She also points to her prior arrest for criminal lockout, which was dismissed, as an indication that it was "clearly established" that the law did not apply to mobile home parks. Finally, Chipperini points to Ossen v. Kreutzer, 563 A.2d 741 (Conn.App. 1989), where the Connecticut Appellate Court held that a specific provision of chapter 830 of the Connecticut General Statutes concerning landlords and tenants did "not apply to proceedings involving mobile home parks." Ossen, 563 A.2d at 744.
(Footnotes added.) Ossen v. Kreutzer , 19 Conn.App. 564, 568–69, 563 A.2d 741 (1989). General Statutes § 47a–23 is the general summary process statute that governs the form and delivery of notices to quit possession, whereas § 21–80 is the provision specific to mobile home summary process actions. See Lampasona v. Jacobs, 209 Conn. 724, 726, 553 A.2d 175, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 919, 109 S.Ct. 3244, 106 L.Ed. 2d 590 (1989).
Upon payment of the amount due within the thirty day cure period, the July 22nd notice to quit was rendered null and void, and the plaintiff was prohibited from taking further action against the defendant. Ossen v. Kreutzer, 19 Conn.App., 564, 568, 563 A.2d 741 (1989); See also, General Statutes § 21-80(b)(3)(B). Therefore, the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the present matter, because the latter notice to quit served on August 31, 2016, was valid.
Section 47a-15 applies only to residential leases, not commercial leases. Hoban v. Masters, 36 Conn. Sup. 611, 613, 421 A.2d 1318 (App. Sess. 1980); see also Johnson v. Fuller, 190 Conn. 552, 558, 461 A.2d 988 (1983); Housing Authority v. Harris, 28 Conn. App. 684, 689, 611 A.2d 934 (1992), aff'd, 225 Conn. 600, 625 A.2d 816 (1993); Ossen v. Kreutzer, 19 Conn. App. 564, 569, CT Page 9088 563 A.2d 741 (1989). The complaint indicates that the lease in the present case is one for "commercial rental.
This notice provision has been interpreted to be separate from and preliminary to the maintenance of a summary process action pursuant to [General Statutes] 47a-23." Ossen v. Kreutzer, 19 Conn. App. 564, 569, 563 A.2d 741 (1989). The notice must be sufficient to apprise the tenant of the information the tenant "needs to protect herself against premature, discriminatory or arbitrary eviction. . . . To further this salutary purpose, the notice requirements of 47a-15 must be construed strictly."
"This notice provision has been interpreted to be separate from and preliminary to the maintenance of a summary process action pursuant to . . . § 47a-23." Housing Authority v. Harris, 225 Conn. 600, 605, 625 A.2d 816 (1993); Ossen v. Kreutzer, 19 Conn. App. 564, 569, 563 A.2d 741 (1989); see also Bridgeport v. Barbour-Daniel Electronics, Inc., 16 Conn. App. 574, 593, 548 A.2d 744 ( Borden, J., dissenting) ("a § 47a-15 notice is a necessary precondition to the landlord's right to serve a notice to quit arising out of the tenant's material noncompliance"), cert. denied, 209 Conn. 826, 552 A.2d 432 (1988). A pretermination notice pursuant to § 47a-15 does not have the effect of terminating a tenancy or of altering the relationship of the landlord and tenant.
" Housing Authority v. Hird, 13 Conn. App. 150, 155, 535 A.2d 377, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 825, 552 A.2d 433 (1988); Marrinan v. Hamer, supra, 103. "As a condition precedent to a summary process action, proper notice to quit is a jurisdictional necessity." Lampasona v. Jacobs, 209 Conn. 724, 729, 553 A.2d 175, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 919, 109 S.Ct. 3244, 106 L.Ed.2d 590 (1989); Ossen v. Kreutzer, 19 Conn. App. 564, 568, 563 A.2d 741 (1989). "In order to demonstrate its compliance with the notices required for a proper termination, a landlord must show that the notices given to the tenant apprised her of the information a tenant needs to protect herself against premature, discriminatory or arbitrary eviction. . . . To further this salutary purpose, the notice requirements of 47a-15 must be construed strictly.
Furthermore, "[s]ection 21-80 (b)(4) provides that unless otherwise specified, `proceedings under this chapter [412] shall be prescribed under Chapter 832,' the general summary process chapter." Ossen v. Kreutzer, 19 Conn. App. 564, 569, 563 A.2d 741 (1989). It is clear from a review of the relevant statutes that they provide for no such procedure as the defendants suggest, namely, selling the mobile home to pay rent arrearages once a summary process action for nonpayment of rent has begun.
The "Kapa" "notice requirement has been interpreted to be separate from and preliminary to the maintenance of a summary process action pursuant to § 47a-23." Ossen v. Kreutzer, 19 Conn. App. 564, 569 (1989). The jurisdictional notice requirement imposed by § 47a-15 has been formulated different ways. InMarrinan v. Hamer, 5 Conn. App. 101, 104 (1985), for example, it was stated that "the notice to quit was invalid because the requirements of § 47a-15 had not been complied with".
Harris, supra, 606. The plaintiff seems to suggest that because most of the requirements of the Kapa notice were included in the combination termination notice and notice to quit that it did provide, the requirements of § 47a-15 were met in any event. The Kapa requirement, however, "`has been interpreted to be separate from and preliminary to the maintenance of a summary process action pursuant to [General Statutes] § 47a-23.' Ossen v. Kreutzer, 19 Conn. App. 564, 569. . . ." Harris, supra, 605.