Congregational Sunday School, 290 Ill. at 112-13, quoting Crerar v. Williams, 145 Ill. 625, 643 (1893). The Solicitation Act was construed in People ex rel. Hartigan v. National Anti-Drug Coalition, 124 Ill. App.3d 269 (1984). There, the State sought injunctive relief against defendant and an accounting of donations solicited by it without first registering under the Solicitation Act as a charitable organization.
108 Ill. App.3d at 1058. In People ex rel. Hartigan v. National Anti-Drug Coalition (1984), 124 Ill. App.3d 269, 464 N.E.2d 690, this court again had before it an appeal from "an action filed by the Attorney General of Illinois seeking injunctive relief and an accounting from * * * National Anti-Drug Coalition, of an organization which solicited donations in Illinois but failed to register with the Attorney General as a charitable organization." The trial court granted injunctive relief and other relief against the defendants.
Article V, § 15 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides that `The Attorney General shall be the legal officer of the State, and shall have the duties and powers that may be prescribed by law.' Indeed, the right of . . . the Attorney General to interfere in the handling of a public charity to prevent or correct abuses cannot be denied. . . . [B]oth the Illinois Constitution and the supreme court have recognized the common law authority of the Attorney General to protect the rights of the people of Illinois. This responsibility includes the duty to protect, supervise and enforce charitable trusts.People v. National Anti-Drug Coalition, 124 Ill. App.3d 269, 79 Ill.Dec. 786, 791 n. 3, 464 N.E.2d 690, 695 n. 3 (1984) (citations omitted); see also In re Estate of Stern, 240 Ill.App.3d 834, 181 Ill.Dec. 461, 608 N.E.2d 534 (1992) (holding Illinois Charitable Trust Act provides Attorney General with authority to supervise and enforce charitable trusts); Moloney v. Newberry Library, 150 Ill. 229, 37 N.E. 236 (1894) (explaining Attorney General is proper party to bring action if doubt exists as to the meaning of a trust). The defendant claims the plaintiff "seeks to have this Court strike all of Defendant Maaherra's references to the Foundation's Declaration of Trust."
Our conclusion is supported by case law from other jurisdictions. For example, in People ex rel. Hartigan v. National Anti-Drug Coalition, 124 Ill. App.3d 269, 79 Ill.Dec. 786, 464 N.E.2d 690 (1984), the Illinois Anti-Drug Coalition and the National Anti-Drug Coalition (hereinafter the "Coalitions") argued that they were political organizations and as such were not "charitable organizations" subject to the registration requirements of the Illinois Solicitation Act, Ill.Rev.Stat., 1981, chp.14, ¶¶ 51 et seq. Similar to our Solicitation of Charitable Funds Act, the Illinois Act defines "charitable organization" as "[a]ny benevolent, philanthropic, patriotic, or eleemosynary person or one purporting to be such which solicits and collects funds for charitable purposes[.]"
¶ 15 Here, plaintiff cannot be considered a prevailing party by merely the grant of an interlocutory motion for a preliminary injunction. The court's grant of the injunction was just a preliminary stage, was not a final disposition on the merits of plaintiff's claim asserting an improper lien, and did not confer plaintiff a permanent relief. See People ex rel. Hartigan v. National Anti–Drug Coalition, 124 Ill.App.3d 269, 273, 79 Ill.Dec. 786, 464 N.E.2d 690 (1984) ("Such an injunction does not decide controverted facts or the merits of the cause; rather it only shows that sufficient cause has been made to authorize or require the court to preserve the rights in issue until a final hearing on the merits."). In granting plaintiff's preliminary injunction, the chancery court specifically stated that it was not deciding the merits of the plaintiff's claim against the defendants. The court emphasized that it was only making a determination on the likelihood of success on the merits for the purposes of the preliminary injunction and suggested that defendants would not be successful in an action to enforce the lien.
Matters decided in a preliminary injunction are not conclusive. A preliminary injunction does not decide controverted facts or the merits of a claim; it only shows that sufficient cause has been shown for the court to preserve the rights in issue until a final hearing on the merits. People ex rel. Hartigan v. National Anti-Drug Coalition, 124 Ill. App.3d 269, 464 N.E.2d 690 (1984). A court's findings made as a result of a preliminary injunction request are not final and do not bind the parties at subsequent stages of the case.
First, petitioner challenges the Board's reliance on the preliminary injunction order entered by Judge Cadagin, wherein Judge Cadagin found that Taylor Ridge was in violation of numerous regulations. Petitioner cites People ex rel. Hartigan v. National Anti-Drug Coalition, 124 Ill. App.3d 269, 273, 464 N.E.2d 690, 694 (1984), for the proposition that a preliminary injunction "does not decide controverted facts or the merits of the cause; rather it only shows that sufficient cause has been made to authorize or require the court to preserve the rights in issue until a final hearing on the merits." Petitioner asserts that therefore the findings contained in a preliminary injunction order do not rise to the level of a "previously adjudicated violation" for purposes of section 42(h)(5) of the Act.
Hartz lastly argues that the circuit court's order constitutes a taking of its property without due process of law. Hartz has waived this issue by raising it for the first time on appeal. See People ex rel. Hartigan v. National Anti-Drug Coalition (1984), 124 Ill. App.3d 269, 272-73, 464 N.E.2d 690. For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the circuit court is affirmed.
The purpose of the Act was to assist the Attorney General in carrying out his common law powers and duties to enforce charitable trusts and to assure that their funds were applied to their intended charitable use. People ex rel. Hartigan v. National Anti-Drug Coalition (1984), 124 Ill. App.3d 269, 464 N.E.2d 690; People ex rel. Scott v. George F. Harding Museum (1978), 58 Ill. App.3d 408, 374 N.E.2d 756. Our supreme court has discussed the Attorney General's authority with reference to litigation involving charitable trusts in In re Estate of Tomlinson (1976), 65 Ill.2d 382, 359 N.E.2d 109.
Rather, the moving party need only raise a fair question as to the existence of the right claimed and that he will be entitled to the relief prayed for if the proof should sustain his allegations. (See People ex rel. Hartigan v. National Anti-Drug Coalition (1984), 124 Ill. App.3d 269, 273, 464 N.E.2d 690, 694; People ex rel. Fahner v. Community Hospital, 108 Ill. App.3d 1051, 1057, 440 N.E.2d 200, 205.) Under the circumstances, which we have already discussed, we believe it is patent that plaintiffs have sufficiently established that they are likely to succeed on the merits. In reviewing this case, we appreciate that the decision to grant or deny injunctive relief is within the discretion of the trial court.