Ostrowski v. Avery

100 Citing cases

  1. O'Neil v. New England Rd., Inc. (In re Neri Bros. Constr. Corp.)

    593 B.R. 100 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2018)   Cited 8 times
    Finding the Chapter 7 trustee had established unjust enrichment, meriting a $686,241.61 award

    "To prevail on a claim of usurpation ... [the] plaintiff bears the burden of establishing [by a preponderance of the evidence]: (1) a fiduciary relationship between the corporation and the alleged wrongdoers; and (2) the existence of a corporate opportunity." Murphy, 247 Conn. at 404, 721 A.2d 1181 (citingOstrowski v. Avery, 243 Conn. 355, 362, 703 A.2d 117 (1997). "An officer and director occupies a fiduciary relationship to the corporation and its stockholders."

  2. Deutsch v. Circa Bistro LLC

    Civil Action No. 3:04CV1253(CFD) (D. Conn. Sep. 13, 2005)

    See Shortt v. Senor Panchos, Inc., 2005 WL 1394780 at *3 (Conn.Super.Ct., May 17, 2005) (Craig applies retroactively); Blackwell v. Barone's Sporting Café, Inc., 2005 Wl 647601 at *3 (Conn.Super.Ct., Jan 10, 2005) (same); Raymond v. Duffy, 38 Conn. L. Rptr. 562, 562, 2005 WL 407655 at *8 (Conn.Super.Ct., Jan 13, 2005) (same); Amato v. Randall's Restaurant, 37 Conn. L. Rptr. 608, 2004 WL 1966099 at *2 (Conn.Super.Ct., Aug 9, 2004) (applying Craig retroactively); Raposa v. Lynam, 36 Conn. L. Rptr. 174, 2003 WL 22962859 at * 2 (Conn.Super.Ct., Dec. 3, 2003) ("find[ing] no barrier to a retroactive application of [Craig]"). All of the Superior Court decisions cited previously analyzed the retroactive effect of Craig v. Driscoll pursuant to the three-part test set forth in Ostrowski v. Avery, 243 Conn. 355, 377 n. 18, 703 A.2d 117 (1997), or at least adopted the reasoning of another court that had applied that three-part test. The three-part test provides:

  3. Campos v. Coleman

    319 Conn. 36 (Conn. 2015)   Cited 32 times
    Recognizing new cause of action for loss of parental consortium after evaluating relevant public policy factors and concluding that factors weigh in favor of recognizing such claim

    89 Finally, we address the defendants' contention that, if we recognize a cause of action for loss of parental consortium, we should not make it available to the parties in the present case but should apply it prospectively only. In support of their claim, the defendants rely on Ostrowski v. Avery, 243 Conn. 355, 703 A.2d 117 (1997), in which this court applied “the three-part test set out in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), for determining whether a decision must be applied prospectively only. A common-law decision will be applied nonretroactively only if: (1) it establishes a new principle of law, either by overruling past precedent on which litigants have relied ... or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed ... (2) given its prior history, purpose and effect, retrospective application of the rule would retard its operation; and (3) retroactive application would produce substantial inequitable results, injustice or hardship.

  4. Campos v. Coleman

    319 Conn. 36 (Conn. 2014)

    Finally, we address the defendants' contention that, if we recognize a cause of action for loss of parental consortium, we should not make it available to the parties in the present case but should apply it prospectively only. In support of their claim, the defendants rely on Ostrowski v. Avery, 243 Conn. 355, 703 A.2d 117 (1997), in which this court applied “the three-part test set out in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), for determining whether a decision must be applied prospectively only. A common-law decision will be applied nonretroactively only if: (1) it establishes a new principle of law, either by overruling past precedent on which litigants have relied ... or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed ... (2) given its prior history, purpose and effect, retrospective application of the rule would retard its operation; and (3) retroactive application would produce substantial inequitable results, injustice or hardship.

  5. Zhao v. Dean

    No. FSTCV196042813S (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 2020)

    Other courts have followed Fink and held that misappropriation of assets and usurpation of corporate opportunities violate CUTPA. See e.g., Spector v. Konover, 57 Conn.App. 121, 133 (2000); Ostrowski v. Avery, 243 Conn. 355, 379 (1997); Getz v. Riek, 2016 WL 6885180 *8 (Conn.Super. 2016). See also Halo Tech Holdings, Inc. v. Cooper, 2008 WL 877156 *19 (D.Conn. 2008) ("this case is about the ... defendants’ unfair and deceptive practices in the sale of a business, conduct to which CUTPA squarely applies").

  6. Raymond v. Duffy

    2005 Ct. Sup. 831 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2005)   Cited 1 times

    And, indeed, the Craig v. Driscoll decision itself was applied retroactively to the parties in that case without discussion. The defendants argue that the test set forth in Ostrowski v. Avery, 243 Conn. 355, 377 n. 18, 703 A.2d 117 (1997) should be applied to the facts of this case. In footnote 18, the Court noted that in Neyland v. Board of Education, 195 Conn. 174, 179, 487 A.2d 181 (1985), it had adopted the three-part test set out in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), for determining whether a decision must be applied prospectively only.

  7. Guillemette v. Rockville Lodge No. 1359

    2005 Ct. Sup. 581 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2005)   Cited 2 times

    There the court stated: "In determining whether a case holding should be applied retroactively, the Connecticut Supreme Court has adopted a three-part test: A common law decision will be applied non-retroactively only if: (1) it establishes a new principle of law, either by overruling past precedent on which litigants have relied . . . or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed . . . (2) given its prior history, purpose and effect retrospective application of the rule would retard its operation; and (3) retroactive application would produce substantial inequitable results, injustice or hardship. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ostrowski v. Avery, 243 Conn. 355, 377 n. 18, 703 A.2d 117 (1997). The first part of the test is clearly met. Craig v. Driscoll overruled the case of Quinnett v. Newman, 213 Conn. 343, 568 A.2d 786 (1990), which expressly held that neither a common-law negligence action nor a public nuisance action exists against the seller of alcohol to an adult who thereafter injures another by reason of his intoxication.

  8. Lopiano v. Gedney

    2004 Ct. Sup. 17303 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004)

    "In determining whether a cause of action for usurpation of a corporate opportunity exists . . . the dominant inquiry is whether the corporate opportunity at issue falls within the corporation's allowed business purpose." Id.; Ostrowsky v. Avery, 243 Conn. 355, 367, 703 A.2d 117 (1997). Among the factors set forth by the Supreme Court in evaluating the claim of usurpation of corporate opportunity is "whether the business opportunity was one in which the complaining corporation had an interest or an expectancy growing out of an existing contractual right; (2) whether there was a close relationship between the opportunity and the corporation's business purposes and current activities; (3) and whether the business area is contemplated by the opportunity were readily adaptable to the corporations' existing business, in light of its fundamental knowledge, practical experience, facilities, equipment and personnel."

  9. Plainville Electrical v. Michaud

    2000 Ct. Sup. 7908 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000)   Cited 1 times

    Discussion of LawFirst and Third Counts — Misappropriation of Corporate Opportunity and Breach of Fiduciary Duty In Ostrowski v. Avery, 243 Conn. 355, 362, 703 A.2d 117 (1997), the Connecticut Supreme Court held that once a plaintiff has proven the existence of a corporate fiduciary relationship and a corporate opportunity, defendant corporate fiduciaries bear the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that they have not usurped a corporate opportunity. "An officer and director occupies a fiduciary relationship to the corporation and its stockholders."

  10. In re Tripodi

    313 B.R. 358 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2004)   Cited 1 times

    b. Breach of fiduciary duty. As with his determination of statutory theft, Judge Schuman identifies the standard of proof applied to his determination of breach of fiduciary duty by reference to case law, namelyOstrowski v. Avery, 243 Conn. 355, 362 (1997). The passage ofOstrowski cited by Judge Schuman sets out a shifting burden of proof applicable to breach of fiduciary duty cases, to wit: