Ossen v. Kreutzer

13 Citing cases

  1. Chipperini v. Crandall

    Civil Action No. 3:00CV345(CFD) (D. Conn. Mar. 26, 2003)   Cited 13 times
    Noting that the inquiry into clearly established law in the context of a warrantless arrest required an analysis of the state criminal statute that a plaintiff-arrestee was suspected by her arresting officers of having violated

    She also points to her prior arrest for criminal lockout, which was dismissed, as an indication that it was "clearly established" that the law did not apply to mobile home parks. Finally, Chipperini points to Ossen v. Kreutzer, 563 A.2d 741 (Conn.App. 1989), where the Connecticut Appellate Court held that a specific provision of chapter 830 of the Connecticut General Statutes concerning landlords and tenants did "not apply to proceedings involving mobile home parks." Ossen, 563 A.2d at 744.

  2. Colonial Investors, LLC v. Furbush

    175 Conn. App. 154 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017)   Cited 5 times

    (Footnotes added.) Ossen v. Kreutzer , 19 Conn.App. 564, 568–69, 563 A.2d 741 (1989). General Statutes § 47a–23 is the general summary process statute that governs the form and delivery of notices to quit possession, whereas § 21–80 is the provision specific to mobile home summary process actions. See Lampasona v. Jacobs, 209 Conn. 724, 726, 553 A.2d 175, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 919, 109 S.Ct. 3244, 106 L.Ed. 2d 590 (1989).

  3. Sunny Waters, LLC v. Huntoon

    CV166102039S (Conn. Super. Ct. May. 26, 2017)

    Upon payment of the amount due within the thirty day cure period, the July 22nd notice to quit was rendered null and void, and the plaintiff was prohibited from taking further action against the defendant. Ossen v. Kreutzer, 19 Conn.App., 564, 568, 563 A.2d 741 (1989); See also, General Statutes § 21-80(b)(3)(B). Therefore, the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the present matter, because the latter notice to quit served on August 31, 2016, was valid.

  4. Chelsea Data v. North Star Management

    2002 Ct. Sup. 9087 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2002)

    Section 47a-15 applies only to residential leases, not commercial leases. Hoban v. Masters, 36 Conn. Sup. 611, 613, 421 A.2d 1318 (App. Sess. 1980); see also Johnson v. Fuller, 190 Conn. 552, 558, 461 A.2d 988 (1983); Housing Authority v. Harris, 28 Conn. App. 684, 689, 611 A.2d 934 (1992), aff'd, 225 Conn. 600, 625 A.2d 816 (1993); Ossen v. Kreutzer, 19 Conn. App. 564, 569, CT Page 9088 563 A.2d 741 (1989). The complaint indicates that the lease in the present case is one for "commercial rental.

  5. Housing Authority v. Harris

    225 Conn. 600 (Conn. 1993)   Cited 58 times
    In Housing Authority v. Harris, 225 Conn. 660, 605, 625 A.2d 816 (1993), the court held that the notice "must be sufficient to apprise the tenant of the information the tenant needs to protect herself (himself) against premature, discriminatory or arbitrary eviction."

    This notice provision has been interpreted to be separate from and preliminary to the maintenance of a summary process action pursuant to [General Statutes] 47a-23." Ossen v. Kreutzer, 19 Conn. App. 564, 569, 563 A.2d 741 (1989). The notice must be sufficient to apprise the tenant of the information the tenant "needs to protect herself against premature, discriminatory or arbitrary eviction. . . . To further this salutary purpose, the notice requirements of 47a-15 must be construed strictly."

  6. St. Paul's Flax Hill Co-operative v. Johnson

    124 Conn. App. 728 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010)   Cited 35 times
    Noting that the notice to quit must be delivered after service of the pretermination notice

    "This notice provision has been interpreted to be separate from and preliminary to the maintenance of a summary process action pursuant to . . . § 47a-23." Housing Authority v. Harris, 225 Conn. 600, 605, 625 A.2d 816 (1993); Ossen v. Kreutzer, 19 Conn. App. 564, 569, 563 A.2d 741 (1989); see also Bridgeport v. Barbour-Daniel Electronics, Inc., 16 Conn. App. 574, 593, 548 A.2d 744 ( Borden, J., dissenting) ("a § 47a-15 notice is a necessary precondition to the landlord's right to serve a notice to quit arising out of the tenant's material noncompliance"), cert. denied, 209 Conn. 826, 552 A.2d 432 (1988). A pretermination notice pursuant to § 47a-15 does not have the effect of terminating a tenancy or of altering the relationship of the landlord and tenant.

  7. Housing Authority v. Harris

    28 Conn. App. 684 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992)   Cited 18 times
    In Housing Authority v. Harris, 28 Conn. App. 684, 691, 611 A.2d 934 (1992), aff'd, 225 Conn. 600, 625 A.2d 816 (1993), this court held that the failure to require others to conduct themselves in a manner that does not constitute a serious nuisance is not itself a serious nuisance.

    " Housing Authority v. Hird, 13 Conn. App. 150, 155, 535 A.2d 377, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 825, 552 A.2d 433 (1988); Marrinan v. Hamer, supra, 103. "As a condition precedent to a summary process action, proper notice to quit is a jurisdictional necessity." Lampasona v. Jacobs, 209 Conn. 724, 729, 553 A.2d 175, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 919, 109 S.Ct. 3244, 106 L.Ed.2d 590 (1989); Ossen v. Kreutzer, 19 Conn. App. 564, 568, 563 A.2d 741 (1989). "In order to demonstrate its compliance with the notices required for a proper termination, a landlord must show that the notices given to the tenant apprised her of the information a tenant needs to protect herself against premature, discriminatory or arbitrary eviction. . . . To further this salutary purpose, the notice requirements of 47a-15 must be construed strictly.

  8. Ossen v. Wanat

    21 Conn. App. 40 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 17 times
    Reviewing order entered pursuant to Practice Book § 111 which is only similar in nature to Rule 11

    Furthermore, "[s]ection 21-80 (b)(4) provides that unless otherwise specified, `proceedings under this chapter [412] shall be prescribed under Chapter 832,' the general summary process chapter." Ossen v. Kreutzer, 19 Conn. App. 564, 569, 563 A.2d 741 (1989). It is clear from a review of the relevant statutes that they provide for no such procedure as the defendants suggest, namely, selling the mobile home to pay rent arrearages once a summary process action for nonpayment of rent has begun.

  9. MacGall Associates v. Sierra

    1997 Ct. Sup. 706 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997)

    The "Kapa" "notice requirement has been interpreted to be separate from and preliminary to the maintenance of a summary process action pursuant to § 47a-23." Ossen v. Kreutzer, 19 Conn. App. 564, 569 (1989). The jurisdictional notice requirement imposed by § 47a-15 has been formulated different ways. InMarrinan v. Hamer, 5 Conn. App. 101, 104 (1985), for example, it was stated that "the notice to quit was invalid because the requirements of § 47a-15 had not been complied with".

  10. East Hartford Housing Authority v. Lundy

    1996 Ct. Sup. 6388 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996)

    Harris, supra, 606. The plaintiff seems to suggest that because most of the requirements of the Kapa notice were included in the combination termination notice and notice to quit that it did provide, the requirements of § 47a-15 were met in any event. The Kapa requirement, however, "`has been interpreted to be separate from and preliminary to the maintenance of a summary process action pursuant to [General Statutes] § 47a-23.' Ossen v. Kreutzer, 19 Conn. App. 564, 569. . . ." Harris, supra, 605.