" (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Overby v. State, 237 Ga. App. 730, 732 (2) ( 516 SE2d 585) (1999). The State argues, however, that the preponderance of the evidence standard for probation revocation was met by the mere fact that Impeduglia had received a report of stolen property and by his testimony that the air compressor bore stickers with the name of the purported victim's business and that it matched the victim's description.

The appellate courts of Georgia have not addressed the issue of admissibility of hearsay evidence in the context of parole revocation hearings, although they have held that hearsay is inadmissible and of no probative value in probation revocation hearings. Overby v. State, 237 Ga. App. 730, 732 (2) ( 516 S.E.2d 585) (1999); Goodson v. State, 213 Ga. App. 283, 284 ( 444 S.E.2d 603) (1994); Barnett v. State, 194 Ga. App. 892, 893 ( 392 S.E.2d 322) (1990). See also Farmer v. State, 266 Ga. 869 ( 472 S.E.2d 70) (1996).

We cannot consider Dennis's claim that the statement was admissible as original evidence to explain his conduct pursuant to OCGA § 24-3-2 because he did not make this argument at the time he sought to admit the statement or at any other time during the trial. See Overby v. State, 237 Ga.App. 730, 732(2)(b), 516 S.E.2d 585 (1999) (declining to consider State's argument that necessity exception to hearsay rule applied because trial court was never asked to consider this theory of admissibility); Ekstedt v. Charter Med. Corp., 192 Ga.App. 248, 249(2), 384 S.E.2d 276 (1989) (refusing to consider necessity exception to hearsay rule as ground for admission of testimony because necessity argument was not raised below). Because we are a court of review, " [g]rounds for reversal which may be considered on appeal are limited to those which were argued before the trial court."

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Overby v. State, 237 Ga. App. 730, 732 (2) ( 516 SE2d 585) (1999) (officer's hearsay testimony in probation revocation hearing that victim reported that defendant shoved her against a tree could not be considered to support allegations of new battery offense) (id. at 732 (2) (a)). Accord Barnett v. State, 194 Ga. App. 892, 893 ( 392 SE2d 322) (1990) (whole court) ("in this jurisdiction hearsay evidence is inadmissible in a probation revocation proceeding") (citations omitted). Further, even though Hamby and Giddens both testified that they were present as the telephone calls between "Nino" and the informant were taking place and that they could hear "Nino" talking on the line, neither Hamby nor Giddens was able to identify the voice on the telephone — "Nino's" voice — as Brown's voice. Hamby gave no testimony that he recognized Brown's voice; and, although Giddens testified that she knew Brown by sight and that "Nino" was Brown's street name, she testified that she did not know if that was Brown's voice on the telephone; s

Although the conduct here was certainly criminal, we agree with Ware that the evidence adduced at the hearing, hearsay or otherwise, was insufficient under the preponderance of the evidence standard applicable to probation revocation proceedings to show she committed the new offense of aggravated assault. See Overby v. State, 237 Ga. App. 730, 731 (1) ( 516 SE2d 585) (1999). Judgment reversed. Andrews, P. J., concurs. Ellington, J., concurs in the judgment only.

Because the evidence was insufficient, under a preponderance of the evidence standard, to find that Parker committed the offense of burglary, the trial court manifestly abused its discretion by revoking Parker's probation. Anderson v. State, 212 Ga. App. 329 ( 442 SE2d 268) (1994) (slight evidence that defendant committed the alleged violation, but not a preponderance of the evidence). See also Young v. State, 265 Ga. App. 425, 427 ( 594 SE2d 667) (2004); Overby v. State, 237 Ga. App. 730, 731-732 (1), (2) ( 516 SE2d 585) (1999); cf. Riggins v. State, 206 Ga. App. 239, 240 (1) ( 424 SE2d 879) (1992). Accordingly we reverse.

Also, because Hickey testified that he did not enter the house and merely asked her to use her phone, that she voluntarily gave him the $200 after he asked if she had change for a $20 bill, and that she let him use her car, the statement helped explain why she feared him and did not resist him. 4. Hickey also argues that the trial court erred in allowing Sgt. Brown to relate what Ms. Brewer reported to him at the scene when he investigated because the statement was hearsay, relying on Overby v. State, 237 Ga. App. 730, 732 (2) ( 516 SE2d 585) (1999). In that probation revocation case, however, the only evidence introduced was hearsay because the victim of the claimed assault was out of state and did not testify.