Other v. New York City Housing Authority

11 Citing cases

  1. Otero v. New York City Housing Authority

    354 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)   Cited 5 times

    The late Judge McLean granted a temporary restraining order barring the Housing Authority from renting apartments to anyone other than members of the plaintiff class (former site occupants). On May 23, 1972, Judge Frankel, on a motion for a preliminary injunction, filed an extensive opinion, reported at 344 F. Supp. 737, holding (1) that the Housing Authority's actions in renting apartments to persons other than members of the plaintiff class violated the Authority's own regulation, GM 1810, and thereby deprived plaintiffs of due process; and (2) that, in renting apartments on a priority basis to Jewish tenants, the Authority violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and (because the action disobeyed the anti-discrimination clauses of 42 U.S.C. § 2000d and 3604) the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. The policy of the Authority is established by its three members in the form of resolutions.

  2. Otero v. New York City Housing Authority

    484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973)   Cited 132 times
    Finding that defendant was “under an obligation to act affirmatively to achieve integration in housing” and that the FHA “requires that consideration be given to the impact of the proposed housing projects on the racial concentration in the area in which the proposed housing is to be built”

    I. The background of this appeal is set forth in the decisions of Judge Frankel granting preliminary relief to the plaintiff class, 344 F.Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), and of Judge Lasker granting permanent relief on plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment after a limited hearing more fully described infra, 354 F.Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). We therefore restrict ourselves to a summary of those facts and proceedings necessary to an understanding of our decision.

  3. Levine v. Town of West Hartford Police Dept.

    541 F. Supp. 741 (D. Conn. 1982)   Cited 1 times

    See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972).See Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, 344 F. Supp. 737, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).See Paul v Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976).

  4. Reese v. Miami-Dade County

    CASE NO. 01-3766-CIV-HURLEY (S.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2009)   Cited 2 times
    Finding that plaintiffs failed to show "that the law was motivated by a racial purpose or object, or is unexplainable on grounds other than race"

    As applied in the FHA context, this provision prohibits intentional discrimination on the basis of race in the site selection process, see e.g. B. A. S. I. C. v Kemp, 776 F. Supp. 637 (D. R.I. 1991); Gautreaux v Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969), and eliminates race-based tenant preferences. See e.g. Otero v New York City Housing Authority, 344 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). As discussed above, the record in this case reveals no evidence of intentional discrimination in the development and implementation of the County's revitalization plan.

  5. Sembach v. McMahon College, Inc.

    86 F.R.D. 188 (S.D. Tex. 1980)   Cited 11 times

    The class proposed by the plaintiffs may be either limited, see 7 Wright & Miller s 1760, at 583 n. 98 (1972 & Supp.1979), or expanded. See Anderson v. Butz, 428 F.Supp. 245, 247 (E.D.Cal.1975) (proposed local class expanded nationwide), aff'd, 550 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1977); Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, 344 F.Supp. 737, 747 (S.D.N.Y.1972) (proposed class of non-whites expanded to include certain whites). In addition, " redefinition may be undertaken . . . on the Court's initiative or upon the motion of a party."

  6. D'Iorio v. County of Delaware

    447 F. Supp. 229 (E.D. Pa. 1978)   Cited 15 times

    On the other hand, it is not necessary that the affected party demonstrate that the denial of the specified procedures will result in a deprivation of a property interest of a kind which would require a hearing, e.g., a tenured employment position. It is sufficient if plaintiff demonstrates that the government's failure to comply with its own procedures will have a pecuniary impact or result in a denial of a right or privilege which plaintiff otherwise would have. Courts have held that there was a denial of due process when a governmental entity failed to comply with regulations or procedures resulting in: (1) an interference in private non-tenured employment, Stokes v. Lecce, 384 F. Supp. 1039, 1048-49 (E.D.Pa. 1974); (2) removal from a school honor society, Warren v. National Ass'n of Secondary School Principals, 375 F. Supp. 1043, 1048 (N.D.Tex. 1974); (3) denial of priority in public housing, Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, 344 F. Supp. 737, 745 n. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); (4) termination of a discretionary federal emergency loan program, Berends v. Butz, 357 F. Supp. 143, 151-53 (D.Minn. 1973); and (5) denial of admission to a municipal university, Hupart v. Bd. of Higher Ed. of City of N.Y., 420 F. Supp. at 1106-07. Courts have recognized the application of this arbitrariness doctrine to cases involving non-tenured employment.

  7. Feldman v. U.S. Dept. of H. U. Development

    430 F. Supp. 1324 (E.D. Pa. 1977)   Cited 11 times
    Holding that HUD's “Loan Management Handbook,” which was not published in the Federal Register, was not an “independent source of authority” for HUD procedures

    Had there been binding regulations which HUD violated, this may have given rise to a due process argument on behalf of the plaintiffs. See, e. g., Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, 344 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). But such was not the case here.

  8. Battison v. City of Niles, Ohio

    445 F. Supp. 1082 (N.D. Ohio 1977)   Cited 2 times

    At least two relocation sites, parcel la and the Arden Furniture Store, which plaintiffs had considered prior to deciding on parcel 4c were disposed of during this period. Finally, council denied plaintiffs effective relocation assistance by not affording them the relocation preference which was extended to other businesses displaced by the NDP. Cf. Cy Ellis Raw Bar v. D.C. Redevelopment Land Agency, supra; Otero v. New York City H. Auth., 344 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N Y 1972). Plaintiffs were entitled to expect that they would be treated in the same fashion as other displaced businesses, and to rely on those expectations in their relocation efforts. In deviating from its established policy, council frustrated these expectations, treated plaintiffs in a disparate fashion, and denied them effective relocation assistance.

  9. Flanagan v. President of Georgetown College

    417 F. Supp. 377 (D.D.C. 1976)   Cited 16 times
    In Flanagan, the court explained that the restriction on the power to terminate funding is designed to direct federal agencies that, in enforcing the antidiscrimination mandate, they are not to cut off all funds to an entire institution once discrimination is found but only to terminate aid to the particular program found to be discriminatory.

    While an affirmative action program may be appropriate to ensure that all persons are afforded the same opportunities or are considered for benefits on the same basis, it is not permissible when it allocates a scarce resource (be it jobs, housing, or financial aid) in favor of one race to the detriment of others. See, e.g., Otero v. New York City Housing, 344 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Such is the situation in this case.

  10. Pa. H. R. Comm. v. Chester Hous. Auth

    327 A.2d 335 (Pa. 1974)   Cited 22 times

    See generally Ackerman, Integration for Subsidized Housing and the Question of Racial Occupancy Controls, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 245, 251-70 (1974); Note, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 870, 875-76 (1972).Otero was decided in two parts at the trial level, 354 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (preliminary injunction granted), and 344 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (order). Judge MANSFIELD, writing for the Second Circuit, analyzed the constitutional basis for the Authority's duty to integrate in this fashion.