The Alexanders counter that the language in the deed demonstrates the intent for the easement to be assignable and appurtenant. They assert that the language in their deed is similar to the language in the deed at issue in Osborn v. Tennison, 2014 Ark.App. 175, 434 S.W.3d 1. In Osborn, the conveyance to Tennison included an easement "for ingress and egress" across the Osborns' property and specified that the easement was "for the exclusive use of Grantors and Grantees only."

When interpreting a deed, the court gives primary consideration to the intent of the grantor. Osborn v. Tennison, 2014 Ark. App. 175, 434 S.W.3d 1. When the court is called on to construe a deed, we will examine a deed from its four corners for the purpose of ascertaining that intent from the language employed.