Opinion
301955/09 5728
10-18-2011
Cheven, Keely & Hatzis, New York (William B. Stock of counsel), for appellant. Sgarlato & Sgarlato PLLC, Staten Island (Brooke Tiffany Skolnik of counsel), for respondents.
, J.P., Moskowitz, Acosta, Renwick, DeGrasse JJ.
Cheven, Keely & Hatzis, New York (William B. Stock of counsel), for appellant.
Sgarlato & Sgarlato PLLC, Staten Island (Brooke Tiffany Skolnik of counsel), for respondents.
Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Wilma Guzman, J.), entered October 25, 2010, which, in an action for personal injuries, granted plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Plaintiffs established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability, and in opposition, defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Defendant's own uncontroverted testimony, stating that he approached a stop sign and then failed to yield the right of way to plaintiff Peter Pace as he was riding his motorcycle, established defendant's negligence as a matter of law based on his violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142(a) (see Murchison v Incognoli, 5 AD3d 271 [2004]). Defendant's argument that Pace was comparatively negligent is unavailing. "[I]t is not plaintiff's burden to establish defendants' negligence as the sole proximate cause of his injuries in order to make out a prima facie case of negligence" (Tselebis v Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 72 AD3d 198, 200 [2010]). In any event, on this record, there is a lack of evidence of comparative fault on the part of Pace.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.
CLERK