The Union quotes a statement by this court in Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City & County of S.F., supra, 51 Cal.2d 766, at page 771, 336 P.2d 514: “[T]he constitutional concept of municipal affairs is not a fixed or static quantity. It changes with the changing conditions upon which it is to operate.

( Pub. Util. Code, § 7901 ;Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City & County of S.F. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 766, 771, 336 P.2d 514 (Pacific Telephone I ).) State law also provides that local government maintains the right “to exercise reasonable control as to the time, place, and manner in which roads, highways, and waterways are accessed.

Past adherence to the principle of local autonomy in tax matters, however, is neither conclusive nor dispositive as to the issue before us. Matters once entirely local in nature may, in a society rapidly increasing in both complexity and interdependence, lose their "strictly local" character and become "matters of statewide concern." ( Bishop v. City of San Jose,supra, 1 Cal.3d 56, 63; City of Santa Clara v. Von Raesfeld,supra, 3 Cal.3d 239, 246; Pacific Tel. Tel. Co. v. City County of S.F. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 766 [ 336 P.2d 514]; CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Com., supra, 43 Cal.App.3d 306, 321.) Plaintiffs argue that the unprecedented mobility of contemporary society, the prevalence of the commuter who works in one community while maintaining his home in another, and the growing disposition of businesses to treat local tax burdens as a key factor in location decisions will all combine to spread, distort and magnify the effect of a local income tax, necessarily producing considerable impact at the state level.

Thus, a local government cannot insist that a telephone corporation obtain a local franchise to operate within its jurisdiction. (See Visalia , at p. 751, 87 P. 1023 ; see also Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City & County of S. F. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 766, 771, 336 P.2d 514 ( Pacific Telephone I ).) The parties also agree that the franchise rights conferred are limited by the prohibition against incommoding the public use of roads, and that local governments have authority to prevent those impacts.

Consequently, California generally affords telephone companies the right to install and maintain lines along public roads without the need to obtain a grant of authority from a local legislative body. (See Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City & County of S.F. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 766, 768 (Pacific Telephone I).) Nevertheless, local governments retain some power over the construction and placement of telephone lines. Among other things, Public Utilities Code section 7901 specifies that local governments retain the authority to ensure that poles and lines do not "incommode the public use of the road . . . ."

( Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hopkins (1911) 160 Cal. 106, 118-119 [ 116 P. 557].) In Pac. Tel. Tel. Co. v. City County of S.F. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 766, 771 [ 336 P.2d 514] ( Pacific Tel. I), the court construed section 7901 as constituting "'a continuing offer extended [by the state] to telephone and telegraph companies . . . which offer when accepted by the construction and maintenance of lines' [citation] gives a franchise from the state to use the public highways for the prescribed purposes without the necessity for any grant [of a franchise] by a subordinate legislative body." Accordingly, section 7901 confers on telephone companies the right to use public rights of way to install lines and equipment without the necessity of seeking a separate franchise from local governments for that purpose (see City of Petaluma v. Pac. Tel. Tel. Co. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 284, 289 [ 282 P.2d 43] [city cannot compel telephone company to obtain a municipal franchise to use the streets and other public places for its lines and equipment]), subject to the proviso that such equipment must be installed in a "manner and at such points as not to incommode the p

The consequences of placement, treatment, and, hopefully, return of the handicapped to a productive and respected place in society is a subject that transcends municipal boundaries. (See Comment (1974) 7 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 150; see also CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Com. (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 306, 323 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 315], holding that because of the statewide consequences of the ecological and environmental impact of land use, California's coastal plan prevails over local zoning ordinances; and People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado (1971) 5 Cal.3d 480 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 553, 487 P.2d 1193]; Pac. Tel. Tel. Co. v. City County of S.F. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 766 [ 336 P.2d 514].) Doubt whether regulation relates only to a municipal affair or to a broader concern must be resolved in favor of the legislative authority of the state.

(2) A charter city may make and enforce all ordinances and regulations with respect to its municipal affairs, subject only to restrictions and limitations contained in its charter, but with respect to other matters, such as those of statewide concern, it is bound by general laws if it is the intent and purpose of such general laws to occupy the field to the exclusion of municipal regulation. ( Bishop v. City of San Jose, 1 Cal.3d 56, 61-62 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 465, 460 P.2d 137]; Pac. Tel. Tel. Co. v. City County of S.F., 51 Cal.2d 766, 768-769 [ 336 P.2d 514]; Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal.2d 366, 369-370 [ 125 P.2d 482, 147 A.L.R. 515].) Whether a subject matter under discussion is of municipal or statewide concern must be judicially determined but no precise definition of the term "municipal affair" has been formulated by the courts.

(4) The idea that the content of "municipal affairs" is indefinite in its essentials is one that has taken root in our cases on the subject. We have said that the task of determining whether a given activity is a "municipal affair" or one of statewide concern is an ad hoc inquiry; that "the constitutional concept of municipal affairs is not a fixed or static quantity" ( Pac. Tel. Tel. Co. v. City and County of S.F. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 766, 771 [ 336 P.2d 514]); and that the question "must be answered in light of the facts and circumstances surrounding each case" ( In re Hubbard (1964) 62 Cal.2d 119, 128 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 393, 396 P.2d 809]). "No exact definition of the term 'municipal affairs' can be formulated and the courts have made no attempt to do so, but instead have indicated that judicial interpretation is necessary to give it meaning in each controverted case." ( Butterworth v. Boyd (1938) 12 Cal.2d 140, 147 [ 82 P.2d 434, 126 A.L.R. 838].)

As to matters which are of statewide concern, however, home rule charter cities remain subject to and controlled by applicable general state laws regardless of the provisions of their charters, if it is the intent and purpose of such general laws to occupy the field to the exclusion of municipal regulation (the preemption doctrine). ( Pacific Tel. Tel. Co. v. City County of San Francisco (1959) 51 Cal.2d 766, 768-769 [ 336 P.2d 514]; Pipoly v. Benson (1942) 20 Cal.2d 366, 369-370 [ 125 P.2d 482, 147 A.L.R. 515].) (2) As is made clear in the leading case of Pipoly v. Benson, supra, local governments (whether chartered or not) do not lack the power, nor are they forbidden by the Constitution, to legislate upon matters which are not of a local nature, nor is the Legislature forbidden to legislate with respect to the local municipal affairs of a home rule municipality.