Opinion
No. 28863.
October 20, 1930.
1. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.
Attorney employed to sue or collect without suit is authorized to receive and receipt for debt or claim and, in doing so, binds client.
2. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT. Administrator was liable for proceeds of insurance policy, where his attorney collected amount but failed to turn it over.
A claim of the estate on a life and accident insurance policy was compromised and settled, and the insurance company sent a voucher payable to the order of the administrator for the compromise amount to the attorney of record for the administrator. The attorney indorsed the voucher and collected the proceeds thereof, but failed to turn it over to administrator.
APPEAL from chancery court of Tishomingo county. HON. A.M. MITCHELL, Chancellor.
T.A. Clark, of Iuka, for appellants.
The proceeds of this insurance policy never came into the hands of Mr. Pace, as administrator, and the insurance company never sent the administrator any check or voucher and the administrator never saw any check or voucher and the administrator never endorsed any check or voucher or authorized anyone to endorse his name to a check or voucher. Mr. Ligon, the attorney, represented the estate, and was not a collector for the administrator, and the insurance company, who issued this voucher had full knowledge that C.L. Pace was the administrator, and they should have mailed him the voucher, and if they failed to do so, they did it at their own peril.
W.B. Ellis, of Iuka, for appellees.
An attorney retained in a cause in court, has by virtue of his employment, as such, authority to do on behalf of his client, all acts in court, or out of it, necessary or incidental to the prosecution and management of the case. And this authority includes the right to demand and receive payment in money of clients debts.
Wharton on Agency, sec. 580; Miller v. Scott, 21 Ark. 396.
The appellees, creditors of the estate of Mollie Newsome, deceased, filed their bill in the chancery court of Tishomingo county in the matter of the administration of the estate of said decedent, against appellants, C.L. Pace, administrator of the estate, and the surety on his bond, for the purpose of charging the administrator, for the benefit of creditors, with the proceeds of a life and accident policy which was owned by the decedent at the time of her death. There was a trial on bill, answer, and proofs, resulting in a decree granting the prayer of appellees' bill; and from that decree appellants prosecute this appeal.
Mollie Newsome died intestate, the only estate she owned at her death being a life and accident insurance policy in the Interstate Life Accident Company, of Chattanooga, Tennessee. The appellant Pace was appointed administrator of her estate; the sureties on the administrator's bond were E.R. Ligon, now deceased, and the other appellant in this cause, J.C. Jourdan, Jr. The surety, E.R. Ligon, was the attorney of record of the administrator, and attended to the administration of the estate, so far as it progressed. The claim of the estate on the life and accident insurance policy was compromised and settled. The Interstate Life Accident Company sent a voucher, payable to the order of the administrator, for the compromise amount. This voucher was sent to Mr. Ligon, who, as stated, was the attorney of record of the administrator, who indorsed the voucher and collected the proceeds thereof, but failed to turn same over to the administrator. The authority to make the compromise settlement is not questioned.
Appellants contend that the administrator is not liable for the proceeds of the insurance policy, because they were neither received by him, nor by any person authorized to act for and on his behalf; that Ligon, the attorney for the administrator, had no right to receive and receipt for the proceeds of the policy.
An attorney employed to recover by suit, or to collect without suit, a debt or claim due his client, is authorized to receive and receipt for such debt or claim, when paid; and in doing so, he binds his client. Butler v. Jones, 7 How. 587, 40 Am. Dec. 82; Hiller v. Ivy, 37 Miss. 431; 2 R.C.L. 993, sec. 73; 6 C.J., p. 654, sec. 164.
The same principle, of course, applies as between an administrator and his attorney of record.
Affirmed.