Opinion
E-23-321
12-11-2024
MITTIE OWEN PPELLANT v. DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF WORKFORCE SERVICES APPELLEE
Miller, Butler, Schneider, Pawlik & Rozzell, PLLC, by: George M. Rozzell IV, for appellant. Cynthia L. Uhrynowycz, Associate General Counsel, for appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS BOARD OF REVIEW [NO. 2023-BR-00281]
Miller, Butler, Schneider, Pawlik & Rozzell, PLLC, by: George M. Rozzell IV, for appellant.
Cynthia L. Uhrynowycz, Associate General Counsel, for appellee.
CINDY GRACE THYER, JUDGE
Mittie Owen appeals an adverse decision from the Arkansas Board of Review (Board) denying her request for unemployment benefits from her former employer Transplace Texas, LP (Transplace). Owen argues on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to support the Board's finding that she voluntarily left her employment without good cause. More specifically, she contends that there was no evidence to support the finding that she voluntarily ended her employment with Transplace and that the Board failed to assess whether good cause existed for ending her employment. We affirm.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
For six years, Owen had been employed as Transplace's general manager of operations. On April 7, 2021, after a conversation with her supervisor, she left work and simultaneously applied for both short-term disability and leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Paperwork from VOYA, the third-party administrator for her claim, indicated that Owen had requested continuous leave from April 7 to June 1, 2021. Owen's request for FMLA leave was based on her claim that she was suffering from severe anxiety and panic attacks upon learning that Transplace was paying her less than her male coworkers and subordinates.
The letter to Owen from VOYA regarding her leave advised her that she was eligible for leave protection under FMLA at the time of her request but that her leave request had not yet been approved. It further advised that she was eligible for up to a total of twelve weeks of unpaid leave in a twelve-month period for certain qualifying reasons. She was informed that if her leave was approved and if she had FMLA time available, she would be entitled to job protection and continued health benefits from April 7 to June 1, 2021.
Owen subsequently filed an EEOC claim against Transplace asserting gender-bias wage discrimination.
In a letter dated April 19, 2021, VOYA advised Owen that medical certification to support her claim was due by May 5, 2021. On June 9 and June 17, VOYA requested authorization to contact Owen's treating physician regarding the status of her medical certification and to obtain missing information. Owen responded to those requests, asserting that she had already provided the requested certification and had not received any request for additional documentation. There is no evidence in the record that she ever provided VOYA with the requested authorization to speak with her provider.
During this time, Owen remained off work. There is no evidence in the record that her leave was ever approved or that she requested her leave be extended past her originally requested June 1, 2021 end date. Owen did not return to work on June 2 or thereafter.
In a letter dated July 2, 2021, Transplace informed Owen that she was being terminated effective immediately. The letter stated:
Your request for a leave was closed and denied on May 26, 2021 after repeated attempts to contact you regarding its status. You have failed to communicate to your manager as required and further failed to return to work since being advised of the denied status. Accordingly, your employment with Transplace is terminated effective immediately.
On July 7, 2021, Owen emailed Transplace disputing the factual accuracy of the termination letter, claiming that she had emails proving her contact with both Transplace and VOYA representatives and noting that she was still awaiting a response from VOYA regarding the paperwork it had requested at the end of June. While the record contains copies of emails to and from the VOYA representative documenting VOYA's request for medical authorization, the record is devoid of any emails between Owen and Transplace representatives discussing her leave request during that time period other than two emails in early April 2021 regarding instructions on how to file for leave. There is also no documentation in the record showing that Owen's request for leave was denied or closed on May 26 as asserted by Transplace in its termination letter.
Owen filed for unemployment benefits on July 22, 2021. In her claimant statement, Owen alleged she was terminated because she had filed a discrimination complaint with Transplace's human resources department. She reported that her discrimination claim had been investigated and closed just days before the termination letter was sent and that she had not been told beforehand that she was being let go. She also claimed to have documents proving that she had been in communication with Transplace twice weekly and that she was still communicating with VOYA about her claim at the end of June.
This documentation was never provided.
Transplace responded, stating that Owen had been discharged due to absenteeism. In its employer statement, Transplace explained that Owen was discharged for job abandonment after failing to return to work from unapproved leave in violation of company policy. Transplace stated that Owen was aware of the absentee policy in the employee handbook and attached the policy to the form.
The Handbook provided:
If an employee does not report to work for two (2) consecutive days and has not contacted his or her supervisor, Transplace considers the employee to have voluntarily resigned his or her position for job abandonment and will not be eligible for rehire.
On February 1, 2022, the Division of Workforce Services issued a notice of agency determination denying Owen's claim. The Division found that Owen quit her job on June 1, 2021, when she failed to return to work as scheduled from her leave of absence. Consequently, it determined that Owen left work voluntarily and without good cause connected with the work.
Owen appealed the Division's determination to the Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal). An initial hearing on the merits of her claim was held on June 8, 2022. Owen appeared and participated in the hearing; Transplace did not. At the hearing, Owen denied that she had resigned or abandoned her position at Transplace and claimed that she had been terminated because of her complaints to human resources. Owen explained that she requested leave because she was experiencing panic and anxiety attacks and that her requested FMLA dates were simply estimated until she was sure her panic attacks were over.
Owen's appeal to the Tribunal was untimely filed, but after a hearing pursuant to Paulino v. Daniels, 269 Ark. 676, 599 S.W.2d 760 (Ark. App. 1980), and a finding that Owen's untimely filing was the result of circumstances beyond her control, the appeal was docketed for a hearing on the merits.
She further claimed she was on FMLA leave when she received the July 2 letter informing her that she had been terminated. She stated that, despite what the termination letter stated, she had not received anything in writing denying her claim in May. To the contrary, the documents she received-including the emails from the VOYA representative discussed above and the email in April from a Transplace representative-all suggested her claim was ongoing.
As for the request for additional documentation, she stated that she sent documentation to support her claim to VOYA in early May. Then, in early June, the VOYA representative informed her there had been a request for additional documentation. Owen denied receiving such a request but told the VOYA representative that she would provide her with the requested documentation. She stated it took the VOYA representative approximately a week to reply to her. The next correspondence she received was the July 2 termination letter from Transplace.
After the hearing, the Tribunal issued an opinion denying Owen's claim for benefits on the basis that she voluntarily left work without good cause connected with the work. More specifically, the Tribunal concluded that Owen had failed to return to work from her leave and had not acted as a reasonably prudent person who was trying to maintain her employment.
Owen appealed the Tribunal's decision to the Board, which remanded the matter to the Tribunal for a new hearing after finding that Owen's attorney had requested, but had not received, a copy of her file.
A new hearing was held before the Tribunal on January 18, 2023. Transplace representatives did not attend, and Owen was the only witness to testify. She again testified that she had requested leave on April 7 because she was suffering from anxiety and panic attacks upon learning that she was being paid less than her male counterparts and subordinates. She stated that her boss, Craig Wilson, told her to contact VOYA and to take off the time needed to deal with her medical issues. She stated that she was working with VOYA on her leave request when she received the July 2 termination letter.
Regarding her application for leave, Owen testified that she had provided VOYA with the documentation it requested and that she believed her VOYA claim was still pending at the time she was terminated. While she admitted she never obtained approval of her leave request, she also denied having received anything rejecting her claim prior to the July 2 termination letter. On the contrary, she noted that she continued to receive requests from VOYA for additional documentation to substantiate her leave request after the date the letter stated her claim had been denied. She further claimed to be familiar with the FMLA process and asserted that the process was not followed in this instance.
Following the hearing, the Tribunal once again denied Owen's request for benefits, finding that she voluntarily left last work without good cause.
Owen appealed the Tribunal's ruling to the Board, which affirmed the Tribunal's denial of benefits. In so finding, the Board made the following findings of fact:
In this case, [Owen] worked for the employer for approximately six years as a general manager. However, [Owen] voluntarily left the employment when she failed to return to work at the end of her medical leave. Specifically, [Owen] admitted she applied for medical leave because she suffered from severe anxiety and panic attacks upon learning her male counterparts and subordinates were paid higher wages. According to the documentation submitted by [Owen], she requested Family Medical Leave for April 7, 2021 through June 1, 2021.
On April 19, 2021, the employer's leave administrator sent a letter to [Owen] stating her medical certification must be submitted by May 5, 2021. Although [Owen] provided documentation showing she submitted the requested information for medical leave by the deadline, the same documents indicated she did not return to work after her leave expired on June 1, 2021. On the contrary, an email was sent to [Owen] from the leave administrator on June 9, 2021, requesting permission to directly contact [Owen's] medical provider because her documentation was never received.
In response to the request, [Owen] replied that she did not receive correspondence requiring additional information, and she asked where the request was sent. Again on June 17, 2021, the leave administrator reiterated its request for authorization to contact [Owen's] doctor directly. [Owen] replied that the medical certification had already been sent and asked if it had been received. There is no indication that [Owen] ever provided the contact information for her healthcare provider or gave her permission to contact her physician as requested. Notwithstanding, it was [Owen's] contention that the employer discharged her in retaliation for filing a grievance regarding the issue of unequal pay due to gender bias.
In light of these facts, the Board issued the following conclusions of law:
After reviewing the evidence, the Board finds [Owen] voluntarily left the employment. Although the Board is convinced that [Owen] applied for a medical leave of absence, the evidence indicated the request was not approved because documentation had not been submitted. While the Board is persuaded that sufficient
evidence exists to prove [Owen] complied with the original request to provide medical documentation on May 4, 2021, the Board finds [Owen] failed to comply with subsequent requests for authorization to contact her physician. Since [Owen] did not return to work after her leave period expired on June 1, 2021, and she did not request an extension of her medical leave, it is the opinion of the Board that [Owen] voluntarily left last work without good cause connected with the work.
Owen now appeals the Board's denial of benefits.
II. Discussion
On appeal of an unemployment-compensation case, we review the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board's findings. Coker v. Dir., 99 Ark.App. 455, 456, 262 S.W.3d 175, 176 (2007). The Board's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. However, that is not to say that our function on appeal is merely to ratify whatever decision is made by the Board. Boothe v. Dir., 59 Ark.App. 169, 954 S.W.2d 946 (1997). We will reverse the Board's decision when it is not supported by substantial evidence. Id.
On appeal, Owen argues that the Board's finding that she left work without good cause is not supported by substantial evidence. She argues that the Board ignored the fact that she was still in communication with both VOYA and Transplace human resources regarding her leave; that she had submitted all the paperwork requested; that she was still expecting to return to work (following the initial projected leave period); that her employer never communicated with her a return-to-work date or that her leave had been denied; and that she was actively engaged in challenging her employer's discriminatory practices. She further argues that the Board failed to analyze and consider whether she took steps to protect her job rights or whether she had had good cause to leave Transplace, including whether her mental health or the discrimination allegations constituted good cause. We, however, must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board's findings, and the Board's findings are supported by substantial evidence.
A person who voluntarily leaves her employment without good cause connected to the work shall be disqualified for benefits. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-513(a)(1) (Supp. 2023). However, no individual shall be disqualified if, after making reasonable efforts to preserve her job rights, she left her last work because of illness, injury, pregnancy, or disability of the individual or member of the individual's immediate family. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-513(b)(2)(A).
In Foster v. Director, 2013 Ark.App. 190, this court held that an employee left her last employment without making reasonable efforts to preserve her job rights when she did not return to work upon the expiration of her FMLA leave. In Foster, we found that the claimant had made no attempt to inform her employer that she wanted to return to her job, which left the employer with no choice but to assume that she had quit. Id. We made a similar finding in Jones v. Director, 2019 Ark.App. 341, 581 S.W.3d 516, in which the claimant failed to return to work after her leave had expired and after she had requested an extension of her leave.
Here, the evidence shows that Owen requested leave from April 7 through June 1, 2021. However, she did not return to work on June 2, nor did she file a request for an extension of leave. Accordingly, as in both Jones and Foster, substantial evidence supports the Board's decision that Owen left her last work without good cause. Even if Owen had requested the full twelve weeks of medical leave permitted under FMLA, that leave would have expired on June 30, 2021, yet Owen did not return to work by that date, either.
Owen next argues that the Board failed to analyze and consider whether she took steps to protect her job rights or whether she had had good cause to leave Transplace, including whether her mental health or the discrimination allegations constituted good cause. We disagree.
As a prerequisite to receiving unemployment benefits, an employee is required to make every reasonable effort to preserve his job rights before leaving employment. Cely v. Dir., 2022 Ark.App. 384, 653 S.W.3d 394. Here, the Board specifically found that Owen's requested leave ended on June 1 and that she did not return to work on June 2 nor did she request an extension of her leave request. Thus, while the Board did not recite the statutory language regarding the claimant's need to preserve her job rights, substantial evidence supports the Board's conclusion that she did not do so, and she was not entitled to benefits.
As for Owen's claim that the Board failed to determine whether good cause existed for her failure to return to work, her argument again fails. In its decision, the Board specifically acknowledged her gender-discrimination claims but found that she had failed to provide the documentation necessary to substantiate her medical claims arising therefrom and failed to request an extension of her medical leave. When a claimant has voluntarily quit work and is seeking unemployment-insurance benefits, the burden is on the claimant to show that he or she had good cause connected with the work for quitting. Owens v. Dir., 55 Ark.App. 255, 935 S.W.2d 285 (1996). Because she failed to provide the requested documentation, she failed in her burden.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. Affirmed.
GLADWIN and HIXSON, JJ., agree.