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Oswalt v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin.

United States District Court, District of Arizona
Jun 30, 2022
CV-20-00556-TUC-JGZ (DTF) (D. Ariz. Jun. 30, 2022)

Opinion

CV-20-00556-TUC-JGZ (DTF)

06-30-2022

Jennifer Oswalt, Plaintiff, v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.


REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Honorable D Thomas Ferraro, United Slates Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Jennifer Oswalt (Oswalt) brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of the final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) finding she was not disabled. (Doc. 1.) The parties have fully briefed the issues. (Docs. 21, 23, 24.) This matter was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 12.) As more fully set forth below, based on the pleadings and the submitted administrative record (AR), the Court recommends the District Court, after its independent review, vacate the decision of the Commissioner and remand for further proceedings because the ALJ erred when evaluating Oswalt's narcolepsy.

BACKGROUND

Oswalt was born in 1973. (AR 207.) She has completed twelve years of education. (AR 236.) She previously worked as a medical assistant, a child monitor, and a service order dispatcher. (AR 57, 242.) Oswalt has a history of depression, anxiety, migraines, and back pain. (AR 325, 327, 339, 384, 487, 614.) She also has a history of narcolepsy.

In March 2018, Oswalt began experiencing hypersomnia. (AR 339.) In June, she requested a sleep study. Id. Oswalt underwent the first sleep study at the end of July. (AR 401.) She reported a high probability of falling asleep in many different scenarios, such as sitting and watching TV, sitting and reading, as a passenger in a car for an hour without a break, lying down to rest in the afternoon when circumstances permit, or sitting quietly after a lunch with no alcohol. (AR 405.) In October 2018, Oswalt received a diagnosis of narcolepsy with cataplexy following a repeat sleep study. (AR 591-97 614, 656.) The sleep study showed a normal electroencephalogram (EEG), and short sleep latency period. (AR 591-92.) Oswalt did not go into the rapid eye movement (REM) phase of sleep; however, her medication could explain this. (AR 592.) The physician noted the REM as the only result inconsistent with narcolepsy. Id. Oswalt's first medication for narcolepsy, Modafinil, caused migraines. (AR 616, 656.)

She then saw neurologists at Brain and Spine Center to rule out seizures as a cause of her myoclonic jerks. (AR 836-61.) The doctors limited her ability to drive until further testing could be completed. (AR 836.) Oswalt told her doctors her daytime sleepiness was improving on her new narcolepsy medication, Ritalin. (AR 850, 857.)

In December 2018, Oswalt's primary care physician filled out a physical residual functional capacity questionnaire. (AR 615-16.) The physician noted that Oswalt's symptoms would frequently interfere with her attention and concentration. (AR 615.) The physician also stated that Oswalt could "perform office and some physical work" but that the issues related to narcolepsy and cataplexy "can be debilitating." (AR 616.)

In September 2019, Oswalt underwent an EEG. (AR 855.) The EEG was normal but did show two "brief jerking movements," consistent with hypnopompic jerk or sleep related movements. (AR 855-56.) In December 2019, Oswalt performed an ambulatory video EEG study, which was normal with no seizure changes. (AR 847-48.) Application Procedure

In June 2018, Oswalt applied for Social Security Disability Insurance under Title II and Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI alleging disability beginning March 31, 2018. (AR 207-19.) She alleged disability based on chronic migraines, chronic fatigue syndrome, fibromyalgia, restless leg syndrome, lower back injury, nerve damage in leg, peripheral neuralgia, and depression. (AR 235.) Later, anxiety, short term memory loss, obesity and narcolepsy were added to the list of conditions. (AR 68, 94.)

In August 2018, Oswalt submitted an adult function report. (AR 251, 259.) She reported being unable to sit or stand in one spot for more than fifteen to twenty minutes. (AR 251.) She also conveyed short-term memory loss, loss of vocabulary, anxiety, sensory overload, nausea, constipation, fatigue, inability to stay awake, inability to concentrate, sensitivity to temperatures, sensitivity to light and sound, vomiting, muscle contractions, passing out, and dizziness. (AR 251, 258.) She described a typical good day, including physical therapy three times a week, showering, feeding her dog, and drawing or painting at a friend's house. (AR 252.) Her friend helped clean up after the dog and helped to batch cook and freeze meals. Id.

Oswalt's claims were initially denied on October 10, 2018. (AR 63-64, 129.) In December 2018, Oswalt reported worsening her daily activities because of her conditions. (AR 278.) She reported living with her best friend and their family, who cared for the house cleaning, cooking, and laundry. Id. Oswalt said she could wipe counters but only for five minutes. Id. She would also attempt to cook one meal every week, but she usually needed help finishing it and to rest afterward. Id. On January 14, 2019, Oswalt submitted a second adult function report. (AR 289. 297.) She described her day with many breaks and naps. (AR 289-90.) She stated she was able to make simple meals, such as sandwiches and soups. (AR 291.)

Oswalt's claims were denied again on February 26, 2019. (AR 91-92, 139, 143.) She requested a hearing. (AR 147.) On May 11, 2020, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Yasmin Elias held an administrative hearing. (AR 32.)

At the hearing, Oswalt and Vocational Expert (VE) Erin Welsh testified. (AR 33.) Oswalt's attorney detailed some medical history, including the unpredictable nature of Oswalt's narcolepsy. (AR 39-41.) The attorney also compared Oswalt's narcolepsy to a seizure or headache disorder. (AR 40-41.)

Oswalt testified she had left her last fulltime position because she had fallen asleep at her desk. (AR 44.) Oswalt also testified she had seen improvement with her medications but that "[i]t's not always dependable." (AR 46.) She stated the medication would start to wear off after three or four hours and that a second dose would cause a migraine ninety-eight percent of the time. (AR 46, 48.) Oswalt also testified that she still drove, when necessary-about two to three times a month. (AR 47.) She told the ALJ that she would get a short warning when she might fall asleep. Id. Oswalt described the daily things she did: dishes, sweep floors, laundry, and run errands with fiance. (AR 51.) Oswalt also discussed her stint as a night nanny, which she only did for about three weeks. (AR 52-53.)

The VE testified that a person fitting the ALJ's hypothetical could still perform Oswalt's past jobs as a medical assistant or service order dispatcher. (AR 59.) The VE also testified that generally someone may be off task for ten percent of the time or six minutes out of every hour. Id. The VE in response to questioning by Oswalt's attorney stated that sleeping on the job would not be tolerated. (AR 61.)

Decision

On June 22, 2020, the ALJ issued her unfavorable decision. (AR 10.) At step one, the ALJ determined Oswalt had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 31, 2018. (AR 15.) The ALJ noted that Oswalt worked as a night nanny for three weeks and also had some earnings in 2019. (AR 15-16.) The ALJ stated, "This undermines the persuasiveness of the claimant's testimony." (AR 16.) But the earnings were below the threshold for substantial gainful activity. Id. At step two, the ALJ concluded Oswalt suffered from the following severe impairments: "degenerative disc disease, lumbar spondylosis, fibromyalgia, migraines, and narcolepsy." Id. At step three, the ALJ found Oswalt did not have an impairment or combinations of impairments that meets or is equal in severity to one listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1. (AR 19.)

Between steps three and four, the ALJ determined Oswalt had a residual function capacity to perform light work except no climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, no work environment requiring more than occasional exposure to extreme cold, extreme heat, or work hazards. Id. The ALJ outlined the two-step process required when considering a claimant's testimony. (AR 19-20.) The ALJ found Oswalt's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause her alleged symptoms. (AR 20.) The ALJ concluded "however, the claimant's statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record." Id.

Specifically with the narcolepsy claims, the ALJ described Oswalt's two sleep studies. (AR 21.) The first, in July 2018, showed mild positional apnea but was insufficient to explain the hypersomnolence; the second, a few months later, was consistent with narcolepsy. Id. The ALJ continued that Oswalt's first medication triggered her migraines but that she showed improved symptoms with the second medication. Id. The ALJ noted normal EEG studies and MRI. Id. The ALJ also mentioned that Oswalt's fiance "had not witnessed any unresponsive staring spells amid allegations and complaints of losing time with memory lapses." Id. The ALJ reasoned that this undermined Oswalt's allegations along with the inconsistent psychiatric and mental status examinations. Id. (citing 2F3, 3F5, 7F4, 7F76, 21F4, 21F12, 21F18, 21F42, 21F49, 21F60, 25F9, 27F27, 27F33, and 27F44). The ALJ also said the degree of fatigue and excessive daytime drowsiness was inconsistent with treating notes describing Oswalt as alert and oriented. Id. The ALJ then noted Oswalt drove "despite" the narcolepsy. Id. Thus, the ALJ concluded that the narcolepsy was not disabling. Id.

The ALJ also considered Oswalt's daily activities and her ability to perform the activities independently. (AR 22-23.) Additionally, the ALJ mentioned Oswalt's potential previous work for the Home Instead Senior Care in 2019. (AR 23.)

At step four, the ALJ concluded Oswalt could perform her past work as a medical assistant as generally performed. (AR 24-25.) Therefore, the ALJ decided Oswalt was not disabled and ended the inquiry. (AR 25.)

On October 26, 2020, the Appeals Council denied Oswalt's request for review. (AR 1-3.) On December 24, 2020, Oswalt filed a complaint challenging the ALJ's unfavorable decision. (Doc. 1.) This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).

STANDARD ON REVIEW

Courts review only those issues raised by the party challenging the ALJ's decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). A person is disabled if their “physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity” that they are unable to do both their previous work and, considering their “age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists” in their immediate area, whether a specific job vacancy exists for them, or whether they would be hired if they applied for the work. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B).

“The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The findings of the Commissioner are meant to be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Matney ex rel. Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 1992)). "[F]or a claimant to qualify for benefits by showing that [their] unlisted impairment, or combination of impairments, is ‘equivalent' to a listed impairment, [they] must present medical findings equal in severity to all the criteria for the one most similar listed impairment." Kennedy v. Colvin, 738 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 531 (1990)).

Courts may overturn the decision to deny benefits only “when the ALJ's findings are based on legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001). This is because the ALJ “and not the reviewing court must resolve conflicts in the evidence, and if the evidence can support either outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney ex rel. Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400 (1971)); see Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004) ("When the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational interpretation, we must defer to the ALJ's conclusion."). The Commissioner's decision, however, “cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1998). Reviewing courts must consider the evidence supporting as well as detracting from the Commissioner's conclusion. Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975).

Even if the ALJ made an error, courts may affirm if it was harmless; in other words, the error was “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.” Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008)). “A reviewing court may only consider the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determination and ‘may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.'” Luther v. Berryhill, 891 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014)); see Stout v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating courts cannot “affirm the denial of benefits on a ground not invoked by the Commissioner in denying the benefits originally” (quoting Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 847-48 (9th Cir. 2001))); see also Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir. 2015).

DISCUSSION

Oswalt raises two issues. (Doc. 21 at 2.) First, she argues the ALJ did not adequately consider the limiting effect of her narcolepsy. Id. at 2, 7. She also contends the ALJ did not articulate clear and convincing reasons to discount her symptom testimony relating to her narcolepsy. Id. at 2, 10.

ALJ Consideration of Narcolepsy

Oswalt argues the ALJ misinterpreted and misunderstood her medical evidence as to her narcolepsy, specifically mentioning steps three and five. Id. at 7-9. Further Oswalt contends the ALJ improperly discounted her primary care physician's opinion. Id. at 9.

Here, the ALJ found that Oswalt's narcolepsy was severe. (AR 16.) The ALJ noted that Oswalt's representative "acknowledged during the scheduled hearing that the severity of her impairments do not meet or equal any listing." (AR 19.) Nonetheless, the ALJ considered listing 1.04 for disorders of the spine, SSR 12-2p: Evaluation of Fibromyalgia, and SSR 19-4p: Evaluating Cases Involving Primary Headache Disorders. Id. The ALJ did not raise narcolepsy or epilepsy as possible or equivocal listings. Id. Finding no impairment or combination of impairments met or was equal to a listed impairment, the ALJ continued her analysis. Id.

The ALJ pointed to reported improved symptoms with medication. (AR 21.) The ALJ also described Oswalt's "normal electroencephalogram (EEG) in September 2019 followed by an unremarkable 72-hour ambulatory EEG completed in early December," and her normal MRI. Id. The ALJ also noted that Oswalt's fiance reported not noticing any unresponsive spells during a medical appointment. Id. Additionally, the ALJ remarked that "The degree of fatigue and excessive daytime somnolence alleged in connection with this application for disability is also inconsistent with objective findings where treating physicians and medical staff have routinely described the claimant's mentation as alert and oriented during examinations." Id. (citation omitted). Finally, the ALJ considered it "worth noting" that Oswalt continued to drive. Id. Thus, the ALJ concluded that Oswalt's narcolepsy was not disabling. Id.

The ALJ noted that she was unpersuaded by Oswalt's primary care physician's opinion about the severity of Oswalt's cataplexy and narcolepsy. (AR 24.) The ALJ reasoned that it was inconsistent with objective findings, particularly the attention, concentration, and mental status during exams. Id. The ALJ noted that Oswalt appeared alert and oriented during exams and that she continued to drive. Id. The ALJ concluded Oswalt's narcolepsy was well controlled with medication. Id.

For step three, Oswalt did not show or really argue her narcolepsy is equal to a listed impairment. (Doc. 21 at 7-9.) Further the ALJ did not reach step five. (AR 25.) Thus, the Court does not find error at step three or five. The substance of Oswalt's argument is that the ALJ erred in analyzing Oswalt's narcolepsy when deciding her RFC. (Doc. 21 at 7-9.)

Oswalt cites to Program Operations Manual System (POMS) DI 24580.005 "Evaluation of Narcolepsy" to support her interpretation of the medical record, specifically the normal MRI and EEG and alertness at exams. Id. at 8. POMS § DI 24580.005 defines narcolepsy as "a chronic neurological disorder characterized by recurrent periods of an irresistible urge to sleep accompanied by three accessory events": cataplexy, hypnagogic hallucinations, and sleep paralysis. The policy statement also notes that other than sleep studies, "laboratory studies will be normal," noting that routine EEGs are usually "normal." Id. It states the patient will be alert once awakened. Id.

POMS do not create a judicially enforced duty on either courts or ALJs. Lockwood v. Comm'r Social Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2010). They are agency interpretations entitled to respect when they have the power to persuade. Id. However, they do aid in interpreting a normal EEG or alert orientation in a claimant with narcolepsy, which is to say that they are consistent with the diagnosis. Here, the ALJ's analysis is directly contrary to this guidance without any explanation as to the difference. Further, even in Oswalt's medical records a "normal" EEG was not contrary to narcolepsy. (AR 592.) Moreover, one of the "normal" EEGs that the ALJ relied on showed two "briefjerking movements," consistent with hypnopompic jerk or sleep related movements. (AR 21, 855-56.) Thus, the Court finds that the ALJ erred in concluding the normal EEGs and alertness at exams undermined Oswalt's narcolepsy.

The Court must consider if this error is harmless. See Ford, 950 F.3d at 1154. The Court finds that it is not harmless. The VE stated during testimony that someone "sleeping on the job" would not be tolerated. (AR 61.) This language indicates that error regarding Oswalt's narcolepsy would affect whether she would be able to return to her past relevant work. Therefore, the Court recommends vacating the ALJ's decision as it contains a harmful error and remanding the matter for further proceedings per Oswalt's request. Oswalt's Credibility Determination

Oswalt challenges the ALJ's decision to discount her narcolepsy symptom testimony. (Doc 21 at 10.) The Court finds merit in this argument.

For an ALJ to discredit a claimant's testimony they must complete a two-step analysis. Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 678 (9th Cir. 2017). “First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment ‘which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.'” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014 (quoting Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007)). The claimant need not present objective evidence of the symptom itself (e.g., pain), or of its severity. Id. (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996)).

Second, if “there is no evidence of malingering, ‘the ALJ can reject the claimant's testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.'” Id. at 1014-15 (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281). This requires more than general findings. Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2014) (“General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant's complaints.” (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended (Apr. 9, 1996))). Thus, “[t]o support a lack of credibility finding, the ALJ [is] required to point to specific facts in the record.” Id. (quoting Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 592 (9th Cir. 2009)).

Here, as described above, the ALJ stated Oswalt had medically determinable impairments that could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms. (AR 20.) The ALJ continued that Oswalt's "statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision." Id. The ALJ pointed to reported of improved symptoms with medication. (AR 21.) The ALJ relied on normal EEGs and MRI. Id. The ALJ noted that Oswalt's fiance stated they had not noticed any unresponsive spells during Oswalt's exam. Id. Additionally, the ALJ remarked that "The degree of fatigue and excessive daytime somnolence alleged in connection with this application for disability is also inconsistent with objective findings where treating physicians and medical staff have routinely described the claimant's mentation as alert and oriented during examinations." Id. (citation omitted). The ALJ added that Oswalt continued to drive. Id.

After the "above objective medical findings," the ALJ considered Oswalt's daily activities and the potential that she worked for two quarters in 2019. (AR 22-23.) The ALJ noted that Oswalt appeared alert and oriented during exams and that she continued to drive. Id. The ALJ concluded that Oswalt's narcolepsy was well controlled with medication. Id.

Oswalt argues that the ALJ erred by failing to provide specific, clear and convincing reasons for disregarding her testimony. (Doc. 21 at 10-14.) The ALJ did not allege that Oswalt was malingering and was required to provide specific, clear and convincing reasons for disregarding Oswalt's testimony. The ALJ provided a few reasons for disregarding Oswalt's testimony: normal test results, alertness at exams, improvement with medication, a statement from Oswalt's fiance, Oswalt's daily activities, Oswalt's driving activity, and Oswalt's possible work history. (AR 20-23.) The Court finds the ALJ's reasons lacking.

As explained above, the normal test results and the alertness at exams are not in conflict with Oswalt's narcolepsy testimony. See POM § DI 24580.005. The ALJ credits the improvement with medication, but Oswalt asserts that this improvement is temporary and only lasts 3-4 hours. (AR 46.) The ALJ does not reconcile this limit into her analysis. (See AR 21.) The ALJ's reliance on Oswalt's fiance is also insufficient to discredit her testimony. The record indicates that Oswalt had only been with her significant other for a month at that point and did not indicate the amount of time the two spend together during that month. (AR 840.)

Additionally, the daily activities described are not inconsistent with Oswalt's narcolepsy testimony because the activities build in rest and provide the ability for Oswalt to fall asleep as needed. (AR 22-23.) The Ninth Circuit has "repeatedly warned that ALJs must be especially cautious in concluding that daily activities are inconsistent with testimony about pain, because impairments that would unquestionably preclude work and all the pressures of a workplace environment will often be consistent with doing more than merely resting in bed all day." Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1016. The ALJ noted that Oswalt drove, but her testimony at the hearing negates any contradiction. (AR 47.) Oswalt would be able to pull over when she needed to and limited her driving extensively. Id. The Commissioner insists that the ALJ did not rely on the 2019 work history to determine Oswalt's RFC but instead used it to show her allegations were exaggerated or inconsistent. (Doc. 23 at 13.) It is unclear what this work history is and how it shows Oswalt was exaggerating her symptoms. Even the ALJ states that "claimant might have worked." (AR 23 (emphasis added).) None of these reasons are adequate to be specific, clear and convincing reasons to discount Oswalt's testimony.

The ALJ failed to provide specific, clear and convincing reasons for discrediting Oswalt's symptom testimony. Hence, the ALJ erred. The Court must consider if this error is harmless. See Ford, 950 F.3d at 1154. For the reasons the previous issue is harmful, the Court finds this error is also harmful. Therefore, the Court recommends vacating the ALJ's decision as it contains a harmful error and remanding the matter for further proceedings per Oswalt's request.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the District Court, after its independent review, enter an order vacating the Commissioner's final decision and remanding this matter for proceedings consistent with its opinion.

This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Fed. R. App. P., should not be filed until entry of the District Court's judgment.

However, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a, d), 72(b). Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. No reply briefs shall be filed unless the District Court grants leave to do so. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the referral of this matter. Filed objections should bear the following case number: CV 20-00556-TUC-JGZ. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003).


Summaries of

Oswalt v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin.

United States District Court, District of Arizona
Jun 30, 2022
CV-20-00556-TUC-JGZ (DTF) (D. Ariz. Jun. 30, 2022)
Case details for

Oswalt v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin.

Case Details

Full title:Jennifer Oswalt, Plaintiff, v. Commissioner of Social Security…

Court:United States District Court, District of Arizona

Date published: Jun 30, 2022

Citations

CV-20-00556-TUC-JGZ (DTF) (D. Ariz. Jun. 30, 2022)