As such, the Court is unable to make any findings as a matter of law. It must also be noted that Herrmann's statements with respect to the deeds by which Edie and his predecessors obtained title to the property are made upon information and belief and, as such, are of no probative value (seeOswald v. Oswald , 107 AD3d 45, 49 [2013] ; Lockwood v. Layton , 79 AD3d 1342, 1344 [2010] ; Anderson v. Livonia, Avon & Lakeville R.R. Corp. , 300 AD2d 1134, 1135 [2002] ; Onondaga Soil Testing v. Barton, Brown, Clyde & Loguidice , 69 AD2d 984, 984 [1979] ).
Nevertheless, this type of marriage have proliferated exponentially. Last year, the Appellate Division, Third Department, in a case also involving the legality of a ULC minister to perform a wedding, reversed the lower court's finding that the marriage was invalid and remanded the matter for a determination to be made as to whether “the ULC constitutes a church' within the meaning of the Religious Corporations Law” ( Oswald v. Oswald, 107 A.D.3d 45, 48, 963 N.Y.S.2d 762 [3d Dept.2013] ). In so doing, the Oswald court wrote, “ Ranieri was decided a quarter century ago, and we simply cannot presume that the belief system, structure and inner workings of the ULC have remained static since that time” ( id. at 47, 963 N.Y.S.2d 762)
That, however, conflicts with the Court of Appeals’ determination in [Matter of] T–Mobile Northeast, LLC that such property is taxable" ( Matter ofLevel 3 Communications, LLC v. Erie County, 174 A.D.3d at 1501, 108 N.Y.S.3d 246 ). Initially, Supreme Court correctly applied the Fourth Department's rule in the absence of controlling precedent from this Court or the Court of Appeals (seeOswald v. Oswald, 107 A.D.3d 45, 47, 963 N.Y.S.2d 762 [2013] ). Moreover, petitioners have not met their burden of demonstrating that their reading of the statute is the only reasonable construction (seeMatter of Charter Dev. Co., L.L.C. v. City of Buffalo, 6 N.Y.3d at 582, 815 N.Y.S.2d 13, 848 N.E.2d 460 ).
It is well established that the FHA must be interpreted in accordance with its "broad remedial intent" ( Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 [1982] ; seeTrafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209, 93 S.Ct. 364, 34 L.Ed.2d 415 [1972] ), and the HRL specifically provides that its provisions "shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof" ( Executive Law § 300 ; see Executive Law § 290 ). Thus, we decline to apply the restrictive standard of necessity enunciated by the Second Department (see generallyOswald v. Oswald, 107 A.D.3d 45, 47, 963 N.Y.S.2d 762 [2013] ).Defendant and his therapist testified that an emotional support dog would alleviate some of his symptoms of depression and anxiety.
In this regard, the complaint merely alleged that Josephine Brusgul, while using her walker to get to the first floor bathroom, was caused to fall. Furthermore, Brusgul's affidavit stating that Josephine Brusgul fell after the insureds' son opened a door and knocked her over is without probative value given that it was made "[u]pon information and belief" (seeOswald v. Oswald, 107 A.D.3d 45, 49, 963 N.Y.S.2d 762 [2013] ; Temple v. Chenango County, 228 A.D.2d 938, 939, 644 N.Y.S.2d 587 [1996] ). As such, the record evidence does not allow for a determination as to whether the personal injuries allegedly sustained from the fall was a loss that fell wholly within the business pursuits exclusion.
Wascomat thus failed to meet its prima facie burden of demonstrating the absence of all material issues of fact as to whether a defect in the dryer caused the fire. Accordingly, summary judgment dismissing the negligence claim against Wascomat was properly denied, regardless of the sufficiency of plaintiff's opposing papers ( see Vega v. Restani Constr. Corp., 18 N.Y.3d 499, 503, 942 N.Y.S.2d 13, 965 N.E.2d 240 [2012]; Oswald v. Oswald, 107 A.D.3d 45, 47, 963 N.Y.S.2d 762 [2013] ).
That, however, conflicts with the Court of Appeals' determination in [Matter of] T-Mobile Northeast, LLC that such property is taxable" (Matter of Level 3 Communications, LLC v Erie County, 174 A.D.3d at 1501). Initially, Supreme Court correctly applied the Fourth Department's rule in the absence of controlling precedent from this Court or the Court of Appeals (see Oswald v Oswald, 107 A.D.3d 45, 47 [2013]). Moreover, petitioners have not met their burden of demonstrating that their reading of the statute is the only reasonable construction (see Matter of Charter Dev. Co., LLC v City of Buffalo, 6 N.Y.3d at 582).
The gravamen of the coop corporation's motion is that, inasmuch as the plaintiff only made that allegation "on information and belief," it is insufficient to sustain any of the causes of action asserted in the complaint, and renders the substantive causes of action time-barred. The court recognizes that it is improper to predicate an award of summary judgment upon an affidavit that alleges material facts and representations upon information and belief, and no statement is made therein as to the sources of the information or grounds of belief (see Oswald v Oswald, 107 AD3d 45, 49 [3d Dept 2013]; Onondaga Soil Testing, Inc. v Barton, Brown, Clyde & Loguidice, P.C., 69 AD2d 984, 984-985 [4th Dept 1979]). Similarly, where an allegation is based only upon information and belief, "without the slightest reference to the source of the information or the grounds for the belief" (Zelnik v Bidermann Indus. U.S.A., 242 AD2d 227, 228 [1st Dept 1997]), it is insufficient to constitute proof of facts necessary to support a motion for leave to enter a default judgment (see id; see also Henriquez v Purins, 245 AD2d 337, 338 [2d Dept 1997])
In the absence of a Third Department decision directly on point, this court is bound to follow the legal precedents set by other Departments of the Appellate Division (see Oswald v. Oswald, 107 A.D.3d 45, 47 [3d Dept. 2013]; Mountain View Coach Lines, Inc. v. Storms, 102 A.D.2d 663, 664 [2d Dept. 1984]). Thus, even assuming the Petitioners' claims are properly before the Court, the Petitioners' first, second, third and fourth causes of action alleging "unlawful" assessment ceilings must be dismissed for failure to state claims.
Indeed this issue has given rise to some conflict at the Appellate Division level with regard to the recognition of marriages performed by Universal Life Church ministers. Ranieri v. Ranieri, 146 AD2d 34 (2d Dept. 1989); Oswald v. Oswald, 107 AD3d 45 (3d Dept. 2013). Since New York statutory provisions set forth the qualifications for a marriage officiant, the court may be able to determine if a person meets those criteria without embroiling the court in religious controversy.