1, Section 46-191, Section 46-192.3, Section 46-361; 288 F. Supp. 735; 233 F. Supp. 550; 313 Pa. 71, 169 A. 106. Asto evidence and testimony sufficient to require the trialjudge to overrule the motion for nonsuit as to the issue ofnegligent entrustment of the car to the Respondent driverby the Respondent, Geraldine Thompson, wife of the ownerof the car: 173 S.C. 34, 174 S.E. 495; 218 S.C. 206, 62 S.E.2d 311; Section 46-192.3, as amended, of the Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1962; 54 N.E.2d 165; 7 N.C. App. 84, 171 S.E.2d 330; 378 F.2d 171; 267 N.C. 314, 148 S.E.2d 132. As to evidence and testimonyof a proximate casual connection between Appellant'sinjuries and the heedlessness and recklessness of the hostdriver and/or the tortious entrustment: 248 S.C. 316, 149 S.E.2d 761; 232 S.C. 46, 100 S.E.2d 540; 114 S.C. 156, 103 S.E. 512; 240 S.C. 223, 125 S.E.2d 470. As to the Trial Judge's erring in excluding the out-of-courtadmission and testimony about the incident when thecar failed inspection because of the two slick tires: Dreher, Page 66, "A Guide to Evidence Law in South Carolina"; 9 Wn.2d 93, 113 P.2d 1030; McCormick's Evidence, Section 228, Chapter 25, pages 464, 465, 466 and 467; 293 Mich. 409, 292 N.W. 350; 215 S.C. 374, 55 S.E.2d 337. As to the inclusion of the out-of-court admissionand/or the testimony about the incident when thecar failed inspection because of two slick tires, ad

Messrs. W.L. Clifton and R. Kirk McLeod, of Sumter, for Appellant, cite: As to the testimony not supporting theorder for direction of verdict in favor of Respondent: 5 Am.Jur. 632, 633, Automobiles, Sec. 237; 218 S.C. 206, 62 S.E.2d 311; 60 C.J.S., 1011-1014, Sec. 399 (5) b; 232 S.C. 593, 103 S.E.2d 265; 239 S.C. 620, 124 S.E.2d 321; 243 S.C. 425, 134 S.E.2d 410. As to theorder for direction of verdict for Respondent constitutingan abuse of legal discretion: 146 S.C. 28, 143 S.E. 474; (S.C.) 135 S.E.2d 319. Messrs. Nash Wilson and John W. Chappell, of Sumter, for Respondent, cite: As to the only reasonable inferencefrom the testimony being that Appellant was a guestand thus Respondent was liable only for gross negligence: 10 A.L.R.2d 1351; 16 Cal.App.2d 128, 60 P.2d 546; 38 N.E.2d 436, 34 Ohio L. Abs. 566; 123 Ohio St. 565, 176 N.E. 217; 199 Va. 85, 97 S.E.2d 820. As to there being no evidence in the record tending to showthat the Respondent was guilty of any actionable negligenceor wilfulness which was the proximate cause of the Appellant'sinjuries and thus the direction of a verdict in favor ofthe Respondent was proper: 231 S.C. 75, 97 S.E.2d 205; 232 S.C. 108, 101 S.E.2d 252; 234 S.W.2d 676, 314 Ky. 198; 97 So.2

Since the respondent was a guest passenger in the automobile of the appellant, the Trial Judge properly charged the jury that this action is governed by the guest statute, Section 46-801 of the Code. Under such statute, a guest cannot recover against the owner and operator of an automobile for simple negligence. Oswald v. Weiner, 218 S.C. 206, 62 S.E.2d 311. The foregoing action, as construed by this Court, restricts liability to cases where injury has resulted from either intentional or reckless misconduct of the owner or operator of the motor vehicle. This Court has also held that the only duty that the operator of an automobile owes to a guest passenger is not to injure her willfully or by conduct in reckless disregard of her rights.

wood, Walker, Todd Mann, of Greenville, for Appellant, cite: As to where the only cause ofPlaintiff's injuries was a tire blowing out on the vehicle inwhich she was riding as a guest, she cannot recover: 117 S.C. 286, 181 S.E. 30; 218 S.C. 206, 62 S.E.2d 313; 226 S.C. 13, 83 S.E.2d 338; 220 S.C. 26, 66 S.E.2d 322; 93 S.C. 287, 75 S.E. 172; 24 A.L.R.2d 174; 131 Neb. 42, 267 N.W. 177; 224 S.W.2d 861; 322 Pa. 353, 185 A. 775; 269 Mich. 293, 257 N.W. 830, 96 A.L.R. 1477; 264 P.2d 698; 142 Kan. 463, 50 P.2d 995. As to the court erring in holding there was otherevidence of recklessness by defendant: 218 S.C. 554, 63 S.E.2d 465; 5 Am. Jur. 569; 177 S.C. 286, 181 S.E. 30; 4 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice 399; 50 Ga. App. 39, 177 S.E. 92. As to the failure ofthe jury to award punitive damages amounting to a findingof no willfullness, wantonness or recklessness: 225 S.C. 52, 80 S.E.2d 740; 183 S.C. 399, 199 S.E. 209; 69 S.C. 160, 48 S.E. 104; 217 S.C. 435, 60 S.E.2d 889; 218 S.C. 206, 62 S.E.2d 311. Sol E. Abrams, Esq., of Greenville, for Respondent, cites: As to there being sufficient evidence to allow the jury to determinewhether or not the defendant was reckless in anyof the particulars alleged in the complaint: 225 S.C. 33, 80 S.E.2d 420; 216 S.C. 539, 59 S.E.2d 149; 24 A.L.R.2d 164; 232 Iowa 959, 5 N.W.2d 327; 277 Mich. 154, 269 N.W. 125; 86 S.W.2d 347; 136 N.J. 123, 3 A.2d 895; (Mich.), 267 N.W. 831; 198 Ark. 197, 128 S.W.2d 50; (Ark), 289 S.W.2d 686; (Cal.) 290 P.2d 911; 323 Pa. 392, 188 A. 181. As toan exception that the verdict was contrary to the law andevidence being too general: 228 S.C. 34, 88 S.E.2d 838. As to the issue of determining the credibility of a witness ina law case being left solely to the jury: 228 S.C. 45, 88 S.E.2d 780; 221 S.C. 243, 70 S.E.2d 238; 107 S.C. 21, 91 S.E. 1043; 271 Wis. 170, 72 N.W.2d 744.

Section 46-801, Code of 1952. The following former decisions relate to it: Fulghum v. Bleakley, 177 S.C. 286, 181 S.E. 30; Ralls v. Saleeby, 178 S.C. 431, 182 S.E. 750; Spurlin v. Colprovia Products Co., 185 S.C. 449, 194 S.E. 332; Cummings v. Tweed, 195 S.C. 173, 10 S.E.2d 322; Peak v. Fripp, 195 S.C. 324, 11 S.E.2d 383; Shockley v. Cox Circus Company, Inc., 204 S.C. 353, 29 S.E.2d 491; and Oswald v. Weiner, 218 S.C. 206, 62 S.E.2d 311. The demurrer was overruled upon the conclusion of the court that, while the complaint is vague and uncertain with respect to the status or capacity of plaintiff's intestate, the demurrer was not timely; but defendants (now appellants) were expressly granted leave to file, quoting from the order, "any motion or defensive pleading they should deem advisable."