P. N.T. Ry. Co. v. Bowman

3 Citing cases

  1. T. C. R. R. Co. v. Randall

    51 Tex. Civ. App. 249 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908)   Cited 6 times

    The court did not err in refusing to permit the witnesses to testify that the crossing in question, at the time and place of the injury, was such a crossing as is in general and common use throughout the State where public highways and streets cross the railroads in towns the size of Morgan. International G. N. Ry. Co. v. Haddox, 81 S.W. 1037; International G. N. Ry. Co. v. Butcher, 81 S.W. 819; Pecos N. T. Ry. Co. v. Bowman, 78 S.W. 22. PRESLER, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE. —

  2. Temple Lumber Co. v. Living

    289 S.W. 746 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927)   Cited 9 times
    In Temple Lumber Co. v. Living, 289 S.W. 746 (Tex.Civ.App. 1926, writ ref.), it was suggested that a child beneath the age of five, as a matter of law, is incapable of negligence and held that a child who was four years and nine months old could not be negligent.

    This holding was again approved and followed by our Supreme Court in the case of Railway Company v. Jones (Tex.Civ.App.) 231 S.W. 824. If the allegation that plaintiff was "compelled" by the negligence of the defendant to incur certain expenses is sufficient to admit proof of the reasonableness of the amount so claimed, it must be held that plaintiffs' allegation in this case that they were forced to incur these expenses was sufficient to admit such proof; the words "compelled" and t "forced" having the same primary meaning. This holding finds further support in the cases of Railway Company v. Greb, 63 Tex. Civ. App. 78, 132 S.W. 490; Railway Company v. Letot (Tex.Civ.App.) 135 S.W. 658; Railway Company v. Bowman, 34 Tex. Civ. App. 98, 78 S.W. 22. We think the evidence before set out was sufficient to sustain the finding of the court that the amount claimed for these expenses was reasonable.

  3. Scott v. Shine

    194 S.W. 964 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917)   Cited 4 times
    Holding that unattended cotton gin exhaust pipe's emission of loud noise and steam, which spooked horse, sufficed to sustain negligence claim

    So it will be seen in that case the District of Columbia, like a railway company, in repairing the street was performing a legal duty which it owed to the public. Many decisions are cited by the appellee, including decisions in cases against railway companies and also against individuals and companies operating manufacturing and other like establishments, to sustain the judgment upon the issues discussed above, such as Sherman S. S. Ry. Co. v. Bridges, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 64, 40 S.W. 536, Weatherford v. Lowery, 47 S.W. 34; Pecos N. T. Ry. Co. v. Bowman, 78 S.W. 22; San Antonio Edison Co. v. Beyer, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 145, 57 S.W. 851; Ft. Wayne Coop. Co. v. Page, 170 Ind. 585, 84 N.E. 145, 23 L.R.A. (N. S.) 946, and note; Wolf v. Des Moines Elevator Co., 126 Iowa 659, 98 N.W. 301, 102 N.W. 517; Knight v. Goodyear's India Rubber Co., 38 Conn. 438, 9 Am.Rep. 406; Crocker v. McGregor, 76 Me. 282, 49 Am.Rep. 611; also Thompson on Negligence, vol. 1, §§ 1257, 1258. In 1 R.C.L. bottom pages 1202 to 1206, is found a discussion of general principles with respect to the liability of owners of property abutting on a public highway for injuries resulting from the fright of animals driven upon the highway caused by the emission of steam, the blowing of whistles, etc., in the operation of machinery upon such abutting property, with numerous citations of authorities in support of the text.