Opinion
No. CV04 0486751 S
April 12, 2004
CERTIFICATION TO SECRETARY OF STATE AND MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiffs, candidates for the offices of co-chair of the Democratic Town Committee for Wards 16 and 15, filed a three-count claim on February 13, 2004, alleging the defendants, Ronald Smith, the New Haven Town Clerk and Sally Brown, the Deputy Town Clerk, caused the plaintiffs irreparable injury when Brown erroneously informed them on or about January 30, 2004, by way of telephone, that their names would be placed on ballot levers 2B and 3B for the Democratic Party primary. In accordance with state election laws, the primary was scheduled for Tuesday, March 2, 2004.
A hearing was held before this court on April 2, 2004, where plaintiffs and the defendants stipulated and agreed that the Plaintiffs Franklin and Osorio-Fuentes were originally designated ballot levers 2B and 3B on the voting machines in Ward 16, and plaintiff Lopez was designated lever 2B in Ward 15. On or about February 2, 2004, the Town Clerk's Office for New Haven issued a written publication confirming the plaintiffs' ballot positions. The plaintiffs allege that in reliance upon Brown's verbal representations, they printed and distributed campaign literature using these ballot lever designations. They also campaigned in their respective Wards, and in doing so, they informed prospective voters of these ballot lever designations.
It was further agreed that on or about February 8, 2004, defendant Brown verbally informed the plaintiffs of a mistake in these ballot lever designations. She told the plaintiffs that the ballot lever designations previously assigned to the plaintiffs were now to be assigned to their opponents in the primary. Plaintiffs Franklin and Osorio-Fuentes would now have their names placed on ballot levers 2C and 3C respectively in Ward 16, and plaintiff Lopez's name would now be placed on ballot lever 2C on the voting machines in Ward 15. On February 9, 2004, Brown in her capacity as Deputy Town Clerk forwarded letters to the defendants informing them of these ballot lever designation changes. Thereafter, on February 13, 2004, the plaintiffs filed the present action.
Count One claims that the actions taken by defendant Brown were intentional and constitute extreme misconduct in Brown's official capacity as Deputy Town Clerk. They claim that these actions violate General Statute § 9-363, which prohibits the circulation of misleading instructions to voters, and that Brown's actions "will have the effect of causing the plaintiffs to lose the [primary] election due to voter confusion, which was caused by the switch in lever numbers." The plaintiffs argue that Brown's actions gave them less than 18 days to meaningfully educate the voters regarding the new ballot lever designations.
Count Two of the plaintiff's complaint alleges that Brown's actions, taken under the auspices of the New Haven Town Clerk's Office, constitute a state action, which must be accompanied by due process protections. Thus, the plaintiffs were not accorded any such protections as guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions, more specifically, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, as enforced through United States Code 42 Sec. 1983. Count Three claims an infringement on voters' ability to vote for the candidate of their choice.
The plaintiffs in their complaint requested temporary and permanent injunctive relief prohibiting the defendants Smith and Brown from changing the plaintiffs' previously designated ballot lever positions; damages; costs and attorneys fees pursuant to United States Code 42 Sec. 1988; and equitable relief.
On February 17, 2004, the court (Pittman, J.) signed an order to show cause and scheduled the matter for February 23, 2004. The court further ordered the plaintiffs to make service on the defendants on or before February 18, 2004. The court notes that the defendants Smith and Brown were the only named defendants and that none of the opposing candidates for co-chairs of the Democratic Town Committee were named as defendants; nor were they ordered to be served by the court. A review of the marshal's return of service in the court's file reveals that defendants Brown and Smith were served on February 18, 2004.
On February 23, 2004, the parties appeared in court pursuant to the court's scheduling of the show cause hearing. The parties, on that date, informed the court that they had resolved the matter and that they had reached a settlement. They additionally informed the court that the action would be withdrawn. The court inquired if the plaintiffs were seeking any relief from the court and was informed that they were not seeking further action by the court. The terms of the settlement were not, however, revealed to the court at the hearing on February 23, 2004.
A review of the evidence submitted at the present hearing reveals that the parties had reached an agreement, wherein, all voters in Ward 15 and Ward 16 eligible to vote in the March 2, 2004 Democratic party primary would receive a letter from the Town Clerk's Office, prior to the primary election, notifying them of the mistaken ballot lever designations. The letter would also notify the voters of the correct ballot lever designations for the Town Committee election. The Town Clerk prepared a first draft of the letter on February 23, 2004 and transmitted the draft copy to the plaintiffs' attorney. On February 25, 2004, the defendants' attorney, by way of fax transmission, notified plaintiffs' counsel that she had not received the plaintiffs' response to this draft copy and urged plaintiffs' counsel to respond, "as time is running short." Defendants' counsel further stated that the letter would not be sent to the voters until the defendants received the releases and withdrawal of action from the plaintiffs, as previously agreed. Defendants' counsel asked plaintiffs' counsel for any proposed changes to the draft letter dated February 23, 2004. Plaintiffs' counsel responded on February 25, 2004, by sending the plaintiffs' draft of the proposed letter to defendants' counsel by fax transmission. On February 26, 2004, defendants' counsel notified plaintiffs' counsel in writing that the plaintiff's draft version of the letter to the voters was unacceptable for various reasons, and that the Town Clerk's Office would proceed to send out letters to the voters, which incorporated some, but not all of the demanded changes requested by the plaintiffs. Defendants' counsel repeated her demand that the plaintiffs deliver their signed releases and a withdrawal of action form to the defendants, in accordance with the settlement agreement of the parties.
Exhibits offered by the plaintiffs at the present hearing establish that on Friday, February 27, 2004, and Saturday, February 28, 2004, the defendants mailed letters to the affected voters in Wards 15 and 16, by use of the United States Postal Service, notifying them of the error in the initial ballot lever designations and setting forth the corrected lever designations. The letter by its terms stated that it "is intended to resolve complaints made by some candidates that those errors could cause confusion among voters." The letter clearly states that several candidates were originally listed on the wrong line, and it clearly sets forth the correct designations for the March 2, 2004, Town Committee election.
The Democratic Party Town Committee primary election was held on March 2, 2004, as scheduled. Each of the named plaintiffs were defeated by large margins ranging from 100 to 165 votes. The election results were certified by the Head Moderator, Jonathan Einhorn on March 2, 2004, and were transmitted to the Election Office at the Secretary of State's Office by fax transmission at 3:20 p.m. on Wednesday, March 3, 2004.
As mentioned herein, the plaintiffs filed their present action on February 13, 2004, requesting that the court enjoin the defendants from changing the previously designated ballot lever positions.
A hearing on the plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief was scheduled for Monday, February 23, 2004, which was eight days before the March 2, 2004, primary date. The plaintiffs' action named the City Clerk Smith and the Deputy City Clerk Brown as defendants. The plaintiffs did not name the opposing candidates as parties; nor were the opposing candidates, the Secretary of State or the State Elections Enforcement Commission served or notified in any manner as to the pending action or the show cause hearing, which was scheduled by the court for February 23, 2004. On February 23, 2004, the date of the hearing to show cause, the court was notified by the parties that they had settled their dispute, and no longer needed the court's assistance.
Thereafter, on March 10, 2004, eight days following the primary election, the plaintiffs filed a "Motion for Injunction" seeking to prohibit the certification of the election results from March 2, 2004. The plaintiffs did not include an order to show cause request in this motion, and the matter, therefore, appeared on the short calendar on March 29, 2004. The court then ordered a hearing for Friday, April 2, 2004, and further ordered that a copy of the plaintiff's writ, summons, complaint, applications for injunctive relief and "supporting memoranda as on file" be served on the successful candidates in the March 2, 2004, primary election, as well as, the Secretary of State and the State Elections Enforcement Commission. The orders of notice by the court were pursuant to the procedural requirements of General Statutes § 9-329a, as amended by Public Act 03-241 because on March 16, 2004, the plaintiffs had filed a pleading titled "Challenge to Election Pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-329a." This pleading also requested that the court issue injunctive relief prohibiting the certification of the election results for the reason that the results were "contaminated by the unlawful conduct" as alleged in the complaint.
The standard for the issuance of a temporary injunction is well settled. The principal purpose of temporary injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be determined after a full hearing on the merits. Olcott v. Pendleton, 128 Conn. 292, 295 (1941); Bridgeport Herald v. Lower Fairfield County Newsdealers, Inc. The issuance of an injunction "is the exercise of an extraordinary power . . ." Scoville v. Ronalter, 162 Conn. 67, 74 (1971). "An injunction is a harsh remedy." Leo Foundation v. Cabelus, 151 Conn. 655, 657 (1964).
"The requirements generally for a temporary injunction are (1) the establishment of a legal right, which involves a likelihood of success on the merits and the lack of adequate remedy at law and (2) the imminence of substantial and irreparable injury to the plaintiff, considered with the weighing of the results on both parties. Conn. Assn. Of Clinical Laboratories v. Conn. Blue Cross, Inc., 31 Conn. Sup. 110, 113 (1973). In deciding whether to grant or dissolve a temporary injunction the court must balance the results which may be caused to one party or the other. Olcott v. Pendleton, supra at 295; Kwiatkowski v. Johnson, No. CV93 0307032S (Oct. 27, 1993) 10 Conn.L.Rptr. 311, 1993 Ct. Sup. 8798, 8798-99." Annex Young Men's Association, Inc. v. City of New Haven, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. CV03 0472728 (February 14, 2003) (Munro, J.).
Count One of the plaintiffs' complaint claim that the actions taken by defendant Brown were intentional and constitute extreme misconduct in Brown's official capacity as Deputy Town Clerk and that Brown's actions violated General Statute § 9-363. General Statutes § 9-363 reads as follows:
Any person who, with intent to defraud any elector of his vote or cause any elector to lose his vote or any part thereof, gives in any way, or prints, writes or circulates, or causes to be written, printed or circulated, any improper, false, misleading or incorrect instructions or advice or suggestions as to the manner of voting on any machine, the following of which or any part of which would cause any elector to lose his vote or any part thereof, or would cause any elector to fail in whole or in part to register or record the same on the machine for the candidates of his choice, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or be imprisoned not more than five years or be both fined and imprisoned.
The plaintiffs claim that Brown's actions "will have the effect of causing the plaintiffs to lose the [primary] election due to voter confusion, which was caused by the switch in lever numbers." The plaintiffs argue that Brown's actions gave them less than 18 days to meaningfully educate the voters regarding the new ballot lever designations.
The plaintiffs have provided no evidence to show any intent by the defendants to defraud any elector of his or her vote or to cause any elector to lose his or her vote by circulating improper, false, misleading or incorrect voting instructions. "To prevail under Section 9-329a of the General Statutes the Court may order a new primary if he finds that but for the error in the ruling of the election official, any mistake in the count of the votes or any violation of said sections, the result of such primary might have been different and he is unable to determine the result of such primary." Zevin v. Board of Canvassers, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, No. 555078 (Nov. 2, 1995) (Langenbach, J.), 15 CLR 358. The usual civil standard of preponderance of the evidence is the appropriate burden of persuasion applicable to an action under General Statutes § 9-329a. In Re Election for Second Congressional District, 231 Conn. 602, 629 n. 25, 653 A.2d 79 (1995).
The placement of candidates on a ballot is governed by General Statutes § 9-437(a) which provides in relevant part:
Sec. 9-437(a) was repealed by P.A. 03-241 Sec. 44. Subsection (a) shown above reflects the new provisions of' P.A. 03-241, which are applicable to primaries and elections held on or after January 1, 2004.
(a) . . . On the first horizontal line, below the designation of the office or position in each column, shall be placed the name of the party-endorsed candidate for such office or position, such name to be marked with an asterisk; provided, where more than one person may be voted for for any office or position, the names of the party-endorsed candidates shall be arranged in alphabetical order from left to right under the appropriate office or position designation and shall continue, if necessary, from left to right on the next lower line or lines. In the case of no party endorsement there shall be inserted the designation "no party endorsement" at the head of the vertical column, immediately beneath the designation of the office or position. On the horizontal lines below the line for party-endorsed candidates shall be placed, in the appropriate columns, the names of all other candidates as hereinafter provided.
It is clear that when there is no party-endorsed candidate in an election, as was the case in the Democratic Town Committee primary of March 2, 2004, the horizontal line on the ballot reserved for party-endorsed candidates on the ballot must remain blank. The subsequent re-assignment of candidates to lines below the party-endorsed line by defendant Brown was proper and was necessary to comply with § 9-437. It is unfortunate that defendant Brown made her original error on February 2, 2004, but this error was timely corrected six days later on February 8, 2004, more than three weeks prior to the March 2, 2004 primary election. Additionally, the defendants, pursuant to an agreement with the plaintiffs, mailed notices by way of the United States Postal Service to the eligible voters in Wards 15 and 16 informing them of the revised ballot positions. The plaintiffs at the hearing conducted by this court also concede that sample ballots showing the correct ballot positions were available at all polling places in Ward 15 and 16 on March 2, 2004, the date of the primary election. The actions of the defendants were in conformance with the law, and the court determines that it had no effect on the election results. See Penn v. Irizarry, 220 Conn. 682, 600 A.2d 1024 (1991).
P.A. 03-6 June 30 Special Session provides
Sec. 102. Subsection (j) of section 9-437 of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective January 1, 2004):
(j) All ballot labels used at a primary shall be prepared by the clerk of the municipality in which such primary is held and shall be printed at the expense of the municipality. Each municipality shall provide for all polling places:
(1) At least forty-eight hours before the primary, such clerk shall have sample ballot labels for general distribution, which [sample labels] shall be arranged in the form of a diagram showing the entire front of the voting machine as it will appear after the official ballot labels are arranged for voting on the day of the primary or that portion thereof that will contain the offices or positions and names of candidates to be voted upon. Each such sample ballot label shall also include printed instructions approved by the Secretary of the State concerning the use of the voting machine and information concerning the date of the primary and the hours during which polling places will be open. Such clerk shall have available for distribution such number of sample ballot labels as he deems advisable, but in no event less than three which shall be posted inside the polling place so as to be visible to those within the polling place during the whole day of the primary. At least one of such sample ballot labels shall be posted so as to be visible to an elector being instructed on the demonstrator or spare voting machine, pursuant to section 9-260. If paper ballots are used in any primary, such sample paper ballots shall be overprinted with the word "Sample."
The certified election vote show the following totals for the Town Committee
Ward 15 Ward 16 Frank R. Redente 292 Catalina Acevedo 258 Maria Reyes Rivera 302 Midaglia Castro 297 Luz S. Lopez (plaintiff) 127 Elba Franklin (plaintiff) 158 Menen Osorio-Fuentes (plaintiff) 156
"[E]lection results should be invalidated only with `reluctance,' and where the will of the electorate cannot be ascertained," Wrinn v. Dunleavy, 186 Conn. 125, 141-42, 440 A.2d 261 (1982), Penn v. Irizarry, supra, 220 Conn. 687 n. 5. "Unless a ballot comes clearly within the prohibition of some statute it should be counted, if from it the wish or will of the voter can be ascertained.' Dombkowski v. Messier, 164 Conn. 204, 207, 319 A.2d 373 (1972); Hurlbut v. Lemelin, CT Page 5962 155 Conn. 68, 77, 230 A.2d 36 (1967); Scully v. Westport, 145 Conn. 648, 651-52, 145 A.2d 742 (1958); State v. Bossa, 69 Conn. 335, 341, 37 A. 977 (1897)." Wrinn v. Dunleavy, supra, 186 Conn. 141-42. The plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of proof for a temporary injunction, which would be that they are likely to succeed, and they certainly could not meet the burden of proof of a preponderance of evidence, which is necessary to prevail on an action brought pursuant to § 9-329a.
The court also finds that the sole remedy for the plaintiffs to contest an action by an election official is the remedies provided in General Statues § 9-329a. The plaintiffs' complaint filed on February 13, 2004 lists only § 9-363 as the basis of their claim for injunctive relief. General Statutes § 9-363 provides for a fine and imprisonment for a violation of its terms and not civil remedies, such as injunctive relief. The court had no jurisdiction to consider injunctive relief on February 25, 2004. The fact that the plaintiffs, along with the defendants informed the court that the matter was settled and would be withdrawn, in itself, did not confer jurisdiction on the court.
The plaintiffs invoked the provisions of § 9-329a for the first time in their pleading filed March 16, 2004 and titled "Challenge to Election." In that pleading the plaintiffs requested that the court issue injunctive relief prohibiting the defendants from certifying the election results of the elections conducted in Wards 15 and 16 on March 2, 2004, due to the defendant's violation of General Statutes § 9-363. This pleading was not identified as an amendment to the complaint. The plaintiffs, despite their filing of March 16, 2004, cannot amend their underlying § 9-363 complaint to transform it to a § 9-329a action. Additionally in this case the certified winning members of the Democratic Town Committee have served since March 8, 2004 and have performed their duties, since that date. The plaintiffs were in error in proceeding by way of a civil action alleging a violation of § 9-363 and then waiting until March 16, 2004 before notifying the court and the defendants that they now wished to rely upon § 9-329a. An action pursuant to § 9-329a is a separate statutory action and was the sole remedy available to the plaintiffs. The provisions of § 9-329a do not cover alleged violations of § 9-363, and the remedies provided in § 9-329a do not include injunctive relief. The court, therefore, is without jurisdiction to adjudicate the underlying merits or lack thereof, of the plaintiffs' action.
General Statutes § 9-329a provides an expedited procedure for handling complaints regarding pending or completed primaries and reads in relevant part as follows:
(a) Any (1) elector or candidate aggrieved by a ruling of an election official in connection with any primary held pursuant to (A) section 9-423, as amended by this act; [ 9-424,] 9-425 or 9-464, or (B) [A] a special act may bring his complaint to any judge of the Superior Court for appropriate action. In any action brought pursuant to the provisions of this section, the complainant shall send a copy of the complaint by first-class mail, or deliver a copy of the complaint by hand, to the State Elections Enforcement Commission. If such complaint is made prior to such primary such judge shall proceed expeditiously to render judgment on the complaint and shall cause notice of the hearing to be given to the Secretary of the State and the State Elections Enforcement Commission. If such complaint is made subsequent to such primary it shall be brought, within fourteen days after such primary, to any judge of the Superior Court.
(b) Such judge shall forthwith order a hearing to be held upon such complaint upon a day not more than five nor less than three days after the making of such order, and shall cause notice of not less than three days to be given to any candidate or candidates in any way directly affected by the decision upon such hearing, to such election official, to the Secretary of the State, the State Elections Enforcement Commission and to any other person or persons, whom such judge deems proper parties thereto, of the time and place of the hearing upon such complaint. Such judge shall, on the day fixed for such hearing, and without delay, proceed to hear the parties and determine the result. If, after hearing, sufficient reason is shown, such judge may order any voting machines to be unlocked or any ballot boxes to be opened and a recount of the votes cast, including absentee ballots, to be made. Such judge shall thereupon, if he finds any error in the ruling of the election official, any mistake in the count of the votes or any violation of said sections, certify the result of his finding or decision to the Secretary of the State before the tenth day following the conclusion of the hearing. Such judge may (1) determine the result of such primary; (2) order a change in the existing primary schedule; or (3) order a new primary if he finds that but for the error in the ruling of the election official, any mistake in the count of the votes or any violation of said sections, the result of such primary might have been different and he is unable to determine the result of such primary.
(c) The certification by the judge of his finding or decision shall be final and conclusive upon all questions relating to errors in the ruling of such election official, to the correctness of such count, and, for the purposes of this section only, such alleged violations, and shall operate to correct any returns or certificates filed by the election officials, unless the same is appealed from as provided in section 9-325. In the event a new primary is held pursuant to such Superior Court order, the result of such new primary shall be final and conclusive unless a complaint is brought pursuant to this section. The clerk of the court shall forthwith transmit a copy of such findings and order to the Secretary of the State.
The plaintiffs, in filing their "Challenge to Election" pleading on March 16, 2004, notifying the court for the first time of their reliance on § 9-329a, have failed to comply with the requirements of § 9-329a. The plaintiffs argue that the procedural requirements of § 9-329a are not applicable to the initial civil suit complaining of a violation of § 9-363 or their motion for injunction, dated March 9, 2004, and that any procedural deficiencies in their § 9-329a action were cured by the court's (Pittman, J.) orders of March 29, 2004. On March 29, 2004, the court ordered a show cause hearing for April 2, 2004, and further ordered that the plaintiffs serve a copy of the court's order, the writ summons and complaint, the applications for injunctive relief and supporting memoranda "as on file," on the Secretary of State, the Elections Enforcement Commission and the four candidates who were successful in the March 2, 2004, primary election in an attempt to comply with § 9-329a(b). However, the court had no authority to entertain a remedy of injunctive relief as requested by the plaintiffs.
On March 29, 2004, the court ordered a show cause hearing for April 2, 2004, and further ordered that the plaintiffs serve a copy of the court's order, the writ summons and complaint, the applications for injunctive relief and supporting memoranda "as on file," on the Secretary of State, the Elections Enforcement Commission and the four candidates who were successful in the March 2, 2004, primary election in an attempt to comply with § 9-329a(b).
The court must approach the questions raised regarding the interpretation of statutes according to the well-established principles of statutory construction designed to further the fundamental objective of ascertaining and giving effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. State v. Kozlowski, 199 Conn. 667, 673, 509 A.2d 20 (1986). The court must look to the words of the statute; to the legislative history; the circumstances surrounding its enactment; to the legislative policy it was designed to implement; and to its relationship to existing legislation and any common-law principles governing the same subject matter. Dart Bogue Co. v. Slosberg, 202 Conn. 566, 572, 522 A.2d 763 (1987); Texaco Refining Marketing Co. v. Commissioner, 202 Conn. 583, 589, 522 A.2d 771 (1987); State v. Jason B., 248 Conn. 543, 729 A.2d 760 (1999).
With any issue of statutory interpretation, our initial guide is the language of the statute itself. Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418, 430-32, 650 A.2d 557 (1994). If its language in drafting and enacting a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for alteration of the legislative decision by the judicial branch. Ambriose v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., 226 Conn. 757, 764-65 (1993). It is assumed that the words themselves express the intent of the legislature. Mazur v. Blum, 184 Conn. 116, 118-19, 441 A.2d 65 (1981). "A corollary of the above rule of construction is that the intent of the legislature is to be found not in what the legislature meant to say, but in the meaning of what it did say." Burnham v. Administrator, 184 Conn. 317, 325, 439 A.2d 1008 (1981).
It is clear from the language of the statute that an action pursuant to § 9-329a was the sole remedy available to the plaintiffs and that strict compliance with the statute was necessary. The plaintiff cannot circumvent the requirements of proceeding by way of § 9-329a, by attempting to convert an improper civil action under § 9-363, into a challenge to a primary election under § 9-329a. General Statutes § 9-329a is the statutory remedy for the plaintiffs and is a separate and independent action, with specific procedural requirements and unique remedies, which do not include injunctive relief or awards of damages. The plaintiffs' matter is not properly before the court, and the court lacks jurisdiction in this matter. Nonetheless, the court finds that the plaintiffs have not been aggrieved by a ruling of the defendant election officials and, therefore, any action properly brought under § 9-329a would also fail.
CONCLUSION
The court hereby finds that the defendants have not violated § 9-363 by re-designating the ballot positions of all of the candidates, defendants included. The plaintiffs have failed to sustain their burden of proof for temporary injunctive relief, and injunctive relief is denied. Furthermore, neither General Statutes § 9-363 or § 9-329a provide for an award of damages or injunctive relief.
The court additionally finds that it has no subject matter jurisdiction, as the plaintiffs have failed to properly bring an action pursuant to § 9-329a. "[T]he question of subject matter jurisdiction, because it addresses the basic competency of the court, can be raised by any of the parties, or by the court sua sponte, at any time . . . Moreover, [t]he parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court, either by waiver or by consent." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) ABC, LLC v. State Ethics Commission, 264 Conn. 812, 822-23, 826 A.2d 1077 (2003); quoting, Webster Bank v. Webster Bank v. Zak, 259 Conn. 766, 774, 792 A.2d 66 (2002).
Accordingly, the court, sua sponte, orders that the plaintiffs' action be dismissed, and further certifies the results of the New Haven Democratic Town Committee Primary Election held on March 2, 2004 in Wards 15 and 16 to the Office of the Secretary of State.
The Court
By Arnold, J.