Opinion
No. 58577/2013.
09-23-2014
Leyin OUYANG, Petitioner/Landlord, v. Caroline CROMELIN, et al., Respondents/Tenants.
Opinion
1664 3rd Ave LLC commenced this holdover proceeding against Caroline Cromelin and Paul Williams, the respondents in this proceeding (“Respondents”) seeking possession of 1664 Third Avenue, Apt. 4N, New York, New York (“the subject premises”) on the ground that Respondents failed to allow access to the subject premises for the purpose of making necessary alterations to the subject premises, in violation of both 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 2524.3(e) and Respondents' lease. Respondents answered, interposing defenses of, inter alia, improper petitioner, laches, statute of limitations, and that the work sought to be done has not been legalized. The Court held a trial on this matter.
At trial, the petitioner in this proceeding introduced into evidence a deed executed on January 29, 2014 (subsequent to the commencement of this proceeding) conveying title to the building in which the subject premises is located (“the Building”) from 1664 3rd Ave LLC, the petitioner in this proceeding and a grantor on the deed, to Leyin Ouyang, the grantee on the deed.
At the close of the prima facie case, Respondents moved to dismiss the proceeding for failure to prove that it was commenced by a proper party pursuant to RPAPL § 721, as there was never a motion to substitute Leyin Ouyang as the petitioner. The petitioner's opposition to Respondents' motion relies upon CPLR § 1018, which permits the continuation of an action by an original party upon transfer of interest. Continuation of this proceeding is not as seamless as Petitioner argues, however. Given the requirement of RPAPL § 721 that a petitioner in a summary proceeding be, inter alia, a “landlord or lessor,” 1664 3rd Ave LLC cannot be the petitioner on the trial of this matter, Muzio v. Rogers, 20 Misc.3d 143A (App. Term 2nd Dept.2008), Terner v. Brighton Foods, Inc., 27 Misc.3d 1225A (Civ.Ct. N.Y. Co.2010), Boyd v. Sametz, 17 Misc. 728, 730 (Dist. Ct. 2nd Dist. N.Y. Co. 1896), especially in the absence of a substitution. Besmanoff v. Allen, 143 Misc.2d 309 (App. Term 2nd Dept.1989). However, the Court has the power under CPLR § 1018 to direct a substitution in a case such as this so long as the substantial rights of the defendants are not prejudiced. Reynolds v. Blue Cross, 158 Misc.2d 859, 862 (S.Ct. Schenectady Co.1993), rev'd on other grounds, 210 A.D.2d 619 (3rd Dept.1994). Crediting Leyin Ouyang's testimony that she is the sole member of 1664 3rd Ave LLC, noting that the most recent renewal lease entered into evidence shows Leyin Ouyang as one of the lessors, evidence of which can otherwise be sufficient to meet one's burden of proving that one is a proper party under RPAPL § 721, Sedgwick Ave. Realty Assoc., L.L.C. v. Torres, 2013 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 166 (Civ.Ct. Bronx Co.2013), and taking judicial notice of a prior summary proceeding against Respondents in which Leyin Ouyang was one of the petitioners, all underscore that Respondents have not proven prejudice sufficient to overcome the ability of the Court to substitute Leyin Ouyang as the petitioner in this proceeding (“Petitioner”), and the Court does so and amends the caption accordingly and denies Respondent's motion to dismiss the proceeding on the basis that it is brought by an improper party.
Petitioner introduced into evidence a lease commencing March 1, 2003 executed by both Caroline Cromelin (“Respondent”) and one “Frank Castlebuono,” identified on the lease as “Owner”. Paragraph 15(a) of this lease provides that “Owner” may enter the subject premises to, inter alia, make “any necessary repairs or changes Owner decides are necessary.” Petitioner also entered into evidence a renewal lease dated March 22, 2012 and commencing July 1, 2012 and expiring on June 30, 2014 that appears to indicate that the subject premises is rent-stabilized, between Respondent and one “Anthony Castlebuono” and Petitioner as “Owner”. Petitioner proved that she is in compliance with the registration requirements of MDL § 325. Petitioner also proved that she timely caused an appropriate predicate notice to be served on Respondents prior to the commencement of this proceeding. Respondents' answer concedes that they continue to occupy the subject premises after service of the notice.
Petitioner testified that she wanted to do work in the Building and introduced into evidence plans (“the Plans”) that had been submitted to the New York City Department of Buildings (“DOB”). The Plans are dated May 17, 2011 and stamped “approved” by DOB on June 5, 2012. Petitioner testified that a requirement of the Plans was to seal windows in the subject premises that open onto two airshafts (“the airshafts”).
Petitioner introduced into evidence a notice of violation and hearing DOB placed on the Building on July 13, 2011, after the Plans had been filed, for, inter alia, covering a ventilation and natural light shaftway on the south side of the Building, and providing that the remedy for the violation would be to maintain the air and ventilation shaftway to Code. Another notice of violation and hearing DOB placed on the Building on July 30, 2011 was placed for, inter alia, the breaking apart of the wall surfaces of four airshafts, and providing that the remedy for the violation would be to maintain the Building in a legal manner.
Petitioner testified that she could not get a quote from a contractor to repair the airshafts, and that a contractor would not repair the airshafts. Petitioner testified that she spoke with an architect (“Petitioner's architect”) to correct the violations, and then retained Petitioner's architect to file the Plans with DOB to incorporate the work necessary to correct the violations. Petitioner testified that, after reviewing plans with the architect, she asked Respondents for access to the subject premises and Respondents would not grant access to the subject premises. Petitioner testified that six apartments at the Building have already had their windows to the airshafts sealed.
On cross-examination, Petitioner testified that her opinion that the airshafts have to be sealed was a lay opinion. Petitioner testified that she requested access to the subject premises on December 26, 2012. On cross-examination, Petitioner testified that she had the tops of the airshafts on the roof of the Building sealed in 2010 or 2011 before plans were filed with the DOB, and that the super of the Building sealed the airshafts with a temporary covering. On cross-examination, Petitioner testified that she had sealed the windows facing the airshafts in some of the other apartments in the Building before the Plans were filed with DOB, and that at least some of those apartments were vacant at the time the windows were sealed, although she did not remember with regard to every apartment where that happened. On cross-examination, Petitioner testified that she did not do anything else inside the subject premises to correct the violations placed by DOB.
On redirect examination, Petitioner testified that the tops of the airshafts were not sealed, but that they were temporarily covered because each time it rained, a continuous leak problem ensued, resulting in rain getting into the fifth floor and the hallway.
Petitioner's architect testified for Petitioner. Petitioner's architect testified that he is a project architect, according to which he oversees projects from beginning to end, working on design, doing code analysis, getting DOB approvals, working on plans, and administering construction. The Court granted Petitioner's motion to qualify Petitioner's architect as an expert witness.
Petitioner's architect testified that he is the project architect for the Building, and that he oversaw the team of people who measured the Building, drew plans, did code analysis, did zoning analysis, and met with DOB. Petitioner's architect testified that he drafted the Plans. Petitioner's architect testified that the Plans are in “approved” status, that DOB audited them for the first time in December of 2011, that a plan examiner issued objections, and that DOB has not revoked the approval.
Petitioner's architect testified that the subject premises has windows to the outside, facing the street. Petitioner's architect testified that the plan is to seal other windows in the subject premises, that face the airshafts in the middle of the subject premises, which do not look out on a court or a yard, and then replace the windows with fire-rated material. Petitioner's architect testified that the purpose of the sealing and replacement of the windows was to increase the fire safety of the Building and to address the violations that DOB placed on the Building, as the airshafts would not need to be maintained if they are sealed; as sealing the airshafts would keep water from flowing down into the shaft; and as anything loose in the airshafts would not get into apartments in the Building.
Petitioner introduced into evidence “I-cards,” which Petitioner's architect testified are older records of the Department of Housing Preservation and Development of the City of New York (“HPD”) that pre-date certificates of occupancy. Petitioner's architect testified that the I-cards show that the Building was constructed before April 12, 1901; that the area of each airshaft is approximately thirteen square feet; and that the airshafts were covered with a ventilated skylight, although on the I-card, handwritten in the column describing whether the airshafts are covered is the word “opened”.
Petitioner's architect testified that the size of the airshafts is important because the Multiple Dwelling Law prescribes a minimum size of an airshaft for a room with a window looking out on it in order for that room to be used for living purposes. Petitioner's architect also testified that both the Multiple Dwelling Law and the previous code in effect did not allow for skylights, but rather required that airshafts be open to the sky, and that the airshafts in the Building were covered by a skylight at the time that the Multiple Dwelling Law passed. Petitioner's architect also referred to what he characterized as a grandfathering provision in MDL § 210, testifying that it is only relevant to “new law” tenements, such that it does not apply to old law tenements.
No room in any old-law tenement shall be occupied for living purposes unless, inter alia, it has a window opening directly upon a shaft at least twenty square feet in area “open to the sky.” MDL § 213(3)(a). An “old-law tenement” is a tenement existing before April 12, 1901. MDL § 4(11).
Petitioner's architect testified that the I-card refers to interiors of rooms in the subject premises that do not have other light and air sources, and thus are not habitable as legal, livable rooms. Petitioner's architect testified that sealing the airshafts will “absolutely” not remove light and air.
Petitioner's architect testified that the Building cannot obtain a certificate of occupancy without plans that include a sealing of the air shafts, which is simple, cheap, and which significantly increases fire safety, as the airshafts in their current state are small enough that they would act like chimneys bringing smoke and fire up to the next floor in the event of a fire on a lower floor of the Building. Petitioner's architect testified that the 1901 tenement act was written to require a minimum shaft size in part because a quarter of all fires in New York City came from these small shafts, which have de minimis light and air anyway.
Petitioner's architect testified on cross-examination that audits of plans at DOB list objections that someone in his position has to address, after which DOB may or may not revoke the permit. Petitioner's architect testified on cross-examination that DOB audited the Plans in the winter of 2013–2014, that there were four objections, that he met with an examiner at DOB in the spring of 2014, about two or three months before his testimony, that he went through their position in technical detail, that the examiner asked Petitioner's architect to draft something that was to be forwarded to the commissioner of DOB, and that Petitioner's architect has not received an answer from DOB as of the date of his testimony. Petitioner's architect testified on cross-examination that during the pendency of the audit, Petitioner was allowed to act at her own peril, although Petitioner's architect would recommend that Petitioner wait until there is a result from the audit to act, as there is a possibility that DOB may yet disapprove of the Plans.
Petitioner's architect testified on cross-examination that there were other ways to correct the two DOB violations in evidence that did not require that the windows to the airshafts be sealed and that it was Petitioner's choice to seal the windows to the airshafts. Petitioner's architect testified that, even though an I-card serves a similar purpose as a certificate of occupancy, it would be beneficial for Petitioner to obtain a certificate of occupancy for the Building, as a certificate of occupancy is a stronger statement of the legal use of the Building. Petitioner's architect also testified on cross-examination that it was not necessary to seal the windows to the airshafts in order to obtain a certificate of occupancy.
On cross-examination, Petitioner's architect testified that the sealing of the windows to the airshafts would not reduce the “legal” light and air in the subject premises, and that even though the statute does not qualify “light and air” with “legal,” “legal” is an interpretation that he puts on it.
Petitioner's architect testified on cross-examination that while there would be no fire-retardant material in the airshafts, if they are not open to individual apartments or the roof, there would still be separate fire zones in the event of a fire. Petitioner's architect testified on cross-examination that while there was a delamination of the airshafts, that there were no plans to laminate them, although there are contractors who would do that kind of work.
Petitioner's architect testified on cross-examination that he was unaware if the covering of the airshafts at the roof of the Building was done with a permit or not, but he acknowledged that the Multiple Dwelling Law would prohibit such an activity without a permit.
Petitioner's architect testified on redirect examination that he does not know of any contractors who would go into the airshafts and that he in fact recommended sealing the windows to the airshafts because of that.
Petitioner's architect testified on redirect examination that DOB issued a second notice of objections after another tenant write a letter to DOB. Petitioner introduced into evidence a submission made to DOB in response to the objection. The focus of this submission is an argument that Petitioner has the right to seal windows to the airshafts.
Petitioner's architect testified on redirect examination that despite the pendency of the audit, DOB has already approved the Plans and Petitioner could legally engage in construction on the Plans as of the time he testified.
Respondents called an architect to testify on their behalf (“Respondent's architect”). The Court granted Respondent's motion to qualify Respondent's architect as an expert witness. Respondent's architect testified that he has been to the Building and the subject premises. Respondent's architect testified that there are two windows in the subject premises that open up to airshafts, so that each airshaft can provide ventilation and light. Respondent's architect testified that he observed the top of the airshafts at the roof of the Building and saw that they were sealed, and improperly so. Respondent's architect testified that sealing the windows on the airshafts would plunge the rooms adjacent to it into darkness and stifle the possibility of getting fresh air. Respondent's architect testified that a fire in the airshafts would lead to the combustion products of smoke and heat going straight up to the roof, but that if the airshafts were sealed, there would be no place for smoke and heat to go but right into apartments through their windows. Respondent's architect testified that it would be safer if the seal at the roof was removed.
Respondent's architect testified that he saw the two DOB violations in evidence. Respondent's architect noted that the violations contain a hearing date, but testified that Petitioner entered into a stipulation with DOB to remedy the violations and that Petitioner paid whatever fine there was, but that the date for compliance came and went two years ago without a correction of the violations. Respondent's architect testified that one violation can be remedied by unsealing the airshafts at the roof, and that the other violations for the maintenance of the Building could be remedied by bringing in masons to remove brickwork and work on the exterior. Respondent's architect testified that Petitioner cannot correct the violations for the crumbling of the interior of the airshafts by sealing the windows to the airshafts, because the airshafts will still crumble. Respondent's architect testified that remedying violations for the state of the airshafts requires accessing the interior of the airshafts by opening up windows, putting in planks, using a scaffold to replace the crumbling parts, and installing fire-protected material of a proper rating.
On cross-examination, Respondent's architect testified that the Building is an existing old-law tenement building as per an I-card that he had seen. On cross-examination, Respondent's architect testified that the square footage of two airshafts could be considered cumulatively. Respondent's architect testified on redirect examination that the pendency of DOB's audit renders its prior approval in suspended status, and that DOB will re-examine the Plans to see if the prior approval was in error, and if anything was overlooked, there could be a revocation of the permit.
Respondent's architect testified on redirect examination that the airshafts, already existing as they had been at the time of the Multiple Dwelling Law, were grandfathered into compliance, and that the airshafts could not have been changed from when the I-card was prepared.
Respondent, the prime tenant of the subject premises, testified that she has lived in the subject premises since March of 1987, and that she lives there with her husband and co-respondent Paul Williams (“co-Respondent”) and her two children. Respondent testified that the landlord of the Building when she moved in was Frank Castlebuono, the father of Anthony Castlebuono, the ex-husband of Petitioner.
Respondent testified that the subject premises is a railroad-style apartment, according to which you enter from the common hallway and then every room leads to the next room. Respondent testified that, at one point, her children's bedroom received light from the windows on the airshafts, although it has not received light from the airshafts since Petitioner sealed the airshafts at the roof of the Building. Respondent testified that it is possible to open the windows to the airshafts and get air to circulate in the subject premises. Respondent testified that she did not want the windows to the airshafts to be sealed, in part because the interior of the subject premises gets very hot in the summer.
On cross-examination, Respondent testified that the only way that she would allow the windows to the airshafts to be sealed is by Court order.
Respondents called Petitioner as their own witness. Petitioner testified that she has rented other apartments in the Building for rents much higher than the rent for the subject premises.
Co–Respondent testified that he has lived in the subject premises for twenty-seven years; that light used to come in through the airshafts, but that there is no light from the airshafts since Petitioner covered it at the roof.
There is no dispute that Petitioner requested access to the subject premises to seal the windows facing the airshafts and that Respondents denied access for that purpose. The Rent Stabilization Code permits a landlord to terminate a tenancy if the tenant has unreasonably refused the landlord access to the housing accommodation for the purpose of making “necessary repairs” or “improvements required by law or authorized by the DHCR.” 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 2524.3(e). The Rent Stabilization Code also permits a landlord to terminate a tenancy if a tenant violated a substantial obligation of his or her tenancy. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 2524.3(a). Petitioner introduced a lease into evidence that obligates Respondents to provide access to Petitioner to make “any necessary repairs or changes Owner decides are necessary.”
The Rent Stabilization Code does not permit a termination of a tenancy on a mere violation of any obligation of a tenancy; rather the obligation violated must be “substantial.” Regulations are generally subject to same canons of construction as statutes. ATM One, LLC v. Landaverde, 2 NY3d 472, 477 (2004). It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction to give effect to every word, and every word must be presumed to have some meaning. Matter of Tristram K., 36 AD3d 147, 151 (1st Dept.2006). Thus, while Respondents' denial of access—and nothing else—may violate an obligation of the tenancy, such a denial must be “substantial” in order for Petitioner to have a cause of action against Respondents. The language in the parties' lease theoretically vests Petitioner with the sole discretion to determine what “repairs or changes” are necessary. By this logic, Respondents would violate an obligation of their tenancy if they denied Petitioner access to, say, demolish their kitchen and bathroom so long as Petitioner deemed it “necessary” to do so. Be that as it may, a landlord may not terminate a tenancy under such circumstances. Compare Eastside Exhibition Corp. v. 210 E. 86th St. Corp., 23 AD3d 100, 103 (1st Dept.2005), Sidereal Studios v. 214 Franklin LLC, 18 Misc.3d 1110A (S.Ct. Kings Co.2008) (an access clause in a lease does not mean that a portion of the demised premises may be permanently confiscated at will), O'Gorman v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Latter-day Saints, N.Y.L.J. Sept. 5, 2008 at 27:1 (S.Ct. N.Y. Co.) (if the work for which a landlord seeks access would materially preclude the tenants from the use, possession, and occupancy of a portion of the leasehold as well as the use of the apartment in the manner in which the tenants have long been accustomed, the tenants show grounds to preliminarily enjoin the landlord from doing such work).
Distinguishing a denial of access that violates an obligation of the tenancy from a denial of access that violates a substantial obligation of the tenancy demands an inquiry into the purpose for which Petitioner sought access. The standard set forth by 9 N.Y.C.R .R. § 2524.3(e) —that Petitioner has a cause of action if Respondents deny access for Petitioner to engage in “necessary repairs” or “improvements required by law or authorized by the DHCR”—thus informs the Court how to evaluate Petitioner's cause of action, and resolving the dispute between the parties pivots on whether sealing the windows facing airshafts in the subject premises is “necessary” or “required by law.” Perovic v. Dijan, 2002 N.Y. Slip Op. 50659(U) (App. Term 2nd & 11th Dists.2002).
The Court finds that the evidence at trial shows that the sealing of the windows facing the airshafts will diminish the amount of light and air in the subject premises, thus posing the most obvious challenge to Petitioner's position. Cf. Leventhal v. Straus, 197 Misc. 798, 800 (Mun. Ct. Bronx 1950), Schulte Realty Co. v. Pulvino, 179 N.Y.S. 371, 373 (App. Term 1st Dept.1919) (if the demise includes the right to light and air, and the landlord physically interferes with such light and air, such an act must logically constitute an eviction of the tenant from the beneficial enjoyment of part of the demise).
Petitioner has several arguments countering this point. The first argument is that the area of each airshaft is thirteen square feet, smaller than the twenty square feet required by MDL § 213(3)(a). Petitioner argues that the grandfathering provision of MDL § 210 does not apply to the Building as an old-law tenement, that the airshafts are therefore not in compliance with the Multiple Dwelling Law, and that the areas of the subject premises deprived of light and air are not be livable rooms anyway because of that.
This argument disregards MDL § 213(1), which provides that no tenement, or any room therein, shall be so altered as to have its light or ventilation diminished in any way not approved by the department. The remedy for airshafts that are too small to provide adequate light and air is emphatically not less light and air, at least without undermining an obvious purpose of the statute, which is to maximize light and air in tenement apartments. See Adamec v. Post, 273 N.Y. 250, 255 (1937) (the statute sets forth “minimum” standards “essential for safe, decent and sanitary dwelling places”).
For this reason, the Court does not find it necessary to address a dispute raised at trial between the parties as to whether the area of the subject premises adjacent to the airshafts is a “room” or a “foyer.”
Petitioner argues that DOB has in fact approved the Plans, such that the sealing of the windows on the airshafts complies with MDL § 213(1). However, as of the close of the record of this case, DOB was auditing the Plans. Petitioner's exhibit 10 in evidence, Petitioner's submission to DOB in response to the audit, is replete with arguments that she should be allowed to seal the windows on the airshafts, compelling the conclusion that DOB scrutinized that aspect of the Plans in particular. Petitioner's architect testified that he would not recommend that a client engage in work under such an audit, even if DOB had previously approved it.
Petitioner argues that DOB should not—and therefore will not—reverse its prior approval of the Plans. However, DOB not only may reverse itself as such, but it has done so in other matters: for example, after “substantial construction” of a building of thirty-one stories, DOB's Commissioner revoked a permit that allowed such construction on the grounds that the permit, to the extent it authorized a height exceeding nineteen stories, was invalid when issued. Parkview Associates v. City of New York, 71 N.Y.2d 274, 280, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 801 (1988). Despite the fact that DOB's initial approval was “erroneous,” and that the building therein was “already constructed,” meaning that the owner in that case would have to tear down twelve floors of a building already constructed, estoppel could not be invoked against the municipal agency. Id. at 282. If DOB can reverse itself when the consequences are as dramatic as tearing down multiple stories of a building that has already been constructed, prohibiting the sealing of windows on airshafts is hardly unthinkable.
However, even assuming arguendo that DOB permits sealing the windows on the airshafts, the windows on the airshafts have been a feature of Respondents' tenancy going back to 1987 and they have provided light and air to a room that Respondents have been using on a long-term basis as a bedroom for their children. When the use of a room in question affected by the feature was necessary to the full enjoyment of such use and the existence of which may have been materially persuasive upon the tenants when they rented the apartment, the tenants should not, at the insistence of the landlord, do without that feature. Hamilton v. Graybill, 19 Misc. 521, 522–523 (App. Term 1st Dept. 1897).
Petitioner argues that she wants to seal the windows to the airshafts as a matter of fire safety. Petitioner's architect, citing a report from 1901, testified that the smaller airshafts could act as a chimney in the event of a fire, spreading smoke and fire. Conversely, Respondent's architect testified that a fire in the airshafts, particularly if the airshafts were sealed at the roof, would leave smoke and fire no place else to go but into apartments adjacent to the airshafts.
Petitioner's architect had previously articulated the position that the airshafts in the Building are not compliant with MDL § 213(3)(a) as their area is less than twenty square feet, i.e., thirteen square feet each. However, Petitioner did not prove why a purported fire hazard from a smaller airshaft would not apply to all airshafts, including those that exceed twenty square feet.
Evidence at trial also showed that Petitioner, without a permit, sealed the tops of the airshafts at the roof of the Building, for which DOB issued a violation. Photos entered into evidence of the seal at the tops of the airshafts do not show any ventilation of the sealed airshafts. Instructively, all closed shafts having an area exceeding four square feet must be provided with a smoke vent, which may be a window, a louver, a skylight, or vent ducts. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 27–344(d). Also instructive is that existing unsprinklered high-rise office buildings must provide at least one smoke shaft through which smoke and heat can be vented to the outdoors. McCallin v. Walsh, 64 A.D.2d 46, 55 (1st Dept.), affirmed, 46 N.Y.2d 808, 810 (1978).
The competing narratives between both parties' experts can already potentially demonstrate that Petitioner has failed to meet her burden of proving that sealing the windows on the airshaft enhances fire safety at the Building. Rinaldi & Sons, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Alarm Service, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 191, 196 (1976). The authority cited above further renders dubious the proposition that a closed, sealed shaft in the Building improves fire safety there. Be that as it may, it bears noting that fire safety improvement does not ipso facto trump the policy disfavoring the reduction of light and air to apartments. See, e.g., Opatoshu v. Concord Properties, Inc., 38 Misc.2d 544, 546–48 (S.Ct. N.Y. Co.1963) (when the addition of a second fire escape, an alteration that would enhance fire safety, would operate to deprive tenants of both light and air, a landlord was charged with removal of the extant fire escape).
Finally, although Petitioner's architect testified on direct examination that sealing the windows on the airshafts would operate to correct the violations DOB placed on the Building, Petitioner's architect testified on cross-examination that it was not necessary to seal the airshafts in order to remove the violations.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner has not met her burden of proving that the work Petitioner sought to do in the subject premises met the standard set by 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 2524.3(e), i.e., that the work was necessary or required by law. Accordingly, the Court dismisses this proceeding. As this ruling renders moot Respondents' motion at trial for a stay, the Court denies this motion.
The parties are directed to pick up their exhibits withing 30 days or they will either be sent to the parties or destroyed at the Court's discretion and in compliance with DRP–185.
This constitutes the decision and order of this Court.