In addition, we do not find appellee's interest sufficient to support his intervention in his parents' dissolution of marriage. In Oster v. Cay Construction Co., 204 So.2d 539 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967), the third district described the required interest to intervene as follows: It is has generally been held that the interest which will entitle a person to intervene under this provision [the predecessor to rule 1.230] must be in the matter in litigation, and of such a direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.
This rationale is based on the language in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.230 and case law which forbid another party's intervention in a law suit unless it is in "subordination of" and "in recognition of" the propriety of the litigation in the main suit. See Oster v. Cay Construction Co., 204 So.2d 539 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967); Riviera Club v. Belle Mead Development Corp., 141 Fla., 538, 194 So. 783 (1939). In this case, Vanguard's attempt to determine whom among the defendants were its insureds, would inject new issues into the Townsend v. Perez, et al., law suit.
A trial court does not abuse its discretion when it denies intervention because the would-be intervenor seeks to inject new issues into the pending action.See Riveria Club v. Belle Mead Development Corp., 141 Fla. 538, 194 So. 783 (1939); Oster v. Cay Construction Co., 204 So.2d 539 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967). AFFIRMED.
may have against [the developers] and the balance, after all such offsets, to the party against whom the judgment was entered or any other party to such litigation shall be remitted to Assignee, without claim by Assignor, except to the extent of attorneys' fees and costs expended by Assignor to obtain such result." We hold that the trial court abused its discretion in denying intervention, see Coral Bay Property Owner's Association v. City of Coral Gables, 305 So.2d 853 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), because (1) the status of the Association as a partial and potentially substantial assignee of the cause of action being sued on by the developers is that of real party in interest in the pending litigation, a status clearly sufficient to justify intervention, see W. Klang Son, Inc. v. Milar Galleries, Inc., 328 So.2d 510 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Blue Cross of Florida, Inc. v. O'Donnell, 230 So.2d 706 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970); compare Faircloth v. Mr. Boston Distiller Corporation, 245 So.2d 240 (Fla. 1970); Oster v. Cay Construction Company, 204 So.2d 539 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967) (mere indirect interest not sufficient for intervention); (2) as is evident from the assignment, the developers' only real interest in the outcome of their action against Aetna is to recover damages sufficient to offset a judgment obtained against them on a promissory note by Aetna, whereas, by contrast, the interests of the Association, the entity which now bears the responsibility to repair the alleged defective construction, can only be adequately protected by as full and complete recovery against Aetna as is possible for it to obtain, Coral Bay Property Owner's Association v. City of Coral Gables, supra (proposed intervenor's interest not adequately protected by party with limited interest); see Miracle House Corporation v. Haige, 96 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1957) (proposed intervenor's interest not adequately protected by disinterested party); (3) not only is the discrete interest of the developers in the outcome of the litigation inadequate to fully protect the rights of the Association,
Therefore, we affirm the order of the trial court dated October 7, 1976, denying appellant's motion to intervene. See Miracle House Corporation v. Haige, 96 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1957); Riviera Club v. Belle Mead Development Corp., 141 Fla. 538, 194 So. 783 (1959); Coral Bay Prop. Own. Ass'n v. City of Coral Gables, 305 So.2d 853 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Oster v. Cay Construction Company, 204 So.2d 539 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967); and Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.230. Affirmed.
In other words, the interest must be that created by a claim to the demand in suit or some part thereof, or a claim to, or lien upon, the property or some part thereof, which is the subject of litigation." Morgareidge v. Howey, 75 Fla. 234, 78 So. 14, 15 (1918); accord, Miracle House Corp. v. Haige, 96 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1957); Oster v. Cay Construction Co., 204 So.2d 539 (Fla.App. 1967). As noted above, appellants' complaint in the case sub judice does not describe nor seek to acquire title to any part of or any rights in the Nidy property.