Owens v. Levee Imp. Dist

28 Citing cases

  1. Powell Salt Water Co. v. Bigham

    69 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934)   Cited 12 times

    Where the evidence establishes that a plaintiff has suffered substantial damages, he is not to be denied a recovery merely because others than the defendant contributed to bring about his loss and he is unable to show distinctly the amount of damages contributed by each tort-feasor. All that the law requires is that the best evidence of which a case is susceptible be produced, and if from such evidence the amount of damages caused by the defendant can be inferred or estimated by the jury with reasonable certainty, then the amount of such damages is for the jury. 17 C.J. 758, 759; 13 Tex.Jur. 368; Owens v. Navarro County Imp. Dist. (Com. App.) 115 Tex. 263, 280 S.W. 532, par. 5; Burr's Ferry v. Allen (Tex.Civ.App.) 164 S.W. 878; Fort Worth D.C. Ry. Co. v. Tomson (Tex.Civ.App.) 250 S.W. 747, par. 5. We think the evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to estimate with reasonable certainty the amount of damages caused by the appellant.

  2. Bildon Farms, Inc. v. Ward County Water Improvement Dist. No. 2

    415 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. 1967)   Cited 24 times
    Explaining that damages need be proved only to a reasonable certainty, not to a mathematical exactness

    damages, he is not to be denied a recovery merely because others than the defendant contributed to bring about his loss and he is unable to show distinctly the amount of damages contributed by each tort-feasor. All that the law requires is that the best evidence of which a case is susceptible be produced, and if from such evidence the amount of damages caused by the defendant can be inferred or estimated by the jury with reasonable certainty, then the amount of such damages is for the jury. 17 C.J. 758, 759; 13 Tex.Jur. 368; Owens v. Navarro County Imp. Dist. (Com.App.) 115 Tex. 263, 280 S.W. 532, par. 5; Burr's Ferry v. Allen (Tex.Civ.App.) 164 S.W. 878; Fort Worth D.C. Ry. Co. v. Tomson (Tex.Civ.App.) 250 S.W. 747, par. 5."

  3. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Nilson

    251 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1952)   Cited 3 times
    In Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Nilson, 151 Tex. 446, 251 S.W.2d 503 (1952), the Texas Supreme Court pointed out that the verdict in that case might conceivably have been upheld (as to damage to the remainder) if the testimony had been 'considering the value which the whole tract would otherwise have for residential subdivision purposes, and considering also the adverse effect for such purposes of both the old and the new pipe lines, the 'before' value of the entire tract was an amount equivalent to $300.

    As remarked by counsel for petitioner, the matter is more one of mathematics than authority. None of the decisions cited appears to bear closely on it, including Gulf, C. S. F. Ry. Co. v. Necco, Tex.Sup., 15 S.W. 1102; Id., Tex.Sup., 18 S.W. 564 and Owens v. Navarro County Levee Imp. Dist. No. 8, 115 Tex. 263, 280 S.W. 532, relied on by respondents. As related to the instant case, these decisions may, indeed, stand for the proposition that in a suit by a landowner for damages to his land as a result of use made by the defendant of the defendant's land, in which the harmful results of the latter use are accompanied by similar damage not chargeable to the defendant, the courts will not require the impossible in the way of evidence showing an 'exact' proration of the total damage as between the two sources.

  4. State v. Schlick

    142 Tex. 410 (Tex. 1944)   Cited 12 times

    We think that the nature of this case is such that probably a proper apportionment cannot be made With mathematical nicety. As this court said in Owens v. Navarro Co. Levee Improvement Dist., 115 Tex. 263, 280 S.W. 532, "The inability to distinguish from the evidence the exact amount of the damages caused by reason of the construction of the levee improvements from that which would have been sustained had such improvements not been constructed would not furnish a sufficient reason to deny a recovery. It is only where under the evidence the amount of the recovery is wholly left to speculation and conjecture that recovery will be denied.

  5. Anderson v. Brawley

    86 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1935)   Cited 7 times

    It was erred to limit the testimony of witnesses regarding certain conversations and in instructing the jury verbally not to consider said testimony as binding upon the defendants and those claiming under him. Davis v. Houston Belt Ter. Ry. Co., 32 S.W.2d 216; Bond v. Kirby Lbr. Co., 2 S.W.2d 936; Texas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Perkins, 48 S.W.2d 249; Franklin v. Tiernan, 62 Tex. 92; Owens v. Navarro Co. Levee Imp. Dist., 115 Tex. 263, 280 S.W. 532; Burrows v. State, 81 S.W.2d 523. C. E. Florence, of Gilmer, W. H. Francis, A. S. Hardwicke and Walace Hawkins, all of Dallas, F. A. Williams, of Galveston, Wynne Wynne, of Longview, and G. C. White, of Cushing, Okla., for defendants in error.

  6. Wichita Falls Trac. Co. v. Elliott

    125 Tex. 248 (Tex. 1935)   Cited 66 times
    In Wichita Falls Traction Co. v. Elliott, 125 Tex. 248, 81 S.W.2d 659, 663, the court approvingly quoted the following from 45 C.J., p. 1200: "The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, now a familiar rule of practice in the trial of negligence cases, which is frequently recognized and applied without specifically naming it is not a rigid or arbitrary formula but a rule that adjusts itself to circumstances.

    In Owens v. Navarro Co. Levee Improvement District, No. 8, et al. (Com. App.), 115 Tex. 263, 280 S.W. 532, Judge Bishop, speaking for the Commission, says: "It is only when it is necessary to enable the jury to properly pass upon and render a verdict on the issues submitted that the court is by statute required to submit explanations in regard to special issues. If the issues submitted are such that explanations are not necessary, none should be given."

  7. City of Amarillo v. Ware

    120 Tex. 456 (Tex. 1931)   Cited 64 times
    Describing a fence as a "valuable and permanent improvement[]" on land

    In some cases where the construction of the improvements and the injury complained of by reason thereof were closely related in point of time, the rule has been stated that the measure of damages for permanent injury to land is the difference in the market value just prior to the time of the construction of the improvements and immediately subsequent to such improvements. Owens v. Navarro County Levee Improvement District No. 8, 115 Tex. 263, 280 S.W. 532; Southern Traction Co. v. Fears (Texas Civ. App.), 199 S.W. 856; Texas Central Ry. Co. v. Brown, 38 Texas Civ. App. 610[ 38 Tex. Civ. App. 610], 86 S.W. 659. Generally speaking, the rule last stated is not flexible enough to meet the ends of justice in all cases.

  8. Ansley v. Tarrant County Water Control and Imp. Dist. No. One

    498 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973)   Cited 8 times

    Under the record before us, the question naturally arises as to whether appellee's improvements caused permanent damage to the land or whether the flooding by the Trinity, regardless and independently of appellee's improvements, caused the land to be permanently damaged. In Owens v. Navarro County Levee Improvement Dist., 281 S.W. 577 (Tex.Civ.App., Waco, 1926), (115 Tex. 263, 280 S.W. 532, Tex.Com.App .), the Court of Civil Appeals said: '* * * Appellee is not liable for the damages that would have been occasioned by the floods independent of and regardless of the construction of the levee in controversy, and, if there were no additional damages occasioned by the construction of the levee, appellant should not recover.

  9. United Ben. Fire Ins. v. Stock

    344 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961)   Cited 11 times
    In United Benefit Fire Insurance Company v. Stock, 344 S.W.2d 941 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston, 1st, 1961, n.w.h.), the court specifically rejected the contention that in a case such as this the plaintiff had the burden of proving that the injuries and their effects are not confined to the specific member.

    The rule requires that such explanatory instruction or definition be necessary to enable the jury to properly pass on such issues. In Owens v. Navarro County Levee Improvement Dist. No. 8 et al., Tex.Com.App., 115 Tex. 263, 280 S.W. 532, 536, opinion adopted, the court in discussing a special charge given by the trial court said: "It is a general charge on the law arising on the facts, and for this reason should not have been given in a case submitted on special issues.

  10. State v. Schlick

    175 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943)   Cited 2 times

    In this court's opinion, there was no evidence of probative force supporting appellants' contention that other factors than the construction and maintenance of the two highways contributed to the specific damage to their lands, of which the appellees complained; hence the trial court did not err in not confining its special issue No. 6, inquiring what the actual intrinsic value of the Schlick farm immediately after the construction of the highways was, "to damage caused by the highways", as appellants urge. State v. Hale, 136 Tex. 29, 146 S.W.2d 731; Owens v. Navarro, 115 Tex. 26, 280 S.W. 532, also Id., Tex.Civ.App. 281 S.W. 577 and Navarro County Levee Imp. Dist. No. 8 v. Owens, Tex. Civ. App. 35 S.W.2d 771; State v. Malone, Tex.Civ.App. 168 S.W.2d 292; Powell Salt Water Co. v. Bigham, Tex.Civ.App. 69 S.W.2d 788; Jackson v. Knight, Tex.Civ.App. 268 S.W. 773; 13 Tex.Jur., Section 210, page 368. Indeed, under the Lower Colorado v. Hughes and State v. Malone cases, cited supra, the controlling contentions of appellants in this controversy seem to have been authoritatively adjudicated adversely to them, upon states of fact not in legal effect different from those here existing; that is, that the State had been herein held liable for damages it did not cause, as there were contributing factors thereto, as to which all of its acts were wholly apart.