Opinion
No. 1289 C.D. 2012
11-05-2012
Pennsylvania State Corrections Officers Association (Edward Williams), Petitioner v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Corrections, Respondent
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE COVEY
Pennsylvania State Corrections Officers Association (PSCOA) petitions this Court for review of the June 14, 2012 arbitration award (Award) denying Edward Williams' (Claimant) petition for benefits under what is commonly referred to as the Heart and Lung Act (HLA). The issue before this Court is whether the Award should be upheld. We affirm.
Act of June 28, 1935, P.L. 477, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 637-38.
The issues presented in PSCOA's brief are: (1) whether the Arbitrator's conclusions are supported by substantial evidence, and (2) whether the Arbitrator's Award violates public policy. However, a review of the PSCOA's argument section in its brief reveals no cogent argument as to either issue, or any statutes, case law or rational basis for its conclusions. Hence, we will address whether the Award should be upheld in accordance with applicable law.
On July 11, 2010, Claimant was working as a Corrections Officer 1 at the State Correctional Institution at Graterford (SCI-Graterford) when he was assaulted by an inmate. Claimant was immediately treated at a nearby hospital for exposure to possible HIV-carrying substances. On July 14, 2010, Claimant was referred to a Commonwealth-authorized medical provider where he was treated and cleared for light duty. On August 24, 2010, light-duty work became available and Claimant assumed such work until September 17, 2010, when he claimed knee and spinal pain related to the July 11, 2010 assault was unbearable, and SCI-Graterford was unable to accommodate him with other assignments. During that period, Claimant treated for joint pain with the Commonwealth's approved provider. On September 11, 2010, he began seeing an orthopedic specialist.
Claimant and PSCOA subsequently petitioned for HLA benefits. A hearing was held before an Arbitrator, who denied HLA benefits because Claimant had failed to establish a connection between his knee and spinal conditions and the July 11, 2010 incident. PSCOA appealed the Award to this Court.
"[T]he role for a court reviewing a challenge to a[n] . . . arbitration award under Act 195 is one of deference. . . . The arbitrator's award must draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement." State Sys. of Higher Educ. (Cheyney Univ.) v. State Coll. Univ. Prof'l Ass'n (PSEA-NEA), 560 Pa. 135, 149-50, 743 A.2d 405, 413 (1999).
Initially we recognize that "review of a labor arbitration award is extremely narrow." Pennsylvania Tpk. Comm'n v. Teamsters Local 250, 988 A.2d 789, 795 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). "[A] court may vacate an arbitrator's award only if it violates the essence test." Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist. v. Marion Ctr. Area Educ. Ass'n, 982 A.2d 1041, 1045 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009).
'[A] court should not engage in merits review of the matter. Indeed, after our reaffirmation of the circumscribed essence test we made it eminently clear that 'the essence test does not permit an appellate court to intrude into the domain of the arbitrator and determine whether an award is 'manifestly unreasonable'.'' (Citation omitted.) This [C]ourt may not substitute its own judgment for that of the arbitrator even if our interpretation of the CBA differs from that of the arbitrator.Pennsylvania Tpk. Comm'n, 988 A.2d at 796 (citations omitted). Here, PSCOA specifically argues:
This case is . . . within the public policy exception to the general rule of deference. . . . Inasmuch as the legal precedent clearly establishes that decisions in Heart and Lung cases, as in Workers' Compensation cases, must be supported by substantial evidence, the decision below is not entitled to deference, to the extent that the decision is not supported by substantial evidence.Petitioner's Br. at 14-15.
We begin our analysis by noting that PSCOA admits in its brief that "[m]atters involving disputes over denial or termination of Heart and Lung benefits between the [PSCOA] and the Commonwealth, Department of Corrections, are resolved pursuant to Appendix H of the [CBA] between the parties." Petitioner's Br. at 5. Thus, it is undisputed that the issue falls within the terms of the CBA. As PSCOA does not address the essence test in its brief, but rather goes directly to the public policy exception argument, we must infer that it does not contest that the Award was rationally derived from the CBA. Notwithstanding,
Appendix H of the CBA is not included in the record, despite this Court's July 11, 2012 order specifically directing PSCOA to include "all arguably relevant provisions of the [CBA] from which the grievance arose." --------
[p]ursuant to the essence test as stated today, a reviewing court will conduct a two-prong analysis. First, the court shall determine if the issue as properly defined is within the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Second, if the issue is embraced by the agreement, and thus, appropriately before the arbitrator, the arbitrator's award will be upheld if the arbitrator's interpretation can rationally be derived from the collective bargaining agreement. That is to say, a court will only vacate an arbitrator's award where the award indisputably and genuinely is without foundation in, or fails to logically flow from, the collective bargaining agreement.Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 982 A.2d at 1045 (quoting State Sys. of Higher Educ. (Cheyney Univ.) v. State Coll. Univ. Prof'l Ass'n (PSEA-NEA), 560 Pa. 135, 150, 743 A.2d 405, 413 (1999)). Here, the award meets the above-stated essence test and is entitled to deference.
Whether substantial evidence exists is not the standard of review in an arbitration award. Rather, we "will only vacate an arbitrator's award where the award indisputably and genuinely is without foundation in, or fails to logically flow from, the collective bargaining agreement." Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 982 A.2d at 1045 (quoting Cheyney Univ., 560 Pa. at 150, 743 A.2d at 413). In the instant case, the issue before the Arbitrator was whether Claimant was entitled to HLA benefits as a result of an incident that occurred on July 11, 2010. Claimant averred that an inmate punched him and threw urine and feces at him. The substances thrown at him were the basis for his HIV treatment. The alleged punch was the foundation for Claimant's knee and spinal conditions. The Arbitrator specifically found Claimant's testimony not credible concerning the punch and the injuries he sustained therefrom and, thus, Claimant failed to establish a connection between his knee and spinal conditions, and the July 11, 2010 incident. The Arbitrator stated: "The reason for my incredulity is the lack of assertions in any of the contemporaneous reports written--some even in the Claimant's own hand and signed by him--of any actual punch or push on July 11, 2010." Petitioner's Br., Appendix "A" at 8. Because Claimant was not recuperating from injuries suffered in the performance of his duties, the Arbitrator deemed him ineligible for HLA benefits.
The Arbitrator further explained "that the mechanism of the injury now adopted by Claimant was only articulated by him weeks after the incident." Petitioner's Br., Appendix "A" at 9. The Arbitrator expounded:
It is simply inconceivable to me that during initial examination and treatment none of the medical providers
would expressly state Claimant had been punched or pushed if Claimant reported that. Without the impact of a punch or push, I adopt Dr. Fras' opinion that 'none of the findings are traumatic in nature.' . . . rather, they are degenerative . . . and unrelated to the July 11, 2010 incident.Id. Section 1 of the HLA provides:
[C]orrection employes employed by the Department of Corrections, whose principal duty is the care, custody and control of inmates, . . . who is injured in the performance of his duties . . . and by reason thereof is temporarily incapacitated from performing his duties, shall be paid by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania . . . his full rate of salary, as fixed by ordinance or resolution, until the disability arising therefrom has ceased.53 P.S. § 637(a) (emphasis added). As HLA benefits can only be granted to a claimant who suffered an injury "in the performance of his duties", the Arbitrator denied Claimant's petition. Id. We will not engage in a merits review of the matter, as we cannot intrude into the domain of the arbitrator and determine whether an award is manifestly unreasonable. Pennsylvania Tpk. Comm'n.
Regarding PSCOA's public policy argument, "an arbitrator's award cannot be vacated for violating public policy unless it violates or sanctions a well-defined, dominant public policy that is ascertainable by reference to the laws and legal precedents." Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 982 A.2d at 1047. Here, PSCOA has not shown that the denial of HLA benefits in the instant case was against public policy.
For all of the above reasons, the Award is affirmed.
/s/_________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
ORDER
AND NOW, this 5th day of November, 2012, the June 14, 2012 arbitration award is affirmed.
/s/_________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge