah in both mainstream and special education classes and to review Sarah's educational history.
In the meantime, the School District began developing a new IEP for Sarah. After School District staff reported on Sarah's present level of performance and determined her IEP needs, the School District and Parents exchanged numerous correspondence. In addition, they met on several occasions from October 2003 to January 2004 to discuss various aspects of the IEP. One issue they discussed was Sarah's extended school year ("ESY") placement. Parents maintained that Sarah should participate in a twelve week, five-day-per-week, ESY program in Summer 2004. The School District responded that Sarah had attended a six-week, part-time ESY program the previous summer and had not suffered a regression of skills. On Parents' request, the School District decided to reserve its determination of Sarah's ESY program until Dr. Udvari-Solner had the opportunity to present her report and recommendation.
In January 2004, Dr. Udvari-Solner presented her report, which concluded that (1) Sarah should receive most of her education in general education classes, (2) the IEP goals referenced in the proposed IEP could be carried out in the general education classes, and (3) the STARS program was unnecessarily restrictive. (Pls.' Ex. FF at 6-8.) Dr. Udvari-Solner further found that Sarah's integration in the mainstream was poor. (Id. at 8-10.) She therefore concluded that the interim IEP program was neither appropriate nor educationally beneficial to Sarah as currently implemented. (Id. at 10.) Thus, Dr. Udvari-Solner recommended that Sarah not participate in the STARS program and that she be fully included in mainstream classes with supplementary aids and services. (Id. at 15-17.)
Thereafter, the School District reviewed Dr. Udvari-Solner's report and met with Parents in January and February 2004 to discuss its application on Sarah's educational program. Although the School District incorporated some of Dr. Udvari-Solner's recommendations, it rejected others. For example, the School District rejected the recommendation to discontinue instruction in the STARS program, reasoning that Sarah had shown progress in response to these strategies and because the strategies were consistent with past recommendations regarding instruction techniques. (Def.'s Ex. 136 at 5; see also Def.'s Ex. 152 at 1-3.) The School District also rejected Dr. Udvari-Solner's recommendation that Sarah primarily concentrate on curriculum that closely parallels the curriculum of her non-disabled peers. The School District rejected that recommendation because "such a restrictive focus would ultimately prove harmful to Sarah. Sarah has significant needs that cannot be met using the general education curriculum, even when such curriculum has been modified and accommodated to an extreme." (Def.'s Ex. 136 at 5.)
The School District prepared a proposed IEP that served as a draft for an upcoming meeting on March 15, 2004. The School District noted that any changes to the draft could be made at the meeting so as to provide Parents with an IEP proposal by the meeting's end. When Kevin Pachl responded that he was uncertain if he could attend the March 15 meeting, the School District offered to arrange for him to participate in the meeting via telephone and stated that the School District would consider any input Parents wished to provide in advance of the meeting. Parents did not participate in the meeting and did not provide comments in advance.
On March 17, 2004, the School District sent Parents a proposed IEP, which was based on past evaluations and reports from Sarah's doctors and Dr. Udvari-Solner, as well as evaluations completed during the 2003-2004 school year by School District staff. (Def.'s Ex. 136.) While Sarah's then-current IEP called for her to spend approximately 28% of her school day (approximately 112 minutes) in the mainstream setting and the rest of her time in the STARS program, the proposed IEP increased Sarah's time in the mainstream to more than half of her day (approximately 280 minutes) and proposed that Sarah spend the remaining 120 minutes in the STARS program. The School District concluded that Sarah needed the STARS center-based instruction to develop skills in a less distracting environment. Specifically, it found that "Sarah needs tasks set up in a structured manner and requires multiple repetitions to make progress" and that she "requires some direct instruction in a quiet environment to work on her specific communication skills." (Id. at 31.)
The proposed IEP also provided that Sarah receive six weeks of ESY services during Summer 2004 in the form of a classroom site program and participation in community based programs. It reasoned that this plan would provide Sarah the services needed to prevent regression and to maintain self-sufficiency, but would allow Sarah to participate with same age peers in community activities. (Id. at 43.) Parents rejected the proposed IEP on March 29, 2004. (Def.'s Ex. 137 at 5.)
On April 20, 2004, Parents informed the School District that they intended to place Sarah in an eight-week ESY program at Children's Care Hospital and School ("CCHS"), a residential hospital facility in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Parents also informed the School District that they would be seeking reimbursement from the School District for $22,000 for the CCHS program. (Def.'s Ex. 145.) Initially, the School District denied the request for the CCHS reimbursement, explaining that it was confident that it could provide Sarah with an appropriate ESY program. In addition, the School District opined that CCHS was an unnecessarily restrictive program. (Def.'s Ex. 147.) Nevertheless, Parents insisted that Sarah attend CCHS, and subsequently requested that the School District reimburse Parents for the tuition portion of the placement. Ultimately, the School District agreed to pay for the tuition portion of Sarah's placement at CCHS. (See Tr. 7-8; Def.'s Ex. 150.)
On May 11, 2004, Parents provided detailed objections to the proposed IEP. In particular, they objected to the inclusion of the STARS program, opining that it unnecessarily separated Sarah from non-disabled students and did not address the nonacademic benefit that Sarah would receive from mainstreaming. In addition, Parents submitted that the proposed IEP failed to identify an appropriate ESY program, and that the School District never fully considered CCHS as an option. (Def.'s Ex. 148.)
In the meantime, the School District retained Dr. Robert J. Miller, a Ph.D. and professor of special education for the Minnesota State University system, to review Dr. Udvari-Solner's recommendations and observe Sarah in both mainstream and STARS environments. Disagreeing with Dr. Udvari-Solner, Dr. Miller opined that the STARS program, with its structured teaching and strategies, was well regarded and appropriate for Sarah given her cognitive capacity and autistic-like characteristics. He also opined that placement of Sarah in the academic classroom would deny her the opportunity for an appropriate education.
After the Parents rejected the proposed IEP, the School District requested a special education administrative due process hearing, which occurred over three days in May 2004. The hearing addressed three issues: (1) whether the proposed IEP provided Sarah with an education in the least restrictive environment; (2) whether the School District had violated the procedural requirements of the IDEA in developing the proposed IEP; and (3) whether the School District was responsible for reimbursing Parents for all of the ESY costs associated with sending Sarah to CCHS. Ultimately, the hearing officer upheld the School District's proposal. Although the hearing officer noted that the proposed IEP goals "could be implemented in the mainstream," the officer nevertheless found that the proposed IEP was more appropriate and was "reasonably calculated to provide the student with meaningful educational benefit." (Compl. Ex. B at Findings of Fact ¶ 35; id. at Conclusion ¶ 5.) In addition, the officer concluded that the School District proved that the proposed IEP was developed according to the procedural requirements of the IDEA. (Id. at Conclusion ¶ 5.) Finally, the officer held that the School District did not have to pay the costs of CCHS, as the School District had already paid the tuition and because the School District — not CCHS — was the least restrictive setting for Sarah to receive ESY services. (Id. at Conclusion ¶ 7.)
The Complaint in this action lists multiple substantive and procedural grounds on which this appeal is based. However, Plaintiffs now focus on two primary issues. First, they claim that the School District violated Sarah's rights under the IDEA by refusing to mainstream her with non-disabled students to the maximum extent appropriate. Second, they claim that the School District violated Sarah's right to appropriate ESY services. The School District seeks dismissal of all claims and affirmation of the underlying administrative decision. Plaintiffs seek reversal of the administrative decision and an order that the School District educate Sarah in a mainstream class with supplementary aids and services.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Under the IDEA, a party may seek review of an administrative decision by bringing an action in federal district court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). At the administrative level, the School District bears the burden of showing that it complied with the IDEA. However, on an appeal to the district court, the party challenging the administrative decision has the burden of proof.E.S. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 196, 135 F.3d 566, 569 (8th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
Judicial review of the administrative record may occur even if there are disputed issues of material fact. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 283 v. S.D. by J.D., 88 F.3d 556, 561 (8th Cir. 1996). The Court must base its decision on the preponderance of the evidence. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B)(iii); Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022, 1028 (8th Cir. 2003). "Because judges are not trained educators, judicial review under the IDEA is limited." E.S., 135 F.3d at 569. Thus, the Court must give due weight to the results of the administrative proceedings, and must resist any temptation to "substitute [its] own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities." Id. (citation omitted).
B. The IDEA
The IDEA provides federal funds to assist states in educating disabled children. To receive the funds, states must provide free, appropriate public education to all of its disabled students by formulating IEPs tailored to their unique needs. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a). The IEP must detail the child's educational performance and goals, as well as the services to be provided to the child. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 300.347(a). A school meets its obligation if the disabled student's IEP is "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits." Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982).
The IDEA also imposes extensive procedural requirements to assure the proper classification and consequent educational placement of the child. Parents must be notified of any proposed change in the "identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child . . . or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3). In addition, parents must be permitted to be present when the child's IEP is formulated, must be permitted to obtain an independent educational evaluation of the child, and must be permitted to bring a complaint about any matter relating to such evaluation and education. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b); 34 C.F.R. § 300.346.
C. Mainstreaming
Plaintiffs maintain that the proposed placement in the STARS program violates the IDEA because it does not allow Sarah to be educated in the least restrictive environment. They further allege that the hearing officer applied an incorrect legal standard to determine the least restrictive environment. Plaintiffs also argue that the hearing officer erroneously relied on the testimony of Dr. Miller, who opined that the STARS program was appropriate for Sarah. In addition, they submit that the hearing officer erroneously discounted the opinion of Dr. Udvari-Solner, who concluded that each goal and objective set forth in the proposed IEP could be implemented in a mainstream setting.
The IDEA requires that disabled children be educated with non-disabled children "to the maximum extent appropriate," or in other words, in the least restrictive environment. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5); 34 C.F.R. § 300.550. Thus, a strong preference for mainstreaming or inclusion exists. A.W. v. Northwest R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 162-63 (8th Cir. 1987). However, this preference is not absolute. Id. The IDEA recognizes that a student may need to be removed from the regular classroom "when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.550; Rowley, 458 U.S. at 181 n. 4 ("Congress recognized that regular classrooms simply would not be a suitable setting for the education of many handicapped children."). Thus, although the IDEA strongly encourages mainstreaming, it does so only to the extent that the inclusion does not prevent a student from receiving meaningful educational benefit. As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals explained in Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989):
School districts must both seek to mainstream handicapped children and, at the same time, must tailor each child's educational placement and program to his special needs. Regular classes, however, will not provide an education that accounts for each child's particular needs in every case. The nature and severity of some children's handicaps is such that only special education can address their needs. For these children, mainstreaming does not provide an education designed to meet their unique needs and, thus, does not provide a free appropriate public education.
. . .
Although Congress preferred education in the regular education environment, it also recognized that regular education is not a suitable setting for educating many handicapped children. Thus, [the IDEA] allows school officials to remove a handicapped child from regular education or to provide special education if they cannot educate the child satisfactorily in the regular classroom. Even when school officials can mainstream the child, they need not provide for an exclusively mainstreamed environment; the Act requires school officials to mainstream each child only to the maximum extent appropriate . . . Schools must provide a free appropriate public education and must do so, to the maximum extent appropriate, in regular education classrooms. But when education in a regular classroom cannot meet the handicapped child's unique needs, the presumption in favor of mainstreaming is overcome and the school need not place the child in regular education.874 F.2d at 1044-45 (internal citations omitted).
When addressing the issue of mainstreaming, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted the analysis of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1983), which stated:
In a case where the segregated facility is considered superior, the court should determine whether the services which make that placement superior could be feasibly provided in a non-segregated setting. If they can, the placement in the segregated school would be inappropriate under the Act. Id. at 1063. The Roncker court identified three circumstances where moving a child to a segregated setting is appropriate: (1) when the disabled student would not benefit from mainstreaming; (2) when any marginal benefits of mainstreaming are far outweighed by the benefits gained from services which could not feasibly be provided in the non-segregated setting; or (3) when the disabled student is a "disruptive force" in the non-segregated setting. Id. The parties dispute whether Sarah would receive a meaningful benefit from full inclusion in the mainstream.
1. Educated in a Regular Classroom
Plaintiffs argue that the School District failed to show that Sarah could not be satisfactorily educated in a regular class. They focus greatly on the preference for mainstreaming and argue that if the student's goals and objectives can be implemented in a regular class, they must be implemented in a regular class. Plaintiffs offer expert opinion that none of the proposed IEP's goals require presence in the center-based classroom and that most could be carried out more appropriately and effectively in the regular education classroom. Indeed, the hearing officer noted that the goals and objectives in the proposed IEP "could be implemented in the mainstream" but ultimately concluded that "it would be more appropriate" for Sarah to be educated in the proposed program.
Plaintiffs rely heavily on Warton v. New Fairfield Bd. of Educ., 217 F. Supp. 2d 261 (D. Conn. 2002), where the district court found that the school district failed to consider supplementary aids and services available to mainstream a disabled child. However, Warton is factually distinguishable, as the school district in that case essentially dumped the child in mainstream classrooms and did not provide adequate aids. Then, after the child failed miserably, the school district separated her from non-disabled children.
In this case, the hearing officer reasonably concluded that the combination of STARS and mainstream programming called for under the proposed IEP is the most appropriate educational environment for Sarah. Sarah's teachers and service providers explained that, given her age and level of functioning, they believed that the increase in functional curriculum in the STARS program would increase her level of independent functioning in the adult world. The School District also determined that the functional curriculum could not be satisfactorily implemented within the regular education environment — even with supplemental aids and services — because of the nature and severity of Sarah's disabilities and her great level of educational need. Indeed, School District staff determined that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to incorporate the functional curriculum into the middle school curriculum, which focuses on increasingly abstract concepts. Moreover, staff noted that even if such a functional curriculum could be developed, it would likely not provide an opportunity for Sarah to work on her IEP goals, or provide her with any meaningful educational benefit.
The proposed mixture of STARS and mainstreaming will provide Sarah with social interactions with her same aged non-disabled peers and will provide her increased opportunities to learn and practice functional life skills in more natural settings. In that way, this case is similar to DeVries v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1989) and Beth B. v. Van Clay, 282 F.3d 493 (7th Cir. 2002). In DeVries, an autistic student appealed the district court's judgment upholding the school board's determination that a county vocational center rather than a public high school was the "appropriate" and "least restrictive" educational environment. The parties did not dispute that the student required considerable special treatment to enable him to function in an educational environment. Nevertheless, the student's parents insisted that the IDEA required the school district to mainstream the student. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the student would not receive an appropriate public education at the high school because the student could not be satisfactorily educated in regular classes even with the use of supplementary aids and services. It recognized that regular classes did not provide an "appropriate peer group academically, socially, or vocationally" for the student. 882 F.2d at 879. For example, even with an aide to assist the student in comprehending and in communicating, the student would be simply monitoring the high school classes and would have difficulty bridging the disparity in cognitive levels. He therefore would glean little from the lectures, and his individualized work would be at a much lower level than his classmates. Id. at 878-80. Based on these findings, the Court of Appeals held that the student could not be accommodated at the high school even with the use of supplementary aids and services. Id. at 880.
The seventeen year old student had an IQ of 72. His academic functioning was depressed, as his math and reading skills were measured at the fourth grade reading level. In addition, he required speech and language therapy and occupational therapy. Socially, he had difficulty with interpersonal communication and relationships.
In Beth B., the parents of a severely disabled child argued that as long as the child was receiving "some educational benefit" from the regular classroom, the school district could not remove her from that setting. The child had been in regular classrooms for seven years, working with a one-on-one aide and used an individualized curriculum tied to the subject matter of her peers. For example, when her peers worked on mathematics, the student was exposed to various numbers. When the class studied meteorology, the student looked at pictures of clouds. When the student approached seventh grade, the school district proposed that the student go to a special education program where the student was mainstreamed for several non-academic classes and then joined other students during lunch, recess, and field trips.
The thirteen year old child had Rett Syndrome, a neurological disorder that results in both cognitive and physical disabilities. The student was nonverbal. She used a board with various pictures and symbols that she singled out with eye contact to communicate. She relied on a wheelchair and had an extreme lack of control over body movement. Experts disagreed whether she had the cognitive ability of a twelve-to-eighteen month old infant or a four-to-six year old.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found a special education program appropriate for the student. It stated:
The relevant IDEA regulation provides that children may not be removed from the regular classroom unless their education there, with the use of supplementary aids and services, cannot be achieved satisfactorily.
. . .
[In the regular classroom, the student's] academic progress was virtually nonexistent and her developmental process was limited. Although the school district provided her with aides, communication devices, computerized books, and an individual curriculum, she was receiving very little benefit from her time there.
We agree with the school district's decision that a modicum of development achievement does not constitute a satisfactory education. 282 F.3d at 499. Rather, it found that the special education program — with the inclusion of non-disabled peers — satisfied the requirement that the student be mainstreamed to the maximum extent appropriate. Id.
The same is true in this case. With full inclusion, Sarah would essentially be among her peers, but not learning with them. Placing her in a learning environment in which she is inundated with lectures and instructions that she does not understand and which have no relevance to the work she is capable of doing is not providing her with a meaningful education. This creates a risk that Sarah will lose critical education time if placed in a fully mainstreamed academic program. The proposed IEP, with thirty percent of the day in the STARS program and seventy percent in the mainstream, provides an appropriate balance so that Sarah will receive a meaningful education and will also provide her with the social interaction and connection she needs. Accordingly, the hearing officer did not err when finding that the School District proved that the combination of the mainstream and STARS learning environments will provide Sarah a meaningful education in the least restrictive environment.
2. Supplementary Aids and Services
Plaintiffs also contend that the School District failed to consider a full range of supplementary aids and services that could help Sarah achieve her goals and objectives in mainstream classes. The School District responds that it considered the full range of supplemental aids and services suggested by Dr. Udvari-Solner. Indeed, School District staff on Sarah's IEP team discussed and analyzed the expert's report and recommendation and brought its analysis to the February 19, 2004, team meeting for discussion. (Tr. at 82-88.) Although several of the expert's suggestions were rejected, many were implemented immediately for Sarah or incorporated into the proposed IEP. The fact that the School District did not adopt the suggestions entirely does not compel the conclusion that the School District did not adequately consider the suggestions. Indeed, the School District provided detailed a explanation for not adopting the recommendations. (See Def.'s Ex. 136 at 4-6; Def.'s Ex. 152.) Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs failed to show that the School District did not consider a full range of supplementary aids and services.
Specifically, Udvari-Solner recommends that the School District use multi-level curriculum, multi-level and multi-sensory materials, varying lesson formats and instructional arrangements and student-specific teaching strategies. She also recommends co-planning, collaborative curriculum design, and on-going consultation by special education personnel and specialists to the classroom teacher. (See Pls.' Ex. FF at 10-15.)
D. Extended School Year
Extended school year services are "special education instruction and related services for pupils who demonstrate the need for continued service on days when school is not in session for all students as a necessary component of a free appropriate public education." Minn. R. 3525.0210, subp. 19. The School District must provide the student with personalized educational services designed to minimize skill regression and maintain performance of IEP goals and objectives. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.309(a).
Plaintiffs allege that the hearing officer erred in finding that the School District offered to pay for the tuition portion of CCHS for Summer 2004. However, the record before the Court shows otherwise. (See Def.'s Ex. 150.) Moreover, even if the hearing officer excluded the letter in which the School District offered to pay for Sarah's tuition, that exclusion is moot since the parties now agree that the School District has indeed offered to pay the tuition. The Court therefore finds that the School District properly agreed to pay the tuition portion of CCHS for Summer 2004.
Plaintiffs also allege that the hearing officer erred in finding that the School District paid for ESY for Sarah at CCHS during Summer 2003. However, that issue is moot since Summer 2003 is not an issue in this proceeding. Thus, the hearing officer's erroneous finding is harmless.
E. Procedural Violations
Although Plaintiffs allege several procedural violations in the Complaint, they address only two in these Motions. First, they contend that the hearing officer erroneously failed to make credibility findings of witnesses and did not accurately reflect the testimony of any witness. The Court disagrees and finds that the hearing officer sufficiently detailed her consideration of the evidence in this case.
For example, Plaintiffs allege that none of the meetings held during the 2003-2004 school year were held in a manner consistent with the IDEA. (Compl. ¶ 13.) Notably, Plaintiffs fail to allege that the alleged violations harmed Sarah's educational progress or Parents' right to notice, participation, or due process. Thus, the alleged procedural errors were harmless.
Plaintiffs also maintain that the hearing officer erroneously ignored the testimony of two witnesses who opined that the School District should have followed a different process in developing Sarah's IEP. There is no evidence that the hearing officer did not consider the testimony. Indeed, the hearing officer expressly found that the proposed IEP was developed according to the procedural requirements of the IDEA. (Compl. Ex. B at Conclusions ¶ 5.) Thus, Plaintiffs' argument on this point fails.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs have failed to show that the hearing officer erred in concluding that the School District complied with the IDEA when developing and implementing the IEP proposed to Parents on March 14, 2004. Accordingly, based on all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendant Independent School District No. 11's Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record (Clerk Doc. No. 47) is GRANTED; and
2. Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record (Clerk Doc. No. 52) is DENIED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.