And because forfeiture of property is disfavored, the statutory scheme must be "strictly construed and limited." Pabey v. State of Ga., 262 Ga. App. 272, 277 ( 585 SE2d 200) (2003). Presumably, the State could have instituted forfeiture proceedings when it found the Silverado in close proximity to the contraband on Childrey's property.
Wal-Mart's constructive knowledge cannot be established through the testimony of Mrs. Wallace, Rountree, or Fleming. See Pabey v. State of Ga., 262 Ga. App. 272, 274 ( 585 SE2d 200) (2003) (matters outside the record cannot be considered). The appellant's reply brief cites the affidavit as being on R. 19. However, that page is part of the defendant's statement of material facts.
Because the deposition of Lewis's wife was not included in the record for our consideration, we cannot consider this statement. See, e.g., Pabey v. State, 262 Ga. App. 272, 274 ( 585 SE2d 200) (2003) ("[t]his Court is unable to consider matters outside the record . . ., and thus we cannot consider any references to the . . . deposition [cited by appellee]") (citation omitted). Appellee further contends that the law governing the commencement of the statute of limitation in misdiagnosis cases does not apply here because the negligent act was not the misdiagnosis but the failure to treat.
Such an arrangement is all the more repugnant in the context of Georgia RICO forfeiture actions, which can be brought only by the State and are “disfavored” under Georgia law. See Patel v. State of Ga., 289 Ga. 479, 482(1), 713 S.E.2d 381 (2011); Pabey v. State of Ga., 262 Ga.App. 272, 277, 585 S.E.2d 200 (2003). For the above reasons, we conclude that the contingency fee arrangement under which Lambros and Cohilas were retained is void as against Georgia public policy.