Opinion
No. C 01-3720 SI (pr)
January 14, 2002
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
INTRODUCTION
Fredrick Owens, Jr., currently incarcerated at High Desert State Prison, filed this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court reviewed Owens' original complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and dismissed it with leave to amend because Owens had not pled any factual support for his allegations that his constitutional rights had been violated. Owens then filed an amended complaint. His amended complaint is now before the court for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
BACKGROUND
Owens' very confusing amended complaint contains the following information: Owens had a suspended or completed disciplinary housing term in the security housing unit ("SHU") as of April 5, 2000 and therefore was not supposed to be kept in disciplinary housing. However he had enemies in the general population and could not be put in general population housing at Pelican Bay, where he was then incarcerated. During a 3-month period when he was awaiting transfer to another prison, he was placed in administrative segregation at Pelican Bay. While he was in administrative segregation, he was wrongly deprived of his personal property, especially his tobacco and lighters. Owens contends that he should have been put in the general population and locked down in a single cell for his protection or locked down in a single cell in administrative segregation but, in either event, he should have been allowed to possess all the property he could have possessed normally as a general population inmate. Owens eventually was transferred to another prison and apparently allowed to have the property that had been removed during the duration of his stay in administrative segregation. The due process, Eighth Amendment and equal protection claims in the complaint concern the temporary, three-month deprivation of Owens' personal property.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. see Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
B. Legal Claim
1. Due Process Claim
Prisons often ban or limit inmates' possession of certain types of personal property while incarcerated. The Constitution itself does not confer specific property interests such that no limitation at all may be imposed on inmates' possession of property. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 477-84 (1995), the Supreme Court held that a prisoner is entitled to procedural due process only if the restraint on his liberty of which he complains imposes "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Id. at 484. Courts are split on whether the rationale of Sandin should be extended to property interest claims arising from prison conditions. Compare Cosco v. Uphoff, 195 F.3d 1221, 1224 (10th Cir. 1999) (extending Sandin's atypical-and-significant-deprivation methodology to property claims by prisoners), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1081 (2001) and Abdul-Wadood v. Nathan, 91 F.3d 1023, 1025 (7th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that Sandin applies to property interest claims brought by prisoners) with Bulger v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 65 F.3d 48, 50 (5th Cir. 1995) (declining to extend Sandin's methodology to property interest claims by prisoners). The Ninth Circuit has not yet determined whether Sandin applies to a prisoner's property claim. Under Sandin, separating an inmate from his property for a mere three months would not amount to an atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life; thus, no procedural protections would be constitutionally required before such action was taken. Owens' claim would fail as a matter of law if Sandin applied. Cf. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487 (no due process required because no protected liberty interest at stake where inmate was sentenced to a 30-day term in disciplinary segregation). Even if Sandin did not apply, Owens' property claim would fail. It is essential that the prisoner show the existence of a property interest that has been initially recognized and protected by state law to obtain protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 (protected property interests "stem from an independent source, such as state law — rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and support claims of entitlement to those benefits"). To assert such an interest, there must be a "legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Id. State law may create a protected property interest that may not be withdrawn without procedural safeguards only if mandatory language in the law substantively restricts the discretion of state officials. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983); see, e.g., Bulger, 65 F.3d at 50 (finding no property interest in inmate UNICOR job assignments); Lyon v. Farrier, 730 F.2d 525, 527 (8th Cir. 1984) (no protected interest in property designated by prison as contraband); Arney v. Simmons, 923 F. Supp. 173, 177 n. 4 (D. Kan. 1996) (no property interest in inmate benefit fund). California Code of Regulations, title 15, § 3192 provides that "[a]n inmate's right to inherit, own, sell or convey real or personal property does not include the right to possess such property within the institutions of the department." Another regulation requires that any personal items must "present no threat to institution security or the safety of persons" and limits the volume of property for an inmate to a maximum of six cubic feet, Cal. Code Reg. tit. 15, § 3190. Pelican Bay Institution Operational Procedure 806 apparently further restricts the possession of property by any inmate in administrative segregation. A California inmate would not have a legitimate claim of entitlement to possess personal property in prison unless explicitly authorized by other state laws or prison regulations — but Owens has not identified any such laws or regulations. Owens did not have a right to due process before he could be temporarily deprived of property that was not permitted in the housing unit in which he was kept. He also had no legitimate claim of entitlement to his proposed alternative accommodation (i.e., that he be kept in the general population with extra security precautions) so that he would not be subjected to the property possession regulations that applied to all inmates housed in administrative segregation. Cf. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225) (1976) (no constitutionally-protected right to housing in a particular prison). The due process claim is dismissed.
2. Cruel And Unusual Punishment Claim
The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishment." The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit inhumane ones. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). In determining whether a deprivation of a basic necessity is sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim, a court must consider the circumstances, nature, and duration of the deprivation. The more basic the need, the shorter the time it can be withheld. See Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 2215 (2001). Although the Eighth Amendment protects against cruel and unusual punishment, this does not mean that federal courts can or should interfere whenever prisoners are inconvenienced or suffer de minimis injuries. See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992) (8th Amendment excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of force); Anderson v. county of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1314-15, amended, 75 F.3d 448 (9th Cir. 1995) (temporary placement in safety cell that was dirty and smelled bad did not constitute infliction of pain), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 919 (1995); Hernandez v. Denton, 861 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1988) (allegation that inmate slept without mattress for one night is insufficient to state 8th Amendment violation and no amendment can alter that deficiency), judgment vacated on other grounds, 493 U.S. 801 (1989). Federal courts instead should avoid enmeshing themselves in the minutiae of prison operations in the name of the Eighth Amendment. See Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1981).
It belittles the Eighth Amendment to suggest that a three-month ban on the possession of personal property, such as tobacco and lighters (which could not be used within the housing unit in any event), amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. The Eighth Amendment claim is dismissed.
3. Equal Protection Claim
In order to state an equal protection claim, a prisoner must allege that he was wrongfully treated differently from similarly situated people. See More v. Farrier, 984 F.2d 269, 271-72 (8th Cir.) (absent evidence of invidious discrimination, federal courts should defer to judgment of prison officials), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 819 (1993); Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1099 8th Cir. 1990) (same), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1209 (1991).
Owens' complaint shows that he was treated the same as all other administrative segregation inmates. See Complaint, p. 5 and Exh. B. And his complaint shows that he was not similarly situated to general population inmates: unlike the general population inmates who he wanted to be treated like, he had documented enemies from whom he had to be protected and segregated — which was the very reason for his retention in administrative segregation. See Complaint, p. 5. The equal protection claim is dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Leave to amend will not be granted because it would be futile. The clerk shall close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
JUDGMENT
The complaint is dismissed without leave to amend for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED.