As to matters which are of statewide concern, however, home rule charter cities remain subject to and controlled by applicable general state laws regardless of the provisions of their charters, if it is the intent and purpose of such general laws to occupy the field to the exclusion of municipal regulation (the preemption doctrine). ( Pacific Tel. Tel. Co. v. City County of San Francisco (1959) 51 Cal.2d 766, 768-769 [ 336 P.2d 514]; Pipoly v. Benson (1942) 20 Cal.2d 366, 369-370 [ 125 P.2d 482, 147 A.L.R. 515].) (2) As is made clear in the leading case of Pipoly v. Benson, supra, local governments (whether chartered or not) do not lack the power, nor are they forbidden by the Constitution, to legislate upon matters which are not of a local nature, nor is the Legislature forbidden to legislate with respect to the local municipal affairs of a home rule municipality.

Even conceding the correctness of plaintiff's contention that the work is a matter of state concern (cf. Pacific Tel. Tel. Co. v. City County of San Francisco, 51 Cal.2d 766, 767 [1a] et seq. [ 336 P.2d 514]), there is nevertheless no requirement that the general prevailing wage in the community be paid for the type of work here involved. The work in the present case clearly constitutes maintenance work.

(Italics added.) See also, Pac. Tel. Tel. Co. v. City County of S. F. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 766, 744 ("Applying the above stated rules of law to the facts of the present case, it is apparent . . . the city cannot today exclude telephone lines from the streets upon the theory that 'it is a municipal affair.'"); Los Angeles Ry. Corp. v. Los Angeles (1940) 16 Cal.2d 779, 787 (facts supported trial court's conclusion regulation of intercity rail system was not a municipal affair of defendant city); CalFed., supra, 54 Cal.3d at pages 16-18 (setting forth framework for analyzing conflict between "municipal affair" and "statewide concern.)

Beginning with the observation in Pac. Tel. Tel. Co. v. City and County of S.F. [(1959)] 51 Cal.2d [766,] 771 [ 336 P.2d 514], that 'the constitutional concept of municipal affairs is not a fixed or static quantity . . . [but one that] changes with the changing conditions upon which it is to operate,' our cases display a growing recognition that 'home rule' is a means of adjusting the political relationship between state and local governments in discrete areas of conflict. When a court invalidates a charter city measure in favor of a conflicting state statute, the result does not necessarily rest on the conclusion that the subject matter of the former is not appropriate for municipal regulation.

The law, like the society if reflects, is not static. (E.g., see Trop v. Dulles (1956) 356 U.S. 86, 100-101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 597-598, 2 L.Ed.2d 630, 642; Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City & County of S.F. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 766, 771, 336 P.2d 514; Soldano v. O'Daniels (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 443, 454-455, 190 Cal.Rptr. 310.) C. Workers' Compensation Provides Less Protection than the FEHA.

Plaintiff, citing cases such as Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City & County of S. F., 51 Cal.2d 766, 366 P.2d 514, and Southern California Roads Co. v. McGuire, 2 Cal.2d 115, argues that since the regulation of traffic on city streets is a matter Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Ross, As stated in Los Angeles Dredging Co. v. City of Long Beach, supra, at page 354, 291 P. at page 842, quoting from a New York case: "Competitive offers or bids have no other object but to insure economy and exclude favoritism and corruption in the furnishing of labor, services, property and materials for the uses of the city.

' (Pac. Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City & County of S. F., supra, 51 Cal.2d 766, 771, 336 P.2d 514, 517; L. A. Brewing Co. v. Los Angeles, supra, 8 Cal.App.2d 391, 397, 48 P.2d 71.) The phrase 'municipal affairs' has received a narrow construction, having been repeatedly modified by the courts with such words Simpson v. City of Los Angeles,