Opinion
2:23-cv-00160-SAL-MGB
10-22-2024
Steven W. Oxendine, Petitioner, v. Warden of Evans Correctional Institution, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Steven W. Oxendine, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, (Dkt. No. 8-1), followed by an amended petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Dkt. No. 32). This matter is before the Court on Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Petitioner's amended petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Dkt. No. 41.)
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the assigned United States Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the amended petition and submit findings and recommendations to the United States District Judge. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 40) should be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
At the time Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition, he was held in the Evans Correctional Institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDOC”) pursuant to commitment orders from the Horry County Clerk of Court following his guilty plea and conviction for Assault and Battery of a High and Aggravated Nature (“ABHAN”). (Dkt. No. 8-1 at 8; Dkt. No. 40 at 1.) Petitioner received a ten (10) year sentence for his crime on August 3, 2020. (Dkt. No. 20 at 1; Dkt. No. 20-8 at 22; Dkt. No. 40 at 1.) He entered the South Carolina prison system on September 2, 2020. (Dkt. No. 20 at 1; Dkt. No. 20-1; Dkt. No. 20-8; Dkt. No. 40 at 2.)
This Report and Recommendation reflects the pagination assigned by the Court's automated docketing system.
Prior to pleading guilty to the ABHAN charge, Petitioner was incarcerated in the J. Reuben Long Detention Center in South Carolina. (Dkt. No. 20-5; Dkt. No. 40 at 3.) While there, Petitioner had several holds placed on him that have since been removed. (Dkt. Nos. 20-3, 20-4, 20-5, 20-7; Dkt. No. 40 at 3.) Petitioner was also served with a Fugitive from Justice Warrant relating to sex offenses committed in Florida. (Dkt. Nos. 20-3, 20-4, 20-5, 20-7; Dkt. No. 40 at 3.) At the time Petitioner was served with the Fugitive from Justice Warrant (January 22, 2020), he was detained pursuant to South Carolina criminal warrants and indictments, including the one to which he later pled guilty-the ABHAN charge. (Dkt. No. 20-7; Dkt. No. 40 at 3.) After being served with the Fugitive from Justice Warrant in South Carolina, Petitioner signed a Waiver of Extradition. (Dkt. No. 20-6; Dkt. No. 40 at 3.) Later, while Petitioner was serving his ten-year sentence for his ABHAN charge, a detainer was lodged on Petitioner relating to sexual battery charges out of Florida. (Dkt. No. 20-3; Dkt. No. 40 at 3.)
On August 1, 2024, Petitioner was released from the SCDOC's custody. (Dkt. No. 40-1 at 1.) Upon release, Petitioner had the option to exercise his previous waiver of extradition to Florida, and Florida had the ability to institute extradition proceedings by seeking a Governor's warrant. (Dkt. No. 40 at 4.)
Alternatively, either party could have requested disposition of Petitioner's charges under S.C. Code Ann., Section 17-11-10, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”). (Id.) Based on the record before the Court, neither Petitioner nor Florida made this request.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner filed a pro se habeas petition with this Court on January 12, 2023. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 8-1.) The Petition was unclear but appeared to challenge the detainer placed on him as a result of Florida sexual offense charges and the execution of the Fugitive from Justice Warrant in January of 2020. (Dkt. No. 8-1.) After requesting and receiving extensions of time, Respondent filed a Return and Motion for Summary Judgment on July 24, 2023. (Dkt. Nos. 16, 17.) Petitioner filed a Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment on August 10, 2023. (Dkt. No. 21.) Respondent replied on August 17, 2023 and Petitioner filed a sur reply on October 6, 2023. (Dkt. Nos. 22, 23.)
On December 19, 2023, the undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that Respondent's summary judgment motion be granted, and that Petitioner's case be dismissed with prejudice. (Dkt. No. 24.) On January 8, 2024, Petitioner filed objections to the undersigned's Report and Recommendation. (Dkt. No. 26.) In his objections, Petitioner implied that his petition should not have been filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and asserted that he is entitled to habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which he claims applies when a person is in state custody “because of something other than a judgment or conviction”-including when he is “in pretrial detention or [is] awaiting extradition.” (Id. at 1-2 (quoting Form No. AO 242, https://www.uscourts.gov/forms/civil-forms/petition-writ-habeas-corpus-under-28-usc-ss-2241)).
In light of Petitioner's pro se status and the record before the Court, the Court liberally construed Petitioner's objections as a motion to amend his Petition. (Dkt. No. 28); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). The Court therefore denied Respondent's summary judgment motion (Dkt. No. 17), without prejudice and with leave to refile. (Dkt. No. 28.) The Court ordered Petitioner to amend his petition or submit supplemental briefing within twenty-one days. (Id.)
Petitioner then filed an Amended Petition on April 19, 2024. (Dkt. No. 32.) On June 18, 2023, Respondent filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 41.) Petitioner filed his response to Respondent's motion on June 27, 2024. (Dkt. No. 51.) Respondent replied to Petitioner's response on July 8, 2024. (Dkt. No. 52.) On that same day, Petitioner filed a second response in opposition to Respondent's motion. (Dkt. No. 53.) Respondent replied to Petitioner's additional response on July 12, 2024. (Dkt. No. 55.) As such, the motion before the Court has been fully briefed and is ripe for habeas review.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment: “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). As to the first of these determinations, a fact is deemed “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the disposition of the case under the applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. In determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the Court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts that set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
I. Petitioner's Amended Petition is Moot
At the outset, the undersigned notes that the only relief requested in Petitioner's Amended Petition is “release from custody” or “earlier release from custody.” (See generally Dkt. No. 32.) However, Petitioner has now been released. (See Dkt. No. 40-1 at 1, indicating that “Inmate Oxendine is scheduled for release on August 1, 2024.”) The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that his Amended Petition (Dkt. No. 32) be DISMISSED as MOOT.
The Court also takes judicial notice that Petitioner is no longer listed as an incarcerated inmate on the South Carolina Department of Corrections website. See https://public.doc.state.sc.us/scdc-public/.
Indeed, a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 must be filed by a person “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The Supreme Court has “interpreted the statutory language as requiring that the habeas petitioner be ‘in custody' under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed.” Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989). As such, “[a] habeas corpus petition is moot when it no longer presents a case or controversy under Article III, § 2, of the Constitution.” Aragon v. Shanks, 144 F.3d 690, 691 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)). “This case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate.” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-78 (1990). In other words, “throughout the litigation, the plaintiff ‘must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.'” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7 (quoting Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477). Since Petitioner was released from custody, he is no longer pursuing his release from confinement and his habeas claim is moot. Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Amended Petition (Dkt. o. 32) be DISMISSED as MOOT.
The undersigned recognizes that there are two possible exceptions to the mootness doctrine: (1) “‘collateral consequences;' and (2) [matters] ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.'” Leonard v. Hammond, 804 F.2d 838, 842 (4th Cir. 1986) (quoting Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237 (1968)); see also Zamora Miranda v. Joseph, No. 9:24-CV-01278-JDA-MHC, 2024 WL 3522176, at *2 (D.S.C. June 20, 2024), adopted sub nom. Miranda v. Joseph, 2024 WL 3520912 (D.S.C. July 23, 2024). A collateral consequence is “some concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration ....” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). However, Petitioner has made no allegations regarding a collateral consequence. (See generally Dkt. No. 32.) Further, a petitioner cannot meet his burden to show that a wrongful detention is “capable of repetition” through the mere possibility that he may be returned to custody one day. See Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d 281, 288-89 (4th Cir. 2007).
II. Alternative Basis for Dismissal
Alternatively, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on Petitioner's claims. The undersigned notes that the Amended Petition is unclear, and Petitioner's allegations are largely nonsensical. (See generally Dkt. No. 32.) However, the undersigned is required to construe the pro se Petitioner's claims broadly and has therefore attempted to discern any possible basis for habeas relief from the allegations set forth in the Amended Petition. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, any attempted claims set forth in the Amended Petition fail for the reasons set forth in greater detail below.
First, to the extent Petitioner challenges the validity of the Fugitive from Justice Warrant and/or the authority of the officials who served him with that Fugitive from Justice Warrant, such claims fail. (See generally Dkt. No. 32.) As Respondent correctly notes, Petitioner was in custody because of a South Carolina state court judgment pertaining to his ABHAN charge; he was not in custody pursuant to the detainer for the Florida charges. (Dkt. No. 40.) Additionally, Petitioner was already in the custody of South Carolina authorities when he was served with the Fugitive from Justice Warrant, so the validity of that warrant would have no impact on his incarceration in South Carolina. Regardless, the Fugitive from Justice Warrant appears to have been validly issued and executed pursuant to S.C. Code. Ann. § 17-9-10. (Dkt. No. 20-7.)
To the extent Petitioner asserts that S.C. Code Ann. § 17-9-10 is inconsistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3182, he presents no colorable argument on this point, and a plain reading of the statutes dispels this assertion. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 32, 51, 53, 54.)
To the extent Petitioner makes any claims regarding extradition, such claims are moot. Florida did not move forward with the formal extradition process following the Fugitive from Justice Warrant, and Petitioner waived extradition on all relevant occasions. (Dkt. No. 20-4 at 3; Dkt. No. 20-6 at 3.)
To the extent Petitioner challenges his pre-trial detainment, this claim also fails. (See generally Dkt. No. 32.) Indeed, “[c]laims for habeas relief from pretrial detention are mooted by a subsequent conviction and sentence.” Walker v. Gallam, No. 9:23-CV-01881-JD-MHC, 2023 WL 10553659, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 6, 2023) (referencing Rafa El v. Wright, No. 22-7409, 2023 WL 3073619 (4th Cir. Apr. 25, 2023) (dismissing appeal as moot because the petitioner pleaded guilty to the state criminal charge and was sentenced); Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 228-229 (5th Cir. 1993) (federal habeas relief for pretrial issues were mooted by the petitioner's subsequent conviction)), adopted, 2024 WL 1333420 (D.S.C. Mar. 28, 2024). Further, a review of the record shows that Petitioner did not appeal any pre-trial detention order at issue here. See, e.g., United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 n. 10 (1979) (noting that “the writ of habeas corpus should not do service for an appeal”); Simmons v. Al Cannon Det. Ctr., No. 8:20-CV-2897-DCC-JDA, 2020 WL 6136601, at *3-4 (D.S.C. Aug. 18, 2020) (“Petitioner's available statutory remedy to attack his detention was to timely appeal . . .; but, he did not do so. Petitioner's failure to appeal . . . is fatal to his present attempt to achieve release by another route.”), adopted, 2020 WL 6136169 (D.S.C. Oct. 19, 2020); Fassler v. United States, 858 F.2d 1016, 1018-19 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (explaining that, absent unique circumstances, a defendant cannot use § 2241 to challenge a pretrial detention order that can be challenged under 18 U.S.C. § 3145). Regardless, it does not appear, based on the current record, that Petitioner was unlawfully detained.
To the extent Petitioner is challenging a potential future confinement by the State of Florida by challenging the Florida detainer, this claim fails. Any remedy to which Petitioner may be entitled for this claim would arise under the IAD. The IAD is “a compact entered into by 48 States, the United States, and the District of Columbia to establish procedures for resolution of one State's outstanding charges against a prisoner of another State.” New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111 (2000); 18 U.S.C. App. § 2; see also Carchman v. New Jersey Dep't of Corrections, 473 U.S. 716, 719 (1985) (“The Agreement is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact within the Compact Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10, c. 3, and thus is a federal law subject to federal construction.”). When one jurisdiction lodges a detainer against a prisoner held in another jurisdiction, the IAD generally allows that prisoner a trial in the jurisdiction that lodged the detainer within 180 days of making his request to “the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction . . .” for “a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint [that is the basis for the detainer on file].” See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 17-11-10 and 42-6-20; United States v. Ross, 243 F.3d 375, 376 (7th Cir. 2001). Here, there is no indication that Petitioner began any type of formal proceedings to test the validity of the Florida detainer about which he complains. Thus, as Respondent correctly notes, Petitioner has not availed himself of his rights under the IAD. Because Petitioner has not exhausted his state remedies as required before federal habeas corpus relief is available and has not provided the Court with any explanation as to why he failed to exhaust such remedies, this claim would be dismissed.
Although 28 U.S.C. § 2241 does not contain a statutory exhaustion requirement, courts have required prisoners to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to seeking habeas review under § 2241. See Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 490-91 (requiring exhaustion in a § 2241 matter); Timms v. Johns, 627 F.3d 525, 531 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting courts require “exhaustion of alternative remedies before a prisoner can seek federal habeas relief” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not waivable, United States v. Jeter, 161 F.3d 4 (4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision), but some courts have held that the judicial exhaustion requirement of § 2241 may be excused by courts for discretionary reasons, such as where requiring exhaustion would be futile. See, e.g., Dunkley v. Hamidullah, No. 6:06-CV-2139-JFA-WMC, 2007 WL 2572256, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 31, 2007). Nevertheless, courts have emphasized that a petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies may be excused only upon a showing of cause and prejudice. McClung v. Shearin, 90 Fed.Appx. 444, 445 (citing Carmona v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 243 F.3d 629, 634-35 (2d Cir. 2001)). Petitioner has made no such showing here. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 32, 51, 53, 54.)
To the extent Petitioner's responses to Respondent's summary judgment motion attempt to raise additional grounds for relief that are not mentioned in the Amended Petition, “Petitioner cannot amend his petition by way of his response to the motion for summary judgment.” Amerson v. Stevenson, No. 4:11-CV-3266-DCN-TER, 2012 WL 1897851, at *5 (D.S.C. May 1, 2012), adopted, 2012 WL 1898623 (D.S.C. May 23, 2012); see also Toese v. Stonebreaker, No. 1:22-CV-4436-BHH-SVH, 2023 WL 6119716, at *5 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 2023), adopted, 2023 WL 6119726 (D.S.C. Sept. 18, 2023); Rogers v. Dodkin, No. 1:22-CV-03348-DCC-SVH, 2023 WL 4238467, at *3 (D.S.C. May 3, 2023), adopted, 2023 WL 4235562 (D.S.C. June 28, 2023). Accordingly, such claims are not properly before the Court. See Folkes v. Nelsen, 34 F.4th 258, 269 (4th Cir. 2022) (holding that the “court must consider claims as they are presented in the petition, reviewing them under the applicable standard....[and it is] the district court's duty to consider only the specific claims raised in a § 2254 petition” (citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
Ultimately, this Court is tasked with determining whether a Petitioner filing a writ of habeas corpus under § 2241 is being held in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Based on the record currently before the Court, the undersigned simply cannot conclude that Petitioner is or was so held. Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 41) be GRANTED, and that the Amended Petition (Dkt. No. 32) be DISMISSED.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Petitioner's Amended Petition (Dkt. No. 32) is rendered MOOT. Alternatively, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court GRANT Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 41) and DISMISS this case with prejudice.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.