(Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Paces Partnership v. Grant, 212 Ga. App. 621, 624 (2) ( 442 SE2d 826) (1994). "The construction which will uphold a contract in whole and in every part is to be preferred, and the whole contract should be looked to in arriving at the construction of any part.

Although Terry claims that the parties did not contemplate that the tortfeasor's insurer would become insolvent following a judgment rendered in the case, his claim would require us to look outside the language of the contract in an attempt to find ambiguity in the facts that developed, which we decline to do. "The court will take the contract by its four corners, and determine its meaning from its language, and, having ascertained from the arrangement of its words what its meaning is, will construe it accordingly." Paces Partnership v. Grant, 212 Ga. App. 621, 625 ( 442 S.E.2d 826) (1994). There is only one conclusion that can be drawn from an examination of the document: that in the event of a renewal action instituted against the UMC, State Farm would have the right to defend on liability and damages, notwithstanding any previous judgment obtained by Terry against the tortfeasor.

(Citation, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.) Paces Partnership v. Grant, 212 Ga.App. 621, 624 (2) (442 S.E.2d 826) (1994). SIPCO contends, and the trial court agreed, that because the purpose of an audit under Section 4.2 is for SIPCO to "verify[ ] the amounts owed" and to "verify . . . the accuracy of the reports furnished by [Mueller

When a lessee has a lease agreement for five or more years, an estate for years passes to the lessee. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-1; Roe v. Doe, 246 Ga. 138, 140 (1) ( 268 S.E.2d 901) (1980); Paces Partnership v. Grant, 212 Ga. App. 621, 624 (1) ( 442 S.E.2d 826) (1994); Searcy v. Peach County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 180 Ga. App. 531 ( 349 S.E.2d 515) (1986). However, a tenant under a contract for less than five years has only a usufruct, which is the rights and privileges arising as a matter of law from the landlord tenant relationship.

(Punctuation omitted.) Paces Partnership v. Grant, 212 Ga. App. 621, 624 ( 442 S.E.2d 826) (1994). This type of transfer clearly violated the interlocutory injunction.

Whatever unencumbered interests in land that the defendant-in-fifa could freely alienate by conveyance, the sheriff can levy and sell under the same rights of alienability as an interest in land. See generally OCGA § 9-13-60; Paces Partnership v. Grant, 212 Ga. App. 621, 624 (1) ( 442 S.E.2d 826) (1994); Hortman v. Childress, 162 Ga. App. 536, 537-538 ( 292 S.E.2d 200) (1982); Alderman v.Crenshaw, 84 Ga. App. 344, 346-347 (1) ( 66 S.E.2d 265) (1951). Any new tenant in common would then have standing as joint owner to bring a petition for partitioning among the several available remedies.

" [Cit.]' [Cit.]" Paces Partnership v. Grant, 212 Ga. App. 621, 624(2) ( 442 S.E.2d 826) (1994). Defendants, having been sued for over $8,000 in past due rent, contend that, because the two signatures contain "Pres."

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Paces Partnership v. Grant, 212 Ga. App. 621, 624 (2) ( 442 S.E.2d 826) (1994). The common usage or popular sense can be determined by a dictionary.

(OCGA §§ 44-6-100; 44-6-102; 44-7-1).' [Cit.]" Paces Partnership v. Grant, 212 Ga. App. 621, 624 (1) ( 442 S.E.2d 826) (1994). The issue not addressed below and the state of the record presented in this case are both very similar to that reviewed in Rotruck v. Grandma's Biscuits, 243 Ga. 512 ( 255 S.E.2d 36) (1979), in which the Supreme Court held: "We cannot find any indication that an assignment occurred here. `As to the usufruct, since the original tenant has no estate in land, one cannot talk about a sublease in the technical common law sense. . . . The confusion as to the use of the terms assignment and sublease would appear to arise in the case of a usufruct where the transfer is not authorized.

An estate for years passes as realty and may be bought and sold as any other estate, subject to the terms and conditions of the lease. O.C.G.A. §§ 44-6-100, 44-6-102, 44-7-1; e.g., Paces Partnership v. Grant, 212 Ga. App. 621 (1994). "[I]t is the policy of the law to treat the tenant of any estate for years as the owner, during the life of such estate."