Here, the trial court correctly concluded that Cawley did not assert his constitutional right to a speedy trial by requesting a jury trial at his arraignment on April 22, 2009. See Meder v. State, 305 Ga.App. 702, 703(c), 700 S.E.2d 706 (2010) ; Over v. State, 302 Ga.App. 215, 218(3), 690 S.E.2d 507 (2010). The trial court further stated that Cawley “had never asserted his right to a speedy trial,” and he weighed the assertion of the right factor against Cawley.

The most important Barker–Doggett factor whether the pre-trial delay harmed the defendant. See Over v. State, 302 Ga.App. 215, 218(4), 690 S.E.2d 507 (2010). The right to a speedy trial is an important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself.

The most important Barker–Doggett factor whether the pre-trial delay harmed the defendant. See Over v. State, 302 Ga.App. 215, 218(4), 690 S.E.2d 507 (2010).The right to a speedy trial is an important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself.

Given that the title and text of Labbee's June 30 motion expressly demanded a trial by jury but made no explicit reference to a speedy trial, the trial court properly found that Labbee did not sufficiently invoke his constitutional speedy trial right for purposes of the third Barker-Doggett factor until he filed his plea in bar on September 28, 2020. See Over v. State , 302 Ga. App. 215, 218 (3), 690 S.E.2d 507 (2010) (rejecting argument that defendant's jury trial demands should be construed as speedy trial demands because they cited Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XI (a), given that the "jury trial demands themselves ... included no explicit speedy trial demands, and ... a demand for jury trial does not invoke a constitutional right to a speedy trial"). Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. 1, Par. I provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property except by due process of law."

The relevant inquiry for purposes of this factor is not whether the prosecutor or the accused bears more responsibility for the delay, but whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay.Over v. State , 302 Ga.App. 215, 217 (2), 690 S.E.2d 507 (2010) (citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied). Here, the trial court was authorized to find that the government bears more responsibility for the delay in this case, and therefore this argument by the state is without merit.

... A court will weigh this factor heavily against the defendant particularly where the defendant ... has been represented by counsel since soon after ... arrest [cit.] and ... does not raise the speedy trial issue until filing a motion to dismiss just before trial. (Citation and footnote omitted.) Id. at 344(2)(c), 693 S.E.2d 578. These are the same circumstances that exist here, and we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by weighing this factor heavily against Carder. Over v. State, 302 Ga.App. 215, 218(3), 690 S.E.2d 507 (2010) (“[t]he accused bears the responsibility for putting the government on notice [that] he does not want a delay, and failure to do so weighs strongly against him”). Compare Hester, 268 Ga.App. at 99(3), 601 S.E.2d 456 (trial court erred in weighing this factor heavily against the accused because this factor was mitigated by the State's failure to indict for three years and by further delay in appointing defense counsel).

Under the procedural circumstances of this case, the trial court did not err in weighing this factor against Wilson. Ogletree v. State, 303 Ga.App. 581, 583(c), 693 S.E.2d 909 (2010) (delay in demanding speedy trial—four years, four months after arrest and almost five months after grant of mistrial—weighed against defendant). See also Over v. State, 302 Ga.App. 215, 218(3), 690 S.E.2d 507 (2010) (22–month delay in demanding a speedy trial weighed against defendant). Finally, the record supports the trial court's finding that there was no evidence of prejudice.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Over v. State, 302 Ga.App. 215, 217(2), 690 S.E.2d 507 (2010) (delay due to crowded docket is attributable to the government). While we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's finding that the delay in this case was not attributable to the prosecutor, at least a portion of the delay was attributable to the government.

We note, however, that it is well-settled that delays exceeding one year are presumptively prejudicial. See Over v. State, 302 Ga. App. 215, 216 (1) ( 690 SE2d 507) (2010). See Walker v. State, 285 Ga. App. 529, 531 (2) ( 646 SE2d 734) (2007).

Hayes v. State, 298 Ga. App. 338, 339 (1) ( 680 SE2d 182) (2009). See Boseman v. State, 263 Ga. 730, 732 (1) (a) ( 438 SE2d 626) (1994) (as the delay approaches one year, it is generally presumptively prejudicial); Over v. State, 302 Ga. App. 215, 217 (1) ( 690 SE2d 507) (2010) (two-year delay presumptively prejudicial); State v. Bazemore, 249 Ga. App. 584, 585 (1) (a) ( 549 SE2d 426) (2001) (21-month delay presumptively prejudicial). See Bowling v. State, 285 Ga. 43, 45 (1) (a) ( 673 SE2d 194) (2009).