Under property law, a reservation of an exclusive and unrestricted mining right is in effect a severance of the mineral estate from the surface estate which creates a fee simple estate in the minerals in place. 1A Thompson On Real Property § 160 at p. 37; 6 Thompson § 3096 at pp. 817-818 (replacement volumes 1964 and 1962); 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 155 at pp. 317-318; Caldwell v. Fulton, 31 Pa.St. 475, 72 Am.Dec. 760 (Pa. 1858); List v. Cotts, 4 W. Va. 543, 545 (1871); Massot v. Moses, 3 S.C. 168, 16 Am.Rep. 697 (1871); Lee v. Bumgardner, 86 Va. 315, 10 S.E. 3 (1889); Outlaw v. Gray, 163 N.C. 325, 79 S.E. 676 (1913); Gray-Mellon Oil Co. v. Fairchild, 219 Ky. 143, 292 S.W. 743, 745-46 (1927); Bostic v. Bostic, 199 Va. 348, 99 S.E.2d 591, 66 A.L.R.2d 971 (1957); Picard v. Richards, 366 P.2d 119, 123 (Wyo. 1961); Clevenger v. Continental Oil Co., 149 Colo. 417, 369 P.2d 550 (1962); Kirby Lumber Corp. v. Claypool, 438 S.W.2d 655 (Tex.Civ.App. 1969); Mauch v. Ballou, 499 P.2d 591, 593 (Wyo. 1972). See also cases cited in 66 A.L.R.2d 978 (1959); 31 Rocky Mt.L.Rev. 393 (1959); 6 Utah L.Rev. 435, 437 (1959); 7 U.C.L.A. Law Rev. 383 (1960) and 2 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute 1, 17 (1956);

Annot., 66 A.L.R.2d 978, 984. Unquestionably, the owner of land may, by a conveyance otherwise valid, convey a present estate in unmined minerals, retaining in himself the title to the other parts of his land, or may convey a present estate in such other parts of the land and retain in himself the title to the unmined minerals therein. Vance v. Guy, 223 N.C. 409, 27 S.E.2d 117; Hoilman v. Johnson, 164 N.C. 268, 80 S.E. 249; Outlaw v. Gray, 163 N.C. 325, 79 S.E. 676. Similarly, he may make a present conveyance, or reservation, of standing timber.

The law as to the relative rights of parties, where mineral and surface rights in land have been severed, was succintly [succinctly] stated by this Court in Hoilman v. Johnson, 164 N.C. 268, 80 S.E. 249. It was there said: "It is well settled that the surface of the earth and the minerals under the surface may be severed by a deed, or reservation in a deed, and when so severed, they constitute two distinct estates. Outlaw v. Gray, 163 N.C. 325. The mineral interests being a part of the realty, the estate in them is subject to the ordinary rules of law governing the title to real property. The presumption that the party having possession of the surface has the possession of the subsoil containing the minerals does not exist when these rights are severed. Armstrong v. Caldwell, 53 Pa. St., 284. The owner of the surface can acquire no title to the minerals by exclusive and continuous possession of the surface, nor does the owner of the minerals lose his right or his possession by any length of nonuser. He must be disseized to lose his right, and there can be no disseizin by any act which does not actually take the minerals out of his possession.

"That mineral substances beneath the surface in the earth may be conveyed by deed distinct from the right to the surface itself is now well settled." Outlaw v. Gray, 163 N.C. 325, 79 S.E. 676; Hoilman v. Johnson, 164 N.C. 268, 80 S.E. 249. This Court has not been called upon to consider many questions growing out of the mining industry, and hence no decision has been called to our attention indicating that the principle of sublateral or subjacent support has ever been adopted in this State, or that occasion had ever arisen to discuss the proposition. The general principle deduced from the decisions of states where the mining industry has flourished is that the owner of the surface has the right of subjacent support unless such right has been waived in specific terms or terms reasonably implying such waiver.

In the construction of deeds these principles seem to be settled: (1) The entire deed must be considered and such construction of particular clauses must be adopted as will effectuate the intention of the parties; (2) such construction will be adopted as, if possible, will give effect to every part; (3) if terms are contradictory the first in order will be given effect to the exclusion of the last; (4) when language is of doubtful meaning it will be given such construction as is most favorable to the grantee; (5) descriptive specifications cannot prevail over a known and controlling call; (6) a further description will not defeat a preceding perfect description which identifies the property conveyed. Mayo v. Blount, 23 N.C. 283; Outlaw v. Gray, 163 N.C. 325; R. R. v. Carpenter, 165 N.C. 465; Lumber Co. v. Lumber Co., 169 N.C. 80, 94; Miller v. Johnston, 173 N.C. 62. Considered in the light of these principles the trial in our opinion was free from error. No error.

Messrs. Weston Aycock, for appellant, submit: Causeof action being on express contract recovery cannot be sustainedon quantum meruit: 60 S.C. 373; 98 S.C. 222. Mr. D.W. Robinson, for respondent, submits: Constructionof contract was for the Court: 66 S.C. 18; 101 S.C. 272-3; 50 S.E. 446; 138 N.C. 25. Rules of construction: 76 S.C. 300, 301. Against party who drew it: 74 U.S. 688; 76 U.S. 394; 192 U.S. 162; 64 S.E. 171; 150 N.C. 385; 46 S.C. 495; 78 S.C. 77. Ambiguity: 62 S.E. 354; 108 Va. 557; 79 S.E. 676; 163 N.C. 325. Entirety: 84 S.C. 153. Interpretation by parties: 81 S.C. 12; 100 S.C. 9-10.

It is well settled that the surface of the earth and the minerals under the surface may be severed by a deed, or reservation in a deed, and when so severed, they constitute two distinct estates. Outlaw v. Gray, 163 N.C. 325. The mineral interests being a part of the realty, the estate in them is subject to the ordinary rules of law governing the title to real property.

The law in this State has long recognized that "the surface of the earth and the minerals under the surface may be severed by a deed, or reservation in a deed, and when so severed, they constitute two distinct estates." Hoilman v. Johnson, 164 N.C. 268, 269, 80 S.E. 249, 250 (1913) (citing Outlaw v. Gray, 163 N.C. 325, 79 S.E. 676 (1913)). The owner may convey a present estate in the unmined minerals and retain title to the surface, or the owner may convey a present estate in the surface and retain title to the minerals.