Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County No. CV-260932, Linda S. Etienne, Commissioner.
Law Offices of Bennett & Sharpe, Barry J. Bennett and Elaine M. Yama for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Garcia Calderon Ruiz, Bonifacio B. Garcia, E. Luis Saenz and Chaka C. Okadigbo for Defendants and Respondents.
OPINION
Kane, J.
Appellant Ermelinda Ozuna appeals from a judgment denying her petition for writ of mandate by which she sought reinstatement as Assistant Superintendent of Educational Services in McFarland Unified School District (the District). Appellant alleged that she was improperly reassigned from her administrative position in violation of her rights under a multi-year contract and Education Code section 35031. The trial court disagreed, finding that appellant failed to prove the Board of Trustees of McFarland Unified School District (the Board) ever ratified her multi-year contract in open session as required by statute. Further, the trial court found that the Board had effectively terminated appellant from her former position and thus she was not entitled to reinstatement. Appellant contends the trial court erred. We disagree. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that appellant was not entitled to a writ of mandate compelling respondents to reinstate her. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Education Code.
Respondents herein include the District, the Board, and the Superintendent of the District, Gabriel McCurtis, who was sued in his official capacity only. We refer to these parties jointly as respondents.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Beginning in 2004, appellant served as the District’s Assistant Superintendent of Educational Services. She initially held that position by appointment, not by contract. On June 20, 2006, the Board voted to “approve to fill” certain listed positions “by written contract of employment.” One of the listed positions to be filled by a written contract of employment was “Assistant Superintendent Educational Services,” the position that appellant occupied at that time. Thereafter, on or about June 28, 2006, appellant and one of the District’s Board members signed a written contract by which the District purportedly agreed to employ appellant as “Assistant Superintendent-Educational Services” through June 30, 2008.
On March 6, 2007, the Board “took action to issue a notice to reassign the Assistant Superintendent of Educational Services,” as recorded in the Board meeting minutes. According to the four Board members who voted at that meeting, they decided to reassign appellant to the classroom as a teacher and they authorized Superintendent McCurtis to carry out that reassignment. During the Board meeting of March 6, 2007, appellant’s husband asked whether the Board knew precisely where appellant would be reassigned, to which question the Board president, Ramon Melendez, responded somewhat equivocally, “no, for now it’s just a possible reassignment.” Following the Board’s March 6, 2007, meeting and decision to reassign appellant to the classroom, Superintendent McCurtis sent appellant a letter on March 12, 2007, informing her that she would be reassigned to a teaching position for the upcoming school year.
It is not clear from the wording of this remark whether Melendez was saying the location to which appellant would be reassigned was not yet certain (therefore the location under consideration was still only a “possible” reassignment), or whether reassignment itself was uncertain. The former is certainly more consistent with the official action taken by the Board to reassign appellant as recorded in the minutes. Melendez stated in his declaration opposing the petition that “I communicated to [appellant’s husband] that I did not know where [appellant] would be reassigned to. I did not intend to communicate that the Board was uncertain about releasing [appellant] from the Assistant Superintendent position and I did not.”
On October 30, 2007, appellant filed her petition for writ of mandate. Appellant alleged therein that she occupied the position of Assistant Superintendent under a multi-year contract that did not expire until June 30, 2008, and that the District and Board violated section 35031 by removing her without her consent and without formally terminating the contract. Appellant’s petition sought an order compelling her reinstatement as Assistant Superintendent and restoring all pay and benefits accordingly. In a second cause of action for declaratory relief, appellant sought a determination that the March 12, 2007, notice of “possible” reassignment was of no legal effect.
We note the written employment contract attached to appellant’s petition for writ of mandate contained a provision allowing the Board to terminate the contract without cause by giving 90 days’ written notice, whereupon the District would be required to pay a lump sum amount as provided in the termination provision.
On March 11, 2008, in light of appellant’s lawsuit claiming she was entitled to reinstatement to her position as Assistant Superintendent, the Board formally terminated appellant’s contract under the provision therein allowing for termination without cause. The Board did so solely “in an abundance of caution” and “considering the uncertain nature of legal outcomes.” The Board made clear that its action “in no way acknowledges or concedes that [appellant] had a valid and/or enforceable contract with the District.”
In support of her writ petition in the trial court, appellant submitted the minutes of the June 20, 2006, Board meeting in which the Board approved a motion “to fill the listed positions by written contract of employment,” including the position of “Assistant Superintendent Educational Services.” Appellant also submitted declarations of Arturo Munoz, Don Chandler and Robert Mena. Munoz and Chandler were Board members during the time that appellant’s contract was purportedly executed; Mena was the District’s Assistant Superintendent of Human Resources during the same period.
The Chandler, Munoz and Mena declarations each asserted that during the closed session of the June 20, 2006, Board meeting, the then Superintendent, Jim Schiffman, “presented contract terms” to the Board concerning several individuals, including appellant. After the closed session concluded, when the Board reported its activities in open session, the Board publicly reported its approval of the filling of several listed positions with contracts of employment, including appellant’s position. The declarations of Chandler, Munoz and Mena claimed the Board expressly approved “two-year contracts,” although that fact is not reflected anywhere in the minutes of that meeting. After the June 20, 2006, meeting, the final terms of the contract were still to be completed by Superintendent Schiffman and Mena, which practice was in accordance with the custom of the Board. The completed written contract that was signed by appellant on June 28, 2006, and by the Board’s former President, Jim Kaisers, on June 30, 2006, allegedly contained the same terms as were presented to the Board at the June 20, 2006, meeting.
In opposition to the petition for writ of mandate, respondents noted there was no evidence that a completed or executed contract with appellant was ever presented to the Board for its ratification. Instead, the above declarations submitted by appellant only mentioned that “contract terms” or information were presented, with the final contract terms still to be completed. According to respondents, this showing fell short of establishing that the Board actually “ratified” appellant’s contract of employment in open session, as required by Government Code section 53262 for all contracts of employment with an Assistant Superintendent.
Respondents’ opposition evidence included declarations of Melendez and Rey DeLeon in support of respondents’ contention that appellant’s employment contract was never ratified. Melendez and DeLeon were Board members who were present at the June 20, 2006, Board meeting. They attest in their declarations that the Board was never presented with appellant’s alleged contract at any Board meeting; the Board never had an opportunity to review appellant’s alleged contract before it was signed; and the Board never voted to approve or ratify appellant’s alleged contract after it was signed.
Respondents also submitted the declaration of Mark Thompson, whose firm, Atkinson, Andelson, Ruud, Loya and Romo, was the District’s general counsel during the time that appellant’s contract was purportedly executed. Appellant’s alleged contract contains the statement: “Contract Reviewed By: Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud and Romo.” However, Thompson states that neither he nor any other attorney at his law firm reviewed appellant’s alleged contract.
On May 22, 2008, the trial court conducted its hearing of the petition for writ of mandate. After oral argument was concluded, the matter was taken under submission and, on August 29, 2008, the trial court issued its initial ruling denying appellant’s petition. The ruling was primarily based on the trial court’s finding that appellant had failed to show that appellant’s alleged contract was ratified by the Board in an open session. The ruling expressly directed counsel for respondents to prepare a final order.
At the hearing, appellant attempted to introduce new evidence—namely, the minutes of the February 27, 2006, Board meeting. The trial court refused to allow any new evidence to be introduced, stating that it was “[d]one with creating a record.”
On September 26, 2008, the trial court entered its judgment denying appellant’s petition. The trial court’s order denying appellant’s petition was filed on October 3, 2008. The trial court’s order set forth the reasons for its denial of the petition, as follows:
Since the trial court’s initial ruling on August 29, 2008, expressly provided that respondents’ counsel would prepare a formal written order, it is clear the trial court intended that such an order would be filed in this case prior to entry of a final judgment. Respondents’ counsel submitted a proposed order and a proposed judgment to the trial court after first consulting with appellant’s counsel, who lodged objections to the proposed order. That the judgment was filed first was clearly inadvertent, and we believe it is appropriate for purposes of our appellate review to consider the October 3, 2008, order as embodying the trial court’s grounds for denial of the writ. (See, e.g., Bed, Bath & Beyond of La Jolla, Inc. v. La Jolla Village Square Venture Partners (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 867, 882-884.) In any event, the differences between the initial ruling of August 29, 2008, and the October 3, 2008, order are not material. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 475 [defects that do not affect substantial rights are disregarded].) Any minor differences in the wording of the October 3, 2008, order from the initial ruling were apparently for the purpose of clarification. Both expressed that the petition was being denied based on appellant’s failure to establish ratification of the contract. Both expressed as a secondary ground for denial of the petition that appellant’s contract was effectively terminated. This secondary ground for denial is stated in somewhat different wording in the October 3, 2008, order. That is, the second paragraph of the October 3, 2008, order corrects a date of certain Board action (March 12, 2008, in place of March 12, 2007), and the August 29, 2008, ruling had expressly mentioned section 44951, while the October 3, 2008, order does not mention that section. In other respects, they are essentially the same.
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate is denied. [Appellant] was required to prove her allegation that she had a contract of employment with Respondent McFarland Unified School District. Government Code [section] 53262[, subdivision] (a) requires that all contracts of employment with an assistant superintendent be ratified in an open session of the governing body which shall be reflected in the governing body’s meeting minutes. Despite the circumstantial evidence provided by [appellant] by way of declaration, the record fails to show either ratification in open session, or a reflection of such ratification in the meeting minutes of the McFarland Unified School District’s governing board.
“Moreover, no further action by the Board was necessary to terminate [appellant’s] alleged contract because the Board’s action on March 6, 2007, and March 12, 2008, as reflected in the minutes, was conclusive.”
According to appellant, the trial court’s order and judgment were not served on her by mail or otherwise. Respondents do not challenge that contention, and nothing in the record indicates otherwise. Hence, appellant had 180 days from entry of judgment in which to file her appeal. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)-(3).) Appellant’s timely notice of appeal was filed on January 6, 2009.
DISCUSSION
“In order to obtain writ relief, a party must establish ‘“(1) A clear, present and usually ministerial duty on the part of the respondent …; and (2) a clear, present and beneficial right in the petitioner to the performance of that duty ….”’ [Citation.]” (City of Dinuba v. County of Tulare (2007) 41 Cal.4th 859, 868.) The petitioner (here appellant) bears the burden of proving the facts upon which his or her claim for relief is based. (California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1153.)
“‘“In reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a writ of mandate, the appellate court is ordinarily confined to an inquiry as to whether the findings and judgment of the trial court are supported by substantial, credible and competent evidence.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Evans v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 398, 407.) However, on questions of interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo review. (Ibid.)
I. Writ of Mandate to Compel Reinstatement Not Available
Although we will address the parties’ principal arguments in parts II to IV below, we begin with a more basic issue. Even if we assume for the sake of argument that appellant had a valid long-term employment contract with the District, can the District be compelled by writ of mandate to reinstate her to her former position as assistant superintendent? The answer is no. Our Supreme Court has made it clear that since there is no statutory or constitutional right to hold such an administrative position, reinstatement cannot be compelled by writ of mandate. (Barthuli v. Board of Trustees (1977) 19 Cal.3d 717, 721; see also Jenkins v. Inglewood Unified School Dist. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1395, fn. 7.) For this reason alone, we conclude the trial court correctly denied the petition.
Since appellant’s March 2007 termination was timely under sections 35031 and 44951, this is not a situation in which the automatic renewal provisions of those sections would arguably apply.
II. Writ of Mandate Was Correctly Denied Because Appellant Was Timely and Effectively Notified of Termination and the District Was Not Required by Statute to Reinstate Her
In support of her petition for writ of mandate, appellant asserted in the trial court that (1) she had a contract entitling her to be employed as Assistant Superintendent until June 30, 2008, (2) the Board never took official action to terminate the contract, and (3) she gave no consent to the contract’s termination. She claimed that under these alleged facts, her reinstatement was required pursuant to section 35031.
One of the grounds upon which the trial court denied the petition was that the Board’s action on March 6, 2007, was conclusive in terminating appellant from her administrative position. We hold that the record supports the trial court’s determination on that issue, and agree that it precluded any entitlement to reinstatement. Hence, the petition was properly denied. We proceed to explain.
The notice letter sent to appellant referred to section 44951. If appellant had a valid contract with an expiration date beyond the then existing school year, section 44951 by its own terms would not apply. As we hold in part IV of this opinion, appellant did not have a valid contract due to lack of ratification. In any event, the important point here is the Board’s action to terminate her from her position as Assistant Superintendent. Appellant was removed or released from her position, was duly notified of that fact, and the trial court so held. The gist of the trial court’s initial ruling and the trial court’s October 3, 2008, order was that the Board’s action was “conclusive” in effecting the Board’s termination of appellant from her position as Assistant Superintendent. The evidence plainly supported that assessment. Further, the comment made by the Board president to the effect that appellant’s new assignment was uncertain does not affect our analysis, since the trial court’s ruling was supported by other substantial evidence. Moreover, it is most reasonable to assume the Board president was referring to the uncertainty of where appellant would be assigned, not of the reassignment itself. (See fn. 3, ante.)
There is substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court’s finding that appellant was terminated from her position as Assistant Superintendent. The minutes of the Board’s March 6, 2007, meeting plainly state that the Board “took action to issue a notice to reassign the Assistant Superintendent of Educational Services.” The four Board members who voted at that meeting affirmed that they determined to remove appellant as Assistant Superintendent and they voted to reassign her to the position of a classroom teacher. Following the Board’s March 6, 2007, meeting and decision to reassign appellant to the classroom, Superintendent McCurtis sent appellant a letter on March 12, 2007, informing her that she was “released” from her present position as Assistant Superintendent and would be reassigned to a teaching position for the upcoming school year. It is clear that the Board took action to remove appellant from her position as assistant superintendent and that appellant was notified by letter of March 12, 2007, of that fact.
Appellant claimed that these actions violated her rights under section 35031, and that she was entitled to reinstatement under that section. Not so.
Section 35031 governs the “[t]erm of employment” of certain administrative positions and recognizes that an assistant superintendent, among others, may be elected by the governing board for a term of up to four years. It provides that the term of employment of such person may be terminated at any time “with the consent of the employee concerned.” (§ 35031.) The statute further provides that if the governing board determines that the employee is not to be reelected or reemployed upon expiration of the existing term of employment, the governing board must give at least 45 days’ written notice of that fact prior to expiration of the existing term. In the event the governing board fails to reelect or reemploy the employee, and fails to give the aforesaid 45 days’ written notice, “he or she shall be deemed reelected for a term of the same length as the one completed, and under the same terms and conditions and with the same compensation.” (Ibid.) The primary purpose of the statute is “‘to afford an administrator proper notice of a possible change in duties and assignment in sufficient time to seek other satisfactory employment as an administrator.’” (Jenkins v. Inglewood Unified School Dist., supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1394.)
Since the Board’s action was taken “at least 45 days” prior to expiration of appellant’s alleged term of employment, the time-notice provisions of section 35031 were not violated. It therefore cannot be argued that the automatic renewal provision of section 35031 applied in this case. Nor does section 35031 create a right to reinstatement simply because the administrative employee was terminated prior to expiration of the employee’s contractual term of employment. Although the statute acknowledges that a termination “may” be undertaken with consent of the employee, no reinstatement right is implied thereby. “As distinguished from teacher personnel, administrative and managerial personnel do not possess a statutory right to their positions.” (McFall v. Madera Unified School Dist. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1228, 1236.) Because administrative personnel do not possess a statutory right to their positions under section 35031 (see Barthuli v. Board of Trustees, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 721), we do not read into it a right of reinstatement, particularly where, as here, the employee was removed by the Board on at least 45 days’ advance notice. Instead, the employee’s remedy in such case, if any, would be for breach of contract. (See Jenkins v. Inglewood Unified School Dist., supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1395, fn. 7 [acknowledging cause of action for breach of contract existed where notice under section 35031 was invalid due to lack of prior board determination, but holding the superior court properly barred writ of mandate since an assistant superintendent cannot obtain specific performance].)
Indeed, the written notice provided to appellant complied with the more stringent requirements of section 44951—the section the Board understood to be applicable.
Moreover, appellant’s alleged written contract expressly permitted the Board to terminate her contract without cause upon 90 days’ advance notice. Thus, even assuming the contract was valid, the Board acted within its contractual rights when it terminated appellant from her position as Assistant Superintendent. Appellant’s contention that her prior consent was required pursuant to section 35031 is entirely untenable.
Whether or not appellant may have had a viable cause of action for breach of contract damages, such a cause of action is not before us in this appeal. We are solely concerned with appellant’s claim to a right of reinstatement that was asserted by way of petition for writ of mandate. We conclude appellant failed to establish a right to reinstatement under section 35031 or under any other statutory provision, and therefore the petition was properly denied. In Barthuli v. Board of Trustees, supra, 19 Cal.3d at page 720, the Supreme Court recognized that reinstatement may be an appropriate remedy if an employee has been discharged in violation of his or her statutory or constitutional rights. The Supreme Court reviewed the provisions of the Education Code and concluded that administrators “do not possess a statutory right to their positions,” and thus “reinstatement to his former position [was] not an available remedy for a discharged associate superintendent.…” (Barthuli v. Board of Trustees, supra, at p. 721; Jenkins v. Inglewood Unified School Dist., supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1395, fn. 7 [“Barthuli … plainly holds an assistant superintendent cannot obtain specific performance of her employment contract and therefore a writ of mandate is unavailable to her”].) The same result follows here. Since no violation of appellant’s statutory rights was shown, writ of mandate was not available to her.
III. Writ of Mandate Relief Premised on Appellant’s Contract is Moot
As discussed above, for appellant to be entitled to the remedy of reinstatement, she had to show a violation of a statutory right to her position, and she failed to do so. But even assuming, hypothetically, that reinstatement could be based on her contract alone, that remedy would be precluded for another reason—mootness. (See Gridley v. Gridley (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1588 [principles of mootness apply to writ proceedings].) Appellant must establish a clear and present duty on the part of respondents to reinstate her to her former administrative position, as well as her clear and present right thereto. (City of Dinuba v. County of Tulare, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 868; Code Civ. Proc., § 1085.) Here, the Board took action in its March 6, 2007, meeting to reassign appellant from her Assistant Superintendent position to that of a classroom teacher. Superintendent McCurtis sent appellant a letter on March 12, 2007, giving her notice of that determination. Under these facts, appellant’s contract expired at the very latest on June 30, 2008, the last day of her contract term. Hence, appellant has no contractual basis for a present right to continue to be employed in her former position as Assistant Superintendent, and thus her claim based thereon is moot.
Thus, her contract expired prior to the trial court’s order denying her petition for writ of mandate.
IV. Writ of Mandate Was Correctly Denied For the Additional Reason That the Contract of Employment was Not Ratified as Required by Statute
The primary ground for the trial court’s denial of appellant’s petition for writ of mandate was that there was no valid contract since the Board never ratified the purported employment contract in open session. It is not disputed that appellant’s claim fails if she had no valid or enforceable contract to retain her position as Assistant Superintendent beyond the then-existing school year. The trial court correctly denied the petition on this ground as well.
Ratification of appellant’s contract was specifically required by Government Code section 53262. Government Code section 53262, subdivision (a), provides that “[a]ll contracts of employment with a superintendent, deputy superintendent, assistant superintendent, … shall be ratified in an open session of the governing body which shall be reflected in the governing body’s minutes.” (Italics added.) Section 53262, subdivision (b), further requires that copies of such contracts of employment are to be made available to the public upon request.
An identical ratification requirement is set forth in the District’s written policies applicable to contracts of employment for such administrative positions. (See McFarland Unified School Dist. Bd. Policy 4312.1.)
Additionally, Board approval or ratification of appellant’s contract of employment was necessary under the general provision of section 35163, which states: “Every official action taken by the governing board of every school district shall be affirmed by a formal vote of the members of the board, and the governing board of every school district shall keep minutes of its meetings … in which shall be recorded every official action taken.” (See, e.g., Cloverdale Union H. S. Dist. v. Peters (1928) 88 Cal.App. 731, 736 [board approval of contract required].) Because Government Code section 53262 specifically requires a ratification of the contract in an open session of the Board, it is the more stringent of the two statutory provisions and is the focus of the parties’ dispute.
Government Code section 53262 was enacted in 1992 as part of Senate Bill No. 1996, which concurrently amended several sections of the Education Code and added sections 53260 through 53264 of the Government Code. (Stats. 1992, ch. 962, § 6.) Senate Bill No. 1996 was passed as emergency legislation to provide for greater fiscal responsibility in the operation of school districts and other local agencies, and such legislative purpose expressly included an intention to limit potential liability of local agencies with regard to employment contracts. (Stats. 1992, ch. 962, § 8.) In view of the above stated purpose of the legislation, it is apparent that Government Code section 53262 was intended to promote fiscal responsibility and open dealings on the part of local agencies concerning significant employment contracts by requiring that all employment contracts for particular administrative positions be “ratified” by the governing board in an open session and reflected in the minutes.
Generally speaking, ratification entails “[a]doption or enactment, [especially] where the act is the last in a series of necessary steps or consents” necessary to give validity to an action; or the “[c]onfirmation and acceptance of a previous act, thereby making the act valid from the moment it was done.” (Black’s Law Dict. (9th ed. 2009) p. 1376, col. 1.) Ratification typically involves giving validity to the act of another. (See McCracken v. City of San Francisco (1860) 16 Cal. 591, 623; Civ. Code, § 2310.) “[A] government body may effectively ratify what it could theretofore have lawfully authorized.” (Mott v. Horstmann (1950) 36 Cal.2d 388, 391.) The act of ratification by a government body must be made with full knowledge of the facts relating to the act ratified. (McCracken v. City of San Francisco, supra, at p. 625.) A proper ratification will bind a governmental body “as effectual as an employment in advance would have done.” (People v. Swift (1866) 31 Cal. 26, 28.)
Here, appellant argues that the ratification requirement of Government Code section 53262 must be reasonably construed to include the Board’s advance approval of the terms of the employment contract in open session, even though there was no completed contract to present to the Board. Respondents argue the requirement that specified contracts of employment be ratified means that the Board must vote to confirm a completed contract in open session. That is, the Board must have the contract itself before it in order to ratify that contract.
Whatever the merits of the parties’ respective positions, we find it unnecessary to resolve the question of statutory interpretation because under either construction of the statute, appellant has failed to show her employment contract was “ratified” by the Board in open session.
Assuming without deciding that the ratification requirement may be satisfied by the governing board’s advance approval of essential contract terms in open session, that is not what happened in this case according to the record of the Board’s official action. By statute, the Board’s official action (if any) had to be reflected in its minutes. (§ 35163; Gov. Code, § 53262, subd. (a).) And in view of the purpose of Government Code section 53262 to ensure fiscal responsibility by mandating all such contracts be “ratified” in open session, to constitute approval the Board must be informed of the essential or material terms of the contract at the time of its alleged approval thereof. Here, the declarations submitted in support of appellant’s petition indicated that some “contract terms” were presented to the Board in a closed session, but there is no indication of what terms were presented or whether they constituted all the material terms of the contract. Moreover, the minutes of the relevant open session merely state that the Board approved “to fill” certain positions “by written contract of employment.” Nothing in the minutes of the open session reflects that the Board was advised of the essential terms of appellant’s contract, or that any particular contract or contract terms were actually being approved at that time. This was clearly insufficient to show compliance with the statute as a matter of law. Hence, even assuming appellant is correct that an advance approval by the Board of the contract’s material “terms” satisfied Government Code section 53262, the record fails to support that theory in this case. Lacking such an approval, appellant’s contract had to be brought before the Board for subsequent ratification after it was completed. That was never done.
We have no reason to conclude the trial court failed to apply this broader construction urged by appellant. Assuming it is the correct construction of the statute, there was clearly substantial evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion of lack of compliance with the statute (i.e., its fact finding of no ratification).
Where a statute prescribes the only mode by which the power to contract shall be exercised by a public entity, “‘“the mode is the measure of the power.” [Citation.]’” (El Camino Community College Dist. v. Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 606, 612.) “Persons dealing with a school district are chargeable with notice of limitations on its power to contract.” (Santa Monica Unified Sch. Dist. v. Persh (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 945, 952.) Since Government Code section 53262 required ratification of the contract of employment with an assistant superintendent and no ratification occurred, we conclude appellant’s contract was not enforceable against the District. The petition for writ of mandate was properly denied.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondents.
WE CONCUR: Vartabedian, Acting P.J., Levy, J.