Opinion
Gorsuch, Kirgis, Campbell, Walker & Grover, Richard B. Harvey, Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.
Carol Van Pelt, Lakewood, for defendant-appellant.
SMITH, Judge.
Plaintiff obtained a divorce from defendant on June 22, 1970. After conducting a hearing upon final orders, the court, on May 12, 1971, awarded custody of the children to plaintiff and divided the property. From this order defendant appeals. We affirm.
Defendant initially contends that an inequitable division of the assets of the parties was made contrary to the requirements of Colorado law. Cited in support of this contention are Kraus v. Kraus, 159 Colo. 331, 411 P.2d 240; Liggett v. Liggett, 152 Colo. 110, 380 P.2d 673; and Nunemacher v. Nunemacher, 132 Colo. 300, 287 P.2d 662. While an equitable division of the assets of the parties is required, the cases defendant cites also acknowledge the complexities of property division and the need for a case-by-case determination of what constitutes an equitable division.
Plaintiff observes that the controlling statute, C.R.S.1963, 46--1--5(2), provides that the court may divide the property 'as the circumstances of the case may warrant' and 'in such proportions as may be fair and equitable.' The application of this standard is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. The exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed where it is supported by competent evidence and there is no abuse of that discretion. Moats v. Moate, 168 Colo. 120, 450 P.2d 64. While the division must be equitable, it need not be equal. See Thompson v. Thompson 30 Colo.App. 57, 489 P.2d 1062. The division of the property determined in this case was justified by the evidence and circumstances, and we will not disturb it.
Defendant seeks to assert that certain testimony on direct examination was improper and an exhibit offered which was based thereon was erroneously admitted. Yet, at trial, defendant did not object either to the testimony or to the admission of the exhibit and thereby waived the assertion of error concerning these matters. Adler v. Adler, 167 Colo. 145, 445 P.2d 906.
Defendant's final argument is that the court abused its discretion by not making detailed findings of fact concerning the value of the real property in question, the amount of savings in a retirement plan, the value of each item of personal property, the financial condition of the parties, and the contribution of the parties. No authority is cited for this argument. C.R.C.P. 52(a) requires the court, in the absence of a jury to 'find the facts specially.' There is compliance with this rule if the court makes findings on the material and ultimate facts. Lininger v. Lininger, 138 Colo. 338, 333 P.2d 625. The material issue here was not whether the property division was equal, but whether it was equitable. The findings of fact of the court resolve the factual issues raised by the evidence presented at trial. There was no need for the court to have determined a value for each item of property in order to insure that each party was awarded exactly one-half of the property. It was essential that the court find, as it did, the value of the estate to be divided, who had the financial burden of custody of the children, and who had the burden of the debts of the marriage. Traynor v. Traynor, 146 Colo. 70, 360 P.2d 431. From the findings and conclusions we are able to determine the basis of the trial court's decision, and this is the purpose of requiring such findings. Twin Lakes Reservoir & Canal Co. v. Bond, 156 Colo. 433, 399 P.2d 793. Competent evidence supports the trial court's findings and the conclusions drawn therefrom. We find no abuse of discretion.
Order affirmed.
DWYER and PIERCE, JJ., concur.