Opinion
# 2012-048-076 Claim No. 121325 Motion No. M-81845
12-19-2012
WAYNE T. OXLEY, JR. v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Synopsis
Defendant's motion to dismiss the Claim of unjust conviction for failure to state a cause of action is denied. Case information
UID: 2012-048-076 Claimant(s): WAYNE T. OXLEY, JR. Claimant short name: OXLEY Footnote (claimant name) : Defendant(s): THE STATE OF NEW YORK Footnote (defendant name) : Third-party claimant(s): Third-party defendant(s): Claim number(s): 121325 Motion number(s): M-81845 Cross-motion number(s): Judge: GLEN T. BRUENING WAYNE T. OXLEY, JR., Pro Se Claimant's attorney: No Appearance HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of the State of New York Defendant's attorney: By: Joel L. Marmelstein, Esq. Assistant Attorney General Third-party defendant's attorney: Signature date: December 19, 2012 City: Albany Comments: Official citation: Appellate results: See also (multicaptioned case) Decision
During the early morning hours of August 30, 2005, Bernard Trickey, Jr., was beaten to death in his Ogdensburg home. On November 16, 2006, Claimant Wayne Oxley, Jr. was convicted of murder in the second degree - a class A-I felony - and, on December 18, 2006, sentenced to an indeterminate term of twenty-five years to life (see Penal Law §§ 70.00; 125.25). On July 30, 2009, Claimant's conviction was reversed and a new trial ordered (see People v Oxley, 64 AD3d 1078 [3d Dept 2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 941 [2010]). The reversal was based on the trial Court's error in excluding evidence of third-party culpability, including testimonial evidence that hours before the murder, a man named Chase threatened to beat Mr. Trickey, together with certain inculpatory statements alleged to have made by Chase.According to the Claim in this action, a second trial ensued, resulting in a hung jury. Thereafter, a third trial commenced and, on February 23, 2012, Claimant was acquitted of the charge of murder in the second degree. Claimant commenced this action seeking to recover damages against the State of New York based upon his allegedly unjust conviction and imprisonment. Submitted with the Claim are seven (7) separately bound volumes consisting of, among other things, excerpts of trial testimony from the first trial resulting in his conviction, forensic investigation reports, the sentencing transcript, the Appellate Division Order reversing the conviction, and an excerpt of trial testimony from the third trial. Defendant now moves pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for dismissal of the Claim based on Claimant's failure to state a cause of action. Claimant does not oppose the motion.
The Appellate Division also held, among other things, that the evidence presented at trial - which did not include evidence of third-party culpability - was legally sufficient to support the conviction and that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Oxley, 64 AD3d at 1079).
"Court of Claims Act § 8-b, the Unjust Conviction and Imprisonment Act, provides a mechanism for 'innocent persons who can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that they were unjustly convicted and imprisoned ... to recover damages against the state' " (Warney v State of New York, 16 NY3d 428, 434 [2011], quoting Court of Claims Act § 8-b [1]). In order to present such a claim, Court of Claims Act § 8-b (3) requires a claimant to establish by documentary evidence that "(a) [he or she] was convicted of a crime, sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and served at least part of the sentence; (b) [he or she] was pardoned on the ground of innocence or, alternatively, the conviction was reversed or vacated and the accusatory instrument was dismissed; and (c) the claim is not time-barred" (id. [citation omitted]). But that is not the end of the pleading requirement. In addition, the Claim must also state facts " 'in sufficient detail to permit the court to find that claimant is likely to succeed' in meeting his or her burden at trial of proving by clear and convincing evidence that, as relevant here, (a) 'he did not commit any of the acts charged in the accusatory instrument' and (b) 'he did not by his own conduct cause or bring about his conviction' (Court of Claims Act § 8-b [4]). 'If the court finds after reading the claim that claimant is not likely to succeed at trial, it shall dismiss the claim' " (Id. at 434, quoting Court of Claims Act § 8-b [4]; see Reed v State of New York, 78 NY2d 1, 7 [1991]).
In support of its motion, Defendant argues that the Claim must be dismissed based on Claimant's failure to satisfy the strict pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act § 8-b (3). Specifically, Defendant contends that Claimant failed to support his Claim with either documentary evidence of his conviction, of the time served in State prison, or of the acquittal after retrial. Defendant further contends that Claimant cannot rely on his acquittal to establish innocence and that he has failed to offer sufficient evidence, pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 8-b (4), that he did not commit the acts with which he was charged. Defendant contends that the exculpatory evidence referred to in the Claim "should be met with a willingness to accept a review of the inculpatory evidence" upon which the Appellate Division based its determination that the verdict, rendered as a result of the first trial, was not against the weight of the evidence (Affirmation of Joel Marmelstein, Esq., paragraph 20).
The Claim in this case alleges, among other things, that, on August 30, 2005, Claimant was arrested for the murder of Mr. Trickey; that, as a result, Claimant was indicted, tried and convicted on November 16, 2006 of murder in the second degree; that Claimant remained incarcerated from August 30, 2005 until he was released on bail on May 23, 2010; that Claimant's conviction was overturned on July 30, 2009 by Decision and Order of the Appellate Division, Third Department; that a second trial resulted in a hung jury; and that, after a third trial, on February 23, 2012, Claimant was acquitted of the charge.
The Court considers both the sentencing transcript attached to the Claim and the Decision and Order of the Appellate Division, Third Department to constitute sufficient documentary evidence that Claimant was convicted of murder in the second degree and sentenced to a term of imprisonment (see Claim, Volume 4, Exhibit W; Part II, Volume 1, Exhibit I; People v Oxley, 64 AD3d 1078). The Court also takes judicial notice that Claimant was convicted of a class A-I felony for which imprisonment is mandatory (see Lanza v State of New York, 130 AD2d 872, 873 [3d Dept 1987]; Penal Law § 70.00), and that Claimant was acquitted of the charge of murder in the second degree on February 23, 2012 (see e.g. Matter of Justin EE., 153 AD2d 772, 774 [3d Dept 1989], lv denied 75 NY2d 704 [1990]). Based on the forgoing, the Court finds that the Claim satisfies the initial pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act 8-b (3).
In addressing whether the Claim satisfies the requirements of Court of Claims Act 8-b (4), in his Claim, Claimant acknowledges certain inculpatory evidence presented against him at the criminal trial, including that hours after the Mr. Trickey's death, Claimant's baseball bat was found in the basement of Claimant's home, on which was found Mr. Trickey's blood and hair together with Claimant's DNA; that Billie Joe Shannon, the son of Claimant's neighbor John Shannon, testified that the night before Mr. Trickey was found dead, he heard a banging noise and saw Claimant banging a stick-like object on Claimant's front porch; that Kathleen Murray, another neighbor, testified that the night before Mr. Trickey was found dead, she saw someone she believed to be Claimant walking toward Mr. Trickey's house; that Michele Warnock, the mother of Claimant's children, testified that Claimant was concerned that Mr. Trickey was selling drugs to kids in the neighborhood; and that Jamin Haggart, another inmate at the St. Lawrence County Correctional Facility, testified that Claimant made a jailhouse admission to the crime.
However, Claimant contends that "[t]he totality of the facts and circumstances of this case, coupled with the proof of third-party culpability (which was excluded during the first trial), demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that Claimant is innocent of Murder in the Second Degree" (Claim, paragraph 15). In support of this proposition, Claimant points to witnesses who testified at trial that Claimant told them he did not go to Mr. Trickey's house the night before the murder, did not kill Mr. Trickey and did not make the jailhouse confession.As evidence of his innocence, Claimant points to the lack of blood found on his clothing, notwithstanding the significant amount of blood splatter found at the crime scene. Claimant also points to his own testimony that on the night of the murder, he was drinking on his porch with two other individuals, one of whom was his neighbor, John Shannon; that after 9:00 P.M., John Shannon asked to use Claimant's baseball bat; that Claimant told John Shannon where the baseball bat was located; that John Shannon thereafter went inside Claimant's residence, and returned outside where he used an object, which Claimant surmises was the baseball bat, to break the windshield of another neighbor's vehicle; that, later that evening, John Shannon again asked to use Claimant's baseball bat; and that, in response to that request, Claimant gave John Shannon the baseball bat and then went to sleep. Claimant asserts that John Shannon had access to Claimant's house and motive to kill Mr. Trickey, who allegedly "shorted" Shannon in recent crack/cocaine purchases. Claimant also points to a witness who testified that Shannon stated he would kill Mr. Trickey.Other witnesses testified that Robert Webb (aka Chase) - an alleged drug dealer - threatened to beat Mr. Trickey at Mr. Trickey's home a few days before the murder and stated that he would and did kill Mr. Trickey.Claimant theorizes that Chase and John Shannon were "jointly responsible for the Murder" (Claim, paragraph 27).
To counter evidence of this jailhouse confession, Claimant points to the testimony of 12 Correction Officers to establish that each did not see Mr. Haggart inside Claimant's cell where Claimant is alleged to have confessed.
Claimant asserts that, at the Preliminary Hearing, John Shannon testified that he was a confidential informant for the Ogdensberg Police Department. Shortly after the murder, John Shannon was found dead in his home, which was involved in a fire.
Chase testified at the criminal trial outside the jury's presence and denied committing the murder and making such statements.
In making a determination as to whether the Claim sufficiently complies with the pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act § 8-b (4), contrary to Defendant's assertion, while supporting documentary evidence is not required, the allegations "must be of such character that, if believed, they would clearly and convincingly establish the elements of the claim, so as to set forth a cause of action" (Warney v State of New York, 16 NY3d at 435 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). The clear and convincing standard "requires a finding of high probability and . . . operate(s) as a weighty caution upon the minds of all judges, and it forbids relief whenever the evidence is loose, equivocal or contradictory" (Matter of Eichner (Fox), 73 AD2d 431, 469 [2d Dept 1980] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see PJI 1:64). While innocence is the "linchpin" of a cause of action for unjust conviction and imprisonment, "an acquittal is not, ipso facto, equivalent to a determination of innocence" (Ivey v State of New York, 80 NY2d 474, 479-480 [1992]). In its analysis, the Court should avoid making factual and credibility determinations (see id.) and, "a claimant who . . . makes detailed allegations with respect to the elements described in section 8-b (4) is entitled to an opportunity to prove the allegations at trial (Court of Claims Act § 8-b [5])" (Warney v State of New York, 16 NY3d at 435).
In assuming the truth of Claimant's allegations in this matter: no blood evidence was found on Claimant's clothes; Claimant, who was cooperative with police, made various exculpatory statements throughout the criminal proceeding and never made the jailhouse confession; John Shannon - a confidential informant and alleged drug user - and Chase - an alleged drug dealer - each stated to separate individuals on separate occasions that each would kill Mr. Trickey; a few days before the murder, Chase went to Mr. Trickey's residence, argued with Mr. Trickey and threatened to beat him; the night before the murder, John Shannon borrowed Claimant's baseball bat and had access to Claimant's house; and, after the murder, Chase made statements admitting that he killed Mr. Trickey. Claimant attaches to the Claim People v Oxley, in which the Appellate Division, Third Department, in its analysis of Mr. Oxley's proffer of third-party culpability in the criminal trial stated that "[t]he court abused its discretion . . . in denying defendant the opportunity to present his evidence which was not merely speculative, but specific and adequately connected Chase to the victim and scene so that it tend[ed] clearly to point out someone besides [defendant] as the guilty party . . .The evidence proffered by defendant was relevant, specific, adequately linked Chase to the crime . . ." (People v Oxley, 64 AD3d at 1083 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the allegations set forth in the Claim, taken as true, demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of success at trial such that Claimant is entitled to proceed with his Claim. To conduct a review of the inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, as Defendant suggests, would necessarily require the Court to make credibility and factual findings, which would be inappropriate at this stage of the litigation (see Warney v State of New York, 16 NY3d at 437).
Accordingly, Defendant's Motion M-81845 is denied and Defendant's time to answer the Claim is extended until ten days after service of notice of entry of this Decision and Order (see 22 NYCRR § 206.7 [a]; CPLR 3211 [f]).
December 19, 2012
Albany, New York
GLEN T. BRUENING
Judge of the Court of Claims
The following papers were read and considered by the Court:
Defendant's Notice of Motion, filed June 25, 2012;
Affirmation of Joel L. Marmelstein, Esq., dated June 25, 2012, with Exhibit 1;
Claim, filed May 18, 2012, with Exhibits consisting of seven (7) separately bound volumes.