A subpoenaed witness's obligation to appear at trial exists only "until the case [i]s concluded or until he [is] dismissed by the court." Otis v. Meade, 483 S.W.2d 161, 162 (Ky. 1972) (emphasis added). Here, the trial court properly exercised its discretion to excuse subpoenaed witnesses.

This contention is meritless, as a trial court at all times retains the authority to call and excuse subpoenaed witnesses. See Anderson v. Commonwealth, 63 S.W.3d 135, 142 (Ky. 2001) ("We believe that once subpoenaed, the witness is answerable to the court and can only be excused by the court."); Otis v. Meade, 483 S.W.2d 161, 162 (Ky. 1972) ("[T]he subpoena created a continuing obligation on his part to be available as a witness until the case was concluded or until he was dismissed by the court."); RCr 7.02(1) ("A subpoena shall be issued by the clerk.").B. Existence of Additional, Undisclosed Records.

Anderson, 63 S.W.3d at 142. ( quoting Otis v. Meade, 483 S.W.2d 161, 162 (Ky. 1972)). We did not hold that he had to testify for the Commonwealth as he was subpoenaed to do; that was the prerogative of the Commonwealth.

We believe that once subpoenaed, the witness is answerable to the court and can only be excused by the court. In affirming a contempt order against an absent subpoenaed witness in Otis v. Meade, Ky., 483 S.W.2d 161 (1972), we held that "the subpoena created a continuing obligation on his part to be available as a witness until the case was concluded or until he was dismissed by the court." Id. at 162 (emphasis added).

That portion of Local No. 1667, United Auto Workers v. Kawneer Co., Inc., Ky., 490 S.W.2d 747 (1973), in conflict with this opinion is overruled. We do not regard Otis v. Meade, Ky., 483 S.W.2d 161 (1972), as applicable to this state of facts. The judgment is affirmed.

A subpoena "create[s] a continuing obligation . . . to be available as a witness until the case [is] concluded or until . . . dismissed by the court." Otis v. Meade, 483 S.W.2d 161, 162 (Ky. 1972). If Smith had not been properly served, he had no obligation to appear.

Finally, a subpoena creates a "continuing obligation" to be available to the trial court until the underlying case is concluded. Otis v. Meade, 483 S.W.2d 161, 162 (Ky. 1972).

KRS 421.110 declares the disobedience of a subpoena to be a contempt of court. The sentence was wholly proper. The Commonwealth has requested that we clarify the principles established in Payne and Otis v. Meade, Ky., 483 S.W.2d 161 (1972). In Otis, the defendant was arrested for his failure to appear as a witness in a criminal trial.

The appellant argues that minimal due process requires that his hearing be in public, that he be advised of his rights against self-incrimination, and that he be afforded the right to counsel, none of which he received. There is no question that a witness who fails to respond to a subpoena is subject to punishment for contempt of court. KRS 421.110, RCr 7.02(7), Otis v. Meade, Ky., 483 S.W.2d 161 (1972). The procedure in determining contempt and its sentence becomes the true issue in these cases. It is well settled that reasonable notice of a charge of contempt and an opportunity to be heard in defense before punishment is imposed are "basic to our system of jurisprudence."

This is an appeal from a judgment assessing a $2500 fine against a labor union "and all of those employees acting in concert therewith" for contempt of court in violating the terms of a restraining order. The case was practiced in the trial court and briefed in this court prior to decision and publication of Miller v. Vettiner, Ky., 481 S.W.2d 32 (1972), and Otis v. Meade, Ky., 483 S.W.2d 161 (1972), from which opinions it is clear that unless the right is waived the trial court may not inflict a fine greater than $500 or incarceration for more than six months except upon the unanimous verdict of a jury under instructions including the reasonable doubt protection, as in comparable criminal cases. It would seem equally indispensable that the persons and parties accused of contemptuous conduct be specifically named in advance of the hearing in order that they may have reasonable opportunity to defend.