Based upon this guideline's language, McKenzie has the burden to establish these circumstances. See Orvedal v. Orvedal, 2003 ND 145, ¶ 12, 669 N.W.2d 89 (holding district court did not err in finding obligor had failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant a finding that amounts available under subdivision b or c of subsection 3 were unavailable in the community). Although the district court concluded "[n]o employment opportunities exist for a physician without a license," the record lacks evidence showing any "prevailing gross earnings in the community" with respect to someone with McKenzie's work history and occupational qualifications.
See Matter of Curtiss A. Hogen Tr. B, 2020 ND 71, ¶ 14, 940 N.W.2d 635 ("Clarification of a judgment is appropriate when the judgment fails to specify some particulars, and uncertainties in the decree arise from subsequent events." (quoting Hoverson v. Hoverson, 2017 ND 27, ¶ 6, 889 N.W.2d 858)); Orvedal v. Orvedal, 2003 ND 145, ¶ 4, 669 N.W.2d 89 ("When a judgment is vague, uncertain, or ambiguous, the court may clarify the judgment.").
The statewide average earning reports published by Job Service of North Dakota are sufficient. Schrodt, at ¶ 24; see also Verhey v. McKenzie, 2009 ND 35, ¶ 13, 763 N.W.2d 113 (citing Orvedal v. Orvedal, 2003 ND 145, ¶ 12, 669 N.W.2d 89).
A district court may clarify a judgment that is vague, uncertain, or ambiguous. Orvedal v. Orvedal , 2003 ND 145, ¶ 4, 669 N.W.2d 89. This Court has said, "When a divorce decree fails to specify some particulars and uncertainties in the decree arise from subsequent events, clarification of the decree is often appropriate."
We have said a district court may clarify a divorce judgment when the judgment is "vague, uncertain, or ambiguous" and clarification is often appropriate when the judgment "fails to specify some particulars[,] and uncertainties in the decree arise from subsequent events." Orvedal v. Orvedal , 2003 ND 145, ¶ 4, 669 N.W.2d 89 ; see also Greenwood v. Greenwood , 1999 ND 126, ¶ 8, 596 N.W.2d 317 (" ‘If the same trial judge clarifies an original judgment, we afford the judge’s clarification considerable deference.’ " (quoting Dakutak v. Dakutak , 1997 ND 76, ¶ 6, 562 N.W.2d 750 ) ).
We have said a district court may clarify a divorce judgment when the judgment is ‘vague, uncertain, or ambiguous’ and clarification is often appropriate when the judgment ‘fails to specify some particulars[,] and uncertainties in the decree arise from subsequent events.’ Orvedal v. Orvedal , 2003 ND 145, ¶ 4, 669 N.W.2d 89 ; see also Greenwood v. Greenwood , 1999 ND 126, ¶ 8, 596 N.W.2d 317 (" ‘If the same trial judge clarifies an original judgment, we afford the judge’s clarification considerable deference.’ " (quoting Dakutak v. Dakutak , 1997 ND 76, ¶ 6, 562 N.W.2d 750 ) ). Nonetheless, in this case, although neither party moved to amend the divorce judgment, the court amended rather than clarified, the judgment, and the hearing notice and hearing itself involved the parties’ competing motions for contempt sanctions under N.D.C.C. ch. 27-10."
[¶ 10] This Court has said that in cases of parenting-time disputes, a more structured judgment may be appropriate. See Seibold v. Leverington, 2013 ND 173, ¶ 21, 837 N.W.2d 342 (In case of an inability “to resolve these parties' potential disputes under the plan, either party may move the court to enter and clarify a parenting plan.”); Orvedal v. Orvedal, 2003 ND 145, ¶ 9, 669 N.W.2d 89 (“When the parties cannot cooperate in arranging visitation, we have recommended that the court enter a structured visitation schedule. Reinecke [v. Griffeth ], 533 N.W.2d [695,] 699 [ (N.D.1995) ].”).
We have said a district court may clarify a divorce judgment when the judgment is “vague, uncertain, or ambiguous” and clarification is often appropriate when the judgment “fails to specify some particulars[,] and uncertainties in the decree arise from subsequent events.” Orvedal v. Orvedal, 2003 ND 145, ¶ 4, 669 N.W.2d 89; see also Greenwood v. Greenwood, 1999 ND 126, ¶ 8, 596 N.W.2d 317 (“ ‘If the same trial judge clarifies an original judgment, we afford the judge's clarification considerable deference.’ ” (quoting Dakutak v. Dakutak, 1997 ND 76, ¶ 6, 562 N.W.2d 750)).
We give substantial deference to a district court's interpretation of its own judgment. See Orvedal v. Orvedal, 2003 ND 145, ¶ 5, 669 N.W.2d 89 (allowing district court considerable deference in clarifying its previously entered divorce judgment). An additional factor weighing in favor of opening the divorce decree is this case's procedural posture.
The moving party bears the burden of establishing that a significant change of circumstances has occurred since the prior visitation order and that it is in the best interests of the child to modify the order. See Orvedal v. Orvedal, 2003 ND 145, ¶ 7, 669 N.W.2d 89. Section 14-09-06.6, however, includes several provisions for parties seeking a custody modification that we have never required for a modification of visitation, including the requirement that the movant establish a prima facie case prior to entitlement of an evidentiary hearing.