Overlock v. Ruedemann

22 Citing cases

  1. Lickteig v. Kolar

    782 N.W.2d 810 (Minn. 2010)   Cited 14 times
    Rejecting sibling immunity

    In Silesky v. Kelman, we stated, albeit in dictum, that "[s]uits are permitted among unemancipated siblings even though they remain in the [same] family household[,]" citing a Connecticut Supreme Court case that held that no immunity existed between unemancipated minor siblings for a suit involving negligent operation of an automobile. 281 Minn. 431, 435-36, 161 N.W.2d 631, 634 (1968) (citing Overlook v. Ruedemann, 147 Conn. 649, 165 A.2d 335, 338 (1960)), overruled in part on other grounds by Anderson, 295 N.W.2d at 601. The general rule is that the doctrine of intrafamilial immunity does not apply to suits between siblings.

  2. Ascuitto v. Farricielli

    244 Conn. 692 (Conn. 1998)   Cited 43 times
    Affirming grant of summary judgment on negligence claim where parental immunity applied

    There is no reason why they could not as well discover its practice within the family circle." Overlock v. Ruedemann, 147 Conn. 649, 654, 165 A.2d 335 (1960), citing Midkiff v. Midkiff, 201 Va. 829, 833, 113 S.E.2d 875 (1960). I will not restate the history of the adoption of parent-child immunity in this state which we have repeatedly set forth; see Squeglia v. Squeglia, 234 Conn. 259, 263-65, 661 A.2d 1007 (1995); other than to remind the reader that it is a judicially crafted doctrine.

  3. Traczyk v. Connecticut Co.

    190 A.2d 922 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1963)   Cited 2 times

    It has been, and continues to be, the settled law of Connecticut that an unemancipated child cannot maintain an action for negligence against his parent. Overlock v. Ruedemann, 147 Conn. 649, 651; Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn. 77, 82. The ground given in denying the maintenance of such an action is that of public policy and the preservation of the integrity and unity of the family relation. Mesite case, supra, 84; see Wright, loc. cit.

  4. Dzenutis v. Dzenutis

    200 Conn. 290 (Conn. 1986)   Cited 79 times
    Establishing business activities exception

    This court, however, has refused to extend the doctrine of parent-child immunity to bar a suit by a child against the employer of the parent whose negligence in the course of his employment caused the child to be injured; Chase v. New Haven Waste Material Corporation, 111 Conn. 377, 380, 150 A. 107 (1930); by a mother against her husband based upon the negligence of their minor son in operating an automobile owned by the husband, whose liability was predicated upon the family car doctrine; Silverman v. Silverman, 145 Conn. 663, 666-68, 145 A.2d 826 (1958); or by a child for injuries caused by the negligence of her sister, also an unemancipated minor. Overlock v. Ruedemann, 147 Conn. 649, 655, 165 A.2d 335 (1960). Prior to the adoption of parent-child immunity in Mesite, we had held in the analogous husband-wife context that the enactment of the Married Women's Act of 1877 gave a wife separate and independent legal status and thus abrogated the common law rule of spousal immunity both for intentional torts; Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 47, 89 A. 889 (1914); and for negligent ones. Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 587, 131 A. 432 (1925).

  5. Mahon v. Heim

    332 A.2d 69 (Conn. 1973)   Cited 9 times

    " In so charging the jury the court correctly stated the settled law in this state as recently repeated in Overlock v. Ruedemann, 147 Conn. 649, 654, 165 A.2d 335, in which this court, speaking by Baldwin, C.J., noted that "in determining the negligence of a minor the law applies to him a standard of conduct which will vary according to his age, judgment and experience," citing Rappa v. Connecticut Co., 96 Conn. 285, 286, 114 A. 81, Colligan v. Reilly, 129 Conn. 26, 29, 26 A.2d 231, and Magaraci v. Santa Marie, 130 Conn. 323, 330, 33 A.2d 424; see also Santor v. Balnis, 151 Conn. 434, 436, 199 A.2d 2; Greene v. DiFazio, 148 Conn. 419, 424, 171 A.2d 411; Marfyak v. New England Transportation Co., 120 Conn. 46, 50, 179 A. 9, with the many cases cited therein on page 50. This accords with the generally accepted rule as summarized in Restatement (Second), 2 Torts 283 A, as follows: "If the actor is a child, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence and experience under like circumstances." While agreeing that the charge as given was that applicable in ordinar

  6. Begley v. Kohl & Madden Printing Ink Co.

    157 Conn. 445 (Conn. 1969)   Cited 82 times
    Rejecting claim that parental immunity doctrine does not bar suit for wilful and wanton misconduct

    " To permit such actions is against sound public policy. See Overlock v. Ruedemann, 147 Conn. 649, 651, 165 A.2d 335. The trial court correctly instructed the jury on the law applicable to the facts of the present case. Section 52-572c of the General Statutes abrogates the immunity between parent and child in actions for negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle in all actions accruing after July 1, 1967. It is noteworthy that the General Assembly declined to modify the doctrine of parental immunity in any other respect.

  7. Silesky v. Kelman

    281 Minn. 431 (Minn. 1968)   Cited 73 times
    In Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968), this court abrogated the doctrine of parent-child tort immunity subject to the following two exceptions: "(1) Where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable parental authority over the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care * * *."

    " The Connecticut court in Overlock v. Ruedemann, 147 Conn. 649, 165 A.2d 335, faced with precedent proscribing all tort actions between children and parents, but permitting spouses to sue, held that an unemancipated minor child could maintain an action against her unemancipated minor sister for negligence in the operation of an automobile. The court did not attempt to delineate the reasons which would permit this lawsuit while prohibiting suits between children and their parents, but stated ( 147 Conn. 654, 165 A. [2d] 338):

  8. Freeland, etc. v. Freeland

    152 W. Va. 332 (W. Va. 1968)   Cited 12 times
    In Freeland v. Freeland, 152 W. Va. 332, 162 S.E.2d 922 (1968), overruled on other grounds, Syl. Pt. 3, Lee v. Comer, 159 W. Va. 585, 224 S.E.2d 721 (1976), we explained the family purpose doctrine is grounded on principles of agency or those of master and servant. 152 W. Va at 336, 162 S.E.2d at 925.

    See annotation, 81 A.L.R.2d 1155. See also Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, 22 N.E.2d 254, 123 A.L.R. 1015; Overlock v. Ruedemann, 147 Conn. 649, 165 A.2d 335; Detwiler v. Detwiler, 162 Pa. Super. 383, 57 A.2d 426, and Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal.2d 421, 289 P.2d 218. The general rule is that one is liable for his tortious act, immunity from such liability being the exception.

  9. Watson v. Nichols

    270 N.C. 733 (N.C. 1967)   Cited 12 times
    Stating that, "when parents are present, in charge of their children of tender years, responsibility for their care and safety falls on the parents"

    These actions usually involve injuries growing out of automobile accidents. Midkiff v. Midkiff, 201 Va. 829, 113 S.E.2d 875 (1960); Overlock v. Ruedemann, 147 Conn. 649, 165 A.2d 335 (1960); Herrell v. Haney, 341 S.W.2d 574 (Tenn., 1960); Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal.2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, 22 N.E.2d 254 (1939); Munsert v. Ins. Co., 229 Wis. 581, 281 N.W. 671 (1938). At this time, and in this case, we do not find it necessary to pass on the question whether one infant member of a household may be held liable for a negligent injury to another infant member of the same household. The facts alleged in the cross action do not make out a case of liability against Mitchell Watson.

  10. Briere v. Briere

    107 N.H. 432 (N.H. 1966)   Cited 88 times
    Allowing minor to sue parent for negligence in automobile accident

    See Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314, 317; see also, Prosser on Torts (3d ed.)p. 887. To allow such a distinction as now exists between tort and other forms of action is indeed not only to perpetuate confusion and irreconcilable decisions (see Overlock v. Ruedemann, 147 Conn. 649, 654), but to entrench a policy from which changing times have drained most of such vitality as it may have once possessed. See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 359; Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, dissenting opinion by Jacobs, J., 254-255.